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The aim of this thesis is to discuss the nature of
social phenomena, and to determine (with particular reference to
economics) the appropriate way to explain them. Many of the
contentions advanced rest largely upon the fact that social phenomena
can be investigated only by methods which respect their distinctive
character and status as social phenomena.
In chapter I it is argued that the most important
difference between the social and the natural sciences is that the
former have to employ intentional criteria to identify their
explananda-phenomena. Because human and societal phenomena are
intrinsically meaningful, the type of causation which prevails in
the social realm is fundamentally different from that which prevails
in the physical.
In chapter II the claim of Popper and Hayek that the
task of the social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences
of human actions is critically examined. Two examples of economic
explanation are given in order to show the importance of unintended
consequences, and to illustrate the general form explanations of
social phenomena (apart from those of single actions) should adopt.
In chapter III the contention that the social sciences
deal with inherently complex phenomena is examined and defended,
and the main implications of this contention for social analysis
are drawn. The extent to which social phenomena are in principle
predictable is discussed.
In chapter IV the structural properties of formal
scientific theories are briefly characterised, and then Friedman's
famous argument on the testability of economic theories is analysed
and rejected. The role within a scientific theory of statements
formulated with reference to idealisations of the phenomena being
studied, and the role within a social explanation of the 'principle
of rationality', are discussed.
In chapter V the central questions behind the
methodological individualism/methodological holism controversy are
brought to light. Provided that methodological individualism is
not construed as a reductionist or mechanistic principle, it can
successfully avoid the main objections of its detractors. It is
argued that the method of functional analysis in sociology (in
the form developed by Merton) is consistent with methodological
individualism. Finally, it is claimed that (apart from a few
minor exceptions) the principle of methodological individualism
does indeed recommend the appropriate way to explain societal
phenomena.
In chapter VI, the various strands of thought running
through the five preceding chapters are dravm together in a brief
summary of the most important points raised by this thesis.
iii.
PREFACE
This thesis assumes that the aim of science is to find
true explanations of whatever phenomena require explanation, and
seeks to show how the social sciences should proceed in order to
realise this goal. Of the two lengthy examples of social explanation
discussed in chapter II, I now consider the second to be somewhat out
of place in the present time of national economic difficulty. In
1973 a more pertinent illustration of purposive actions leading to a
societal repercussion not intended by the acting agents themselves,
is given by the phenomenon of hyper-inflation; we all desire to
maintain the purchasing power of our incomes, but in trying to
achieve this aim (and in trying to gain an increment sufficiently
large to offset expected price rises in the immediate future), our
actions have the actual result of worsening the very situation which
originally prompted us to act. However, while it would have been
of greater contemporary interest to examine the example of hyper¬
inflation rather than an example concerning demand deficiency, I
see no reason to detract what I assert near the end of the second
chapter; namely, that the 'paradox of thrift' phenomenon is one of
the finest examples, if not the finest example, known to the social
sciences of actions directed towards a particular end bringing about
a consequence utterly different from that intended by those whose
actions cause the phenomenon in question.
I would like to record my gratitude to my supervisors
whose help, advice and encouragement made it possible for me to write
this thesis. First, I wish to thank Professor W.H. Walsh (my main
supervisor) for his assistance throughout the period of my studies,
and in particular for his kindness in reading and criticising so
much of the material I produced during this time. Secondly, I wish
to thank Professor A.J. Youngson for giving me his comments on my
views concerning the basis and structure of economic theory.
I would like to thank also all those with whom I have
had discussions over the past three years, and who stimulated me to
think out a number of the points and arguments to be found in this
thesis; I wish particularly to acknowledge the debt I owe in this
iv.
respect to my colleague Mr L.B. Briskman (but I do not of course
claim that he agrees with everything in this.work). I must also
add that I have learnt much from my students, especially from those
in the present and two previous Logic and Philosophy of Science
classes upon whom I have tried out (in tutorials and lectures) many
of my ideas.
Notwithstanding the aid and guidance I received from
those I name above and from those I do not mention by name, I wish
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EXPLANATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS .
I EXPLANATION AND THE SCIENCES OF SOCIETY
(i) The Concept of Explanation
What constitutes an. explanation? The answer that has
dominated the philosophy of scientific method (or 'methodology*, as this
is usually called) in modern times can he found advocated in the
nineteenth century by John Stuart Hill (1806-1873) • 111 A System of
Logic he writes;
"An individual fact is said to be explained by
pointing out its cause, that is, by stating the law or
laws of causation of which its production is an instance.
.... and in a similar manner, a law of uniformity .... is
said to be explained when another law or laws are pointed
out, of which that law itself is but a. case, and from
which it could be deduced."
This account of the nature of explanation was re-developed by K.fi. Popper
2(now Sir Karl Popper ) in his Logik dor Forschxmg of 1934." However,
1. J.S. Kill, A System of Logic. 1843* (Longmans, London, edit., 1965),
p. 385 (i.e. Bk. Ill, Oh. XII, sec. l)
2. K.IL .Popper, The Lo,?lc of Scientific Discovery. (Hutchinson, London,
1959, edit., 1968), pp. 59-62 Also;
K.R. Popper, The Owen Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, (Routledge and
Kegan Paul, London, 1945, fifth edit., 1966), pp. 362-364
K.E. Popper, The poverty of Historiclsra, (iioutledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1957, second edit., 1966), pp. 122-124
although in recent times the discussion undoubtedly originated with
Popper , the best known expositions and elaborations of this view of
explanation ar® those presented by Carl G. Hempel in 1942, and by
1
Hempel jointly with Paul Oppenheira in 1948. Mention should also be
2 3
made of the lucid analyses of Ernest Hagel and E.B. Braithwaite ,
which too have become acknowledged classics within this area of thought.
Heapel and Oppenheim declare that a particular
occurrence (of an event of a certain sort) is explained if, and only if,
a statement describing it can be validly deduced from a set of
independently testable true statements composed of (a) statements of
1. C.G. Eempel, *The Function of General Laws in History* (1942), in
P. Gardiner (ed), Theories of History, (The Free Press, Glencoe,
Illinois, 1959)f pp. 344-356
C.G. Eempel and P. Oppenheira, 'The Logic of Explanation* (1948), in
H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of
Science, (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1953), pp. 319-352
Also:
C.G. Eempel, *Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation', in
H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, Vol. Ill, (University of Minnesota Pres3, Minneapolis,
1962)", pp. 98-169
C.G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and other Essays in
the Philosophy of Science, (The Free Press, New York, 1965, edit.,
1970), pp. 331-496
C.G. Eempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, (prentice-Hall,
Englewrood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp. 47-69
2. E. Hagel, The Structure of Science, (fioutledge find Kegan Paul,
London, 1961, edit., 1968), pp. 15-46
3* R.B,.Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1953~, edit., 1955), pp. 319-341
general laws, and (b) singular existential statements describing a
number of antecedent (or 'initial') spatio-temporal conditions,, The
statement describing the event to be explained is called the
'explanandum*, the event itself is called the •explanandum-event•, and
the set of premises is called the 'explanans*. Schematically, the form
of an explanation as envisaged by this theory can be laid out thus;^"
( 1^, I>2» ...... General Laws
Logical (
deduction ( C^, C^, Descriptions of
initial conditions




According to this account, the two most important characteristics of an
explanation are that (i) "the explanandum must be logically deducible
from the information contained in the explanans" , and that (ii) "the
explanans must contain general laws, and these must actually be
3
required for the derivation of the explanandum" . Because of the claim
that "the decisive requirement for every sound explanation (is) that it
4
subsume the explanandura under general laws" , this analysis of what
constitutes an explanation is known as the 'deductive-nomological theory
of explanation' .
The 1948 article advances a severely formalistic approach
to explanation. It lays down that unless one is able to deduce the
explanandum from explicitly exhibited statements of nonological laws and
1. C.G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 322
2. Ibid., p. 321
3. Ibid., p. 321
4. Ibid., p. 351 (italics added)
initial conditions, one has not explained the explanandum-event. (The
general laws with reference to which the event in question is explained,
are themselves to be explained by deduction from a formal theory. This
formal theory is in turn to be explained by deduction from a wider theory
and so on, if not ad infinitum then at least ad indefinitum,) For only
if these rigorous criteria of adequacy are fulfilled can it be shown
conclusively why a particular event occurred rather than did not occur,
An explanation that conforms to the deductive-nomological pattern can do
this because it rules out the possibility (since the explanandum is a
logical consequence of the explanans) that a statement describing the
non-occurrence of the explanandua-event could be consistent with the truth
of the explanans. Thus, on this account, sn event is either explained or
it is not. The former is the case only if the formal criteria of
adequacy are actually fulfilled.^ Therefore , if one advances a
1. Once the two main criteria of adequacy have been fulfilled another
feature of explanation (on this analysis) becomes discernible. This is
the ability of the general form of the explanation to provide the
structure for a prediction of the event in question - "an explanation
in not fully adequate unless its explanans, if taken account of in
time, could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon under
consideration". (C.G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 323) Thus,
according to the deductive-nomological theory, the explanatory and
predictive processes are formally symmetrical and hence, identical in
respect of logical status. The only difference between them pertains
to the temporal position of the inquirer: after the occurrence, to
deduce the explanandura is to provide an explanation; before the
occurrence, a prediction.
At the beginning of chapter III section (iii) of this discussion ths
ambiguities of the term 'prediction8 will be made plain. At the present
moment it is sufficient to say that if by 'prediction' one means
'hypothetical prediction8, then in most instances one's predictive
ability will be as good as the degree to which one's explanations of
the kind of events in question can conform to the formal structure
advocated by the deductive-nomological theory.
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candidate for an explanation and if, upon examination, this does not
measure up to the required stringent standard, then what in fact one is
offering is either, to use the terminology Bempel employs in his 1942
paper, a "pseudo explanation" or a mere "explanation sketch" .
However, in his later writings Heiapel abandons the ultra™
formal.!stic view that seemingly he held earlier, namely that !to deduce
an explananduss from an explanans containing at least one general law * is
what is properly meant by the phrase 'to give an explanation of an
occurrence' . He acknowledges, in clear contradistinction to the spirit
pervading the 1942 and 1943 articles, that one can have genuine
explanations in cases where the explanandum is not (and cannot be)
formally deduced from the explanans, but receives only informal or
practical support from it* In what he calls "probabilistic
2
explanations" of particular occurrences, statistical lavs take the
place of universal laws in the explanans. The general schema for an
explanation of this kind is as followsj
Informal ( p (K,S) » r ) Explanans
inference ( e is a case of R )
""
——— (r)
e is a case of S ) Explanandum
Here 'R* stands for the reference class of events, vhile stands
for the class of events whose members are those elements of the reference
class which possess some specified property. Tho statistical law asserts
1. C.G. Hempel, in P. Gardiner (ed), op. cit., p. 351
2. G.G. Henrpel, Philosophy of Natural Science, op. cit., p. 53ff
C.G. Herapel, Aspects, op. cit., p. 376f'f
that the probability (or liiait of the relative frequency) with which the
members of the given reference class have the specific property in an
infinite series of such events is of value r . The initial conditions
include the statement that a particular event e is a member of the
reference, class. Given the truth of the explanans, it can be inferred
informally that, with a likelihood of value r , e is a member of the
specific class of events.
It is obvious that with probabilistic explanations the truth
of the explanans is logically compatible with the falsity of the
explanandun whenever the value of r is other than 1 . Should it not
therefore be argued that probabilistic explanations, since they cannot
show why the occurrence of an event had to take place but only that it
was likely to do so, are not proper explanations but only 'explanation
sketches' ? Herapel faces up to this criticism, but his reply involves
a sharp modification of his earlier explications of the concept of
explanation. He writes:
"It is sometimes said that .... a probabilistic
account does not explain the occurrence of an event, since the
explanans does not logically preclude its nonoccurrence. But
the important, steadily expanding role that probabilistic laws
and theories play in science and its applications, makes
it preferable to view accounts based on such principles as
affording explanations as well, though of a less stringent kind
than those of deductive-nomological form." 1
As an instance of an explanation that conforms to the general schema for
a probabilistic explanation, Hempel gives a concrete example from the
physical sciences. This concerns the radioactive decay of a sample of
1. C.G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, op. cit., p. 68
With reference to the same point, Hempel writes elsewhere:
a) " .... this objection to the idea of probabilistic explanation
rests on a too restrictive conception of scientific explanation:
for there can be no question that statistical generalisations
are widely invoked for explanatory and predictive purposes in
such diverse fields as physics, genetics and sociology."
(Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ill, op.
cit., pp. 127-128)
b) " .... this objection to the idea of probabilistic explanation
rests on a too restrictive conception of scientific explanation:
for many important explanatory accounts offered by empirical
science make quite explicit use of statistical laws which,
in conjunction with the rest of the explanatory information
adduced, make the explanandum no more than highly probable."
(Aspecta of Scientific hxplanation, op. cit., p. 391)
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one milligram of polonium :
"Suppose that what is left of this initial amount after
3.05 minutes is found to have a mass that falls within the
interval from .499 to .501 milligrams. This finding can be
explained by the probabilistic law of decay for polonium"'
for that law, in combination with the principles of
mathematical probability, deductively implies that given
the huge number of atoms in a milligram of polonium1'5', the
probability of the specified outcome is overwhelmingly
large, so that in a particular case its occurrence may be
expected with 'practical certainty' ." ^
The point made forcibly here, is that genuine explanations may have a
form that departs somewhat froia the syntactic character of the strict
deductive-nonological structure. Herapel thus appears to urge that the
question of the form a particular explanation should adopt is not
something that can be decided just in the abstract, but that reference is
required as well to the land of explanandum-phenomenon in question. Prom
this important insight (made with reference, it should be noted, to
explanations within the sphere of the physical sciences), much of value
can be learnt as to the general nature of the process of explanation.
Whether a purported explanation of a specific occurrence
possesses the form that an adequate explanation of ma event of that sort
should possess, is a matter that cannot be determined just by
scrutinising the syntactic connections holding within the set of
statements offered as an explanation. This matter can only be settled
by showing that the structure of the candidate for an explanation is
appropriate as regards the phenomena within the domain of inquiry with
which one is concerned. But how does one show that a particular form of
1. C.G. Hempel, Philosophy of natural Science, op. cit., p. 68
explanation is indeed appropriate for events that take place within the
type of subjeet-raatter under investigation? Unhappily, this is not
something that one is ever able to demonstrate with certainty; in
practice, one can only obtain 'good assurance' that a particular
explanation has a general structure that is appropriate to the nature of
its subject-matter* A possible indication that this is so is given if
those seeking explanations as replies to their questions of inquiry
('Why did this happen?' , or 'Why is this the case?8) are to a
considerable extent in inter-subjective agreement, both among themselves
and with the person from whoa they request the giving of explanations,
as regards what metaphysical (i.e. basic or fundamental) presuppositions
are true of the phenomena comprising the subject-matter in question. A
second possible indication that on© is in fact using an appropriate mode
of inquiry, is given if one's actual investigations succeed in producing
fruitful explanatory accounts - but here it needs to be recognised that
how the terra 8fruitful8 is to be understood in this context may itself
be a contentious affair. Nevertheless, although it is the case that
assurance concerning the formal adequacy of any given explanation is
either relative to the extent of agreement upon 8fundamentals8 in the
human context of its deliverance, or is dependent upon the partially
pragmatic criterion of research •success', we shall here assume that it
is hardly open to dispute that many explanations possessing formal
structures that are truly appropriate to the kind of phenomena with which
they are concerned, are provided by both the natural and social sciences.
In the diverse and heterogeneous body of disciplines known
as the natural sciences - physics, chemistry, zoology, taxonomic
botany, geology, etc. and their many offshoots and technological
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applications - one is dealing with, subject-matters that contain,
purely physical (i.e. non-conscious and non-purposive) phenomena.^"
Within the natural sciences, it is a basic metaphysical presupposition
that the objects and processes comprising the subject-matters are non-
sentient and purposively 'inert*, that is, they cannot be persuaded,
reasoned with or treated in the way one treats deliberative agents. If
one's aim is to explain the occurrence of (rather than merely to describe
and classify) such phenomena, then it is methodologically appropriate
to understand the question 'Why is this the case?' as meaning
•According to what (universal or probabilistic) nosological laws, and by
virtu© of what antecedent conditions does this phenomenon occur?' . As
far as the natural sciences are concerned, if the general question of
inquiry is taken to mean anything other than this, an inappropriate
form of explanation will result. In. the natural sciences, one explains
the occurrence of a phenomenon by bringing it under a nomological law
(or a number of theia). How stringent the syntactic connections holding
between the explanans and the explanandua need to b®, is something that
again depends on what particular sort of physical phenomenon is under
investigation.
1. Strictly, this statement should be qualified slightly. All branches
of biology are deesed (mistakenly?) to bo natural sciences, and yet
biologists, qua biologists, study, amongst other things, the behavioxiral
patterns of organisms many kinds of which are undeniably conscious and
whose behaviour is thus, supposedly, purposive to some degree. Therefore
one must say that when biologists investigate 'lower* creatures as
conscious beings living in animal 'societies', their methods must
resemble, to put this no stronger, the modes of inquiry employed by
social scientists, (what these methods are, will be discussed in due
course.)
11.
It is certainly the case that in some areas of the natural
sciences* notably Newtonian mechanics and classical thermodynamicsf one
can produce explanations that successfully instantiate the strict formal
structure demanded by the deductive-nomological theory. Explanations
within classical physics can reach the methodological 'ideal* of a
fully-fledged deductive-nomological explanation.^ But within the natural
sciences generally, tha formal structure of explanations obtainable
within classical physics should not be considered as paradigmatic. Areas
of natural science such as elementary particle physics and Darwinian
evolutionary theory (just to take two examples) have to use explanatory
structures that are significantly different. In particle physics, as is
well illustrated by Hezapel's analysis of the appropriate way to explain
tha radioactive disintegration of a sample of polonium , one has to
resort to a probabilistic (and thus non-deductive) form of nosological
explanation. In evolutionary theory, the nature of the subject-matter is
such that one cannot provide 'explanations of detail* , but only
*explanations of the principle1 upon which specific explananda-
phenomena are produced. This kind of explanation is used in cases
where on® is dealing with areas of 'complex' phenomena, and for this
reason 'explanations of the principle* do not show precisely why
particular events occur, but show instead that what dees occur falls
within a wide rang® of events not prohibited as empirically impossible
2
by the theory in use.
1. This topic will be discussed in chapter III.
2. Again, this question will be examined in chapter III.
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Even if one confines one's attention solely to the natural
sciences and to the explanation of purely physical phenomena, the
question of the formal manner in which an event should be explained
cannot be answered if one remains entirely preoccupied with matters of
syntactic structure; one can only decide what form a particular
explanation should adopt, once one possesses a notion (or guess, or
conjecture) as to the basic nature of the kind of subject-matter under
investigation. And if this is the case (as it seems to be) with
reference to just the various natural sciences, then it is surely a
fortiori true when one turns to exaraine the appropriate way to explain
occurrences lying within the distinctive field of actions and social
phenomena.
(ii) Teleologies! Explanation and Social Causation
What are known collectively as the 1 social sciences *,
consist of the individual disciplines of economics, sociology, social
anthropology, political science and their variants. Although these
are normally the only subjects which count as 'social sciences', it
does no harm to add to this group huraan psychology"'" and history. It
is to be recognised that this move may evoke vehement protest from both
psychologists and historians; however, because a large number of
methodological problems are common to both these two subjects and to the
1. For an analysis of the difference between human and physiological
psychology, see chapter V of this discussion.
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generally recognised social sciences, it is convenient to use the term
•social science* generically to cover all these disciplines together.
The social sciences (considered in this slightly wider fashion) differ
considerably among themselves in character, as do the natural sciences.
Some of the *internal* differences among the social sciences will be
discussed in the following section; meanwhile in this section, attention
will be directed at what the social sciences have in common, and what
unites them together and renders them a distinct body of subjects as
against the natural sciences.
It has already been stated that no analysis of the concept
of explanation can be concerned merely with questions of form, to the
exclusion of questions relating to substantive content; for questions of
form only arise vjhen. one possesses some notion of what sort of subject-
matter one is inquiring into. Since we have accepted that tbis is so,
we are therefore duty bound to state openly what basic presuppositions
need to be held if social scientific investigation is to make
headway.
Whatever else may be their particular concerns, all the
social sciences are involved, in some way or other, with explaining the
actions of rationally purposive agents^" pursuing their individual aims
1. It should be noted that if one is in a position to explain the action
of an individual agent, then Ipso facto one is able to explain the
action of an institution. To do this, is simply to explain the actions
of those individuals who are empowered or entitled to act in its name.
It will be argued in chapter V that although institutions undeniably
exist, they do not literally possess aims of their own. Since only
individuals can bo the operative causes of social change, all references
to the aims of institutions are merely metaphorical ways of referring to
the aims of the institutionalised individuals who represent or control
the institutions in question.
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within some societal or natural setting. The social sciences in dealing
with deliberative social actors, have 'objects' of study which belong,
to a different order from the inanimate and inexorably determined
phenomena which are the objects of study for the natural sciences; that
is to say, all genuine social investigations are predicated on the
fundamental presupposition that there is an absolutely unbridgeable
chasm between the human and social sciences (which are concerned with
meaningful actions and phenomena issuing from purposive agency) and the
natural sciences (which are concerned with phenomena falling within the
province of what is brought about wholly by nornic causation) . The
numerous implications of this very crucial assertion will dominate not
only the remainder of this chapter, but the entire discussion; the
assertion will be defended in many places, and, in particular, the third
section of the present chapter will argue that even those who overtly
contend that things such as consciousness, self-interpretation and
purposive agency are 'really' physical phenomena, cannot maintain this
position with consistency when they themselves undertake first-order
social inquiry.
Granted this fundamental conception of the nature of the
phenomena studied by the various human and social disciplines, if what is
referred to is a freely initiated action, then it is appropriate to
take the question. 'Why did this occur?1 as a request for a teleological
explanation of some sort. (As used within the present discussion, the
phrase 'teleological explanation' describes any explanation that makes
reference to an end or goal which is sought or aimed at.) Since there
are two ways (at least) of understanding the aforementioned question of
inquiry, there are corresponding to these, two different kinds of
teleological explanation that could be given as acceptable replies.
Which of these two kinds should be given on any particular occasion,
depends on which of the two interpretations the questioner has in mind.
The first sort of teleological explanation is given in
circumstances when 'Why did this action take place?' is understood as
meaning 'What aim or goal is the agent in question trying to achieve?' ,
and in which the inquirer assumes it reasonable to hold that whatever the
purpose may actually be, the agent considers that hie action is
necessary to bring it about. In such a situation, one successfully
explains the action by informing the inquirer of the agent's reason for
the performance of the action. (Here, the term 'reason' is used in the
evaluatively neutral sense of 'the intention in the mind of the agent',
find not in the justificatory sense of 'what the agent takes as his
warrant or entitlement to act' .) What can therefore be called a
1. A reason in the sense of what entitles an agent to act may refer
to one or other (or both together) of the following: (a) the agent's
belief that the goal to which bis action is directed is morally
praiseworthy, or (fa) the agent's belief that he is in possession of
good evidence that his action will bring about his intended goal,
whatever this may be. A reason in the justificatory sense of a warrant
for an action presupposes the existence of a reason in the sense of an
intention, but not vice versa.
16.
•rational explanation* explains an action by revealing the reason (i.e.
the intention) for which it was initiated, and hence to what goal it was
purposively directed.
The second, and more commonly encountered kind of
teleological explanation, is given when 'Why did this occur?' is taken
not as requesting the aim of an action, but a3 seeking the answer to
•Why was this action initiated to achieve that particular goal?' . In
this case, the explanatory reply should make it clear why the agent
acted one way and not another to achieve his chosen goal. Such an
explanation operates by showing that the action in question was the (or,
17.
was ail) ideally rational1 thing for the agent to have done in the
circumstances in which he found himself. One can call this kind of
teleological explanation a 'rationality explanation' . The name is
suitable because the general form of such an explanation employs a
principle that treats agents as idealisations of rational men. The
principle of rationality as employed by such an explanation, is the
empirical assumption that a human agent will always choose the most
technically efficient means (or, one of a number of equally efficient
means) open to him in his situational circumstances to bring about his
1. To talk about the rationality of an action is to venture into an
area bristling with philosophical problems. Does one mean the standards
of rationality as conceived by the social scientist, or the standards
of rationality as conceived by the acting agent in his own societal
situation? In the social sciences of contemporary society (i.e. much
of economics and sociology) this question does not pose a difficulty
because both the social scientist and the agents in the society under
investigation can easily reach agreement on what is a rational., and
what is an irrational, choice of means to a given goal or hierarchy of
given goals. Eowever, this question has to be faced in a serious way
by the social sciences dealing with primitive societies ^i.e. social
anthropology) and with societies of the past (i.e. history).
To deal with this problem one needs to distinguish the following:
subjective rationality, ideal rationality and objective rationality.
The first of these is possessed by a piece of behaviour if it contains
any element (no matter how small) of intentionality, that is if it is
planfully directed in some way (no matter how inappropriately) to the
achievement of a chosen goal. The last of these three is what is
rational according to the criteria of the observing social scientist.
Ideal rationality, situated on a movable point on a continuous scale
running between the other two, is attributed to an action if it
constitutes a means that is thought to be objectively appropriate
within the acting agent's own situational circumstances.
This topic will receive further treatment in chapter IV, section (iv).
18.
desired end (or hierarchy of ends) .
J




( - Agent X aims to achieve goal G in
situation S .
- Agent X is ideally rational .
- For an agent in X*s situation (and
with a full awareness of all the
scientific knowledge in X's culture)
the/an appropriate means to adopt to
achieve G, is course of action A .
Agent X initiates action A
Explanans
) Explanandum
One may wonder why here the explanandum is only *informally inferable*
rather than 'formally deducible* from the explanans. The reason is that
one wants to be able to establish the truth of the explanans without
having to refer to the occurrence of the explanandum-phenomenoa, i.e. one
wants the premises to be independently ascertainable. But if this
condition is fulfilled, then it is a logical possibility (although not
perhaps an empirical likelihood) that the explanmis may be ti*ue and yet
the explanandun false, because the agent may decide for no reason at all
not to initiate the action in question. Since it is conceivable that an
agent should so decide, unless one allows that it is possible for the
truth of the explanans to be logically consistent with the falsity of the
explanandura, the explanation harbours a petitio principii; part of the
evidence that is used to establish the truth of the explanans is the
occurrence of the explanandum-event itself.
1. The references and literature pertaining to this kind of explanatory
structure (and its modifications) ai-e to be found as footnotes in the
second half of chapter IV .
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Both, rational and rationality explanations of actions
involve reference to the intentions and intended goals of free agents.
In this present analysis, the exposition of the way both these kinds of
teleological explanation function, rests on the implicit suppositions
that (i) an intention to achieve a certain goal is something quite
distinct from the goal-directed action itself, and that (il) it is
possible to discover the details of an agent's intention on a specific
occasion, without having to have knowledge of how he in fact does act
at that time. A good way of investigating these two assumptions is to
seek an answer to the question 'Are intentions (partial) causes^ of
actions, and can they be ascertained as such in particular instances?' .
It should be obvious that an affirmative answer to this, can only be
given if suppositions (i) and (ii) above are in fact correct.
The thesis that intentions can be, and indeed often are,
causes of actions has been challenged by many philosophers, one of the
best known and most recent of whom is Abraham I. Helden . He argues
that the relationship between a motivating aim and an action, cannot be
causal because one cannot describe the former in language which is
conceptually unrelated to that which is used to describe tho resultant
1. In the context of this question (because one is dealing with the
realm of actions and not that of purely physical phenomena) one does
not mean by the word 'cause8 , a 'neurophysiologies! process whose
occurrence renders a set of material conditions sufficient to produce
a reflex movement of the human body' , but rather, a 'voluntarily
entertained thought process that commences the (part mental, part
physical) series of occurrences that terminates in the performance
of a meaningful goal-directed piece of behaviour8 . (The question
of the meaningful import in actions will be discussed shortly in
this section.)
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action. Kelden writes: "surely .... one lesson we can derive from a
reading of Hume's discussion of causation .... (is that) the very
notion of a causal sequence logically implies that cause and effect are
intelligible without any logically internal relation of the one to the
other"*". Tints, according to Kelden's line of argument, because an
•independent' description cannot be given of an intention on the one
hand, and an action on the other, therefore the relationship between
these sorts of tilings is logical or conceptual rather than causal.
The argument here is unsatisfactory on two counts. First,
it is a plain fact that when an agent intends to bring about some goal,
something is going on in his mind, namely, a conscious sustaining of his
determination to obtain the chosen end; and it is this thought process,
certainly sometiling not identical with the resultant action, that one
wants to say causes the 'airaimg action' initiated as a means to the
achievement of the desired goal. Secondly, Kelden's analysis of what
is necessary to constitute a causal connection is a strange one and
against it one can endorse the criticisms of Donald Davidson .
Davidson claims that Helden's argument fails because "events are
often redescribed in terms of their causes" (eg. 'he was injured
because ha was burnt') , and "to describe an event in terms of its
3
cause is not to identify the event with its cause" . What events
are causally connected is a question of what pertains in actuality;
1. A.I. Kelden, Free Action, (fioutledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961,
edit., 1967), p. 53 and p. 52
2. D. Davidson, 'Actions, Heasons and Causes' (1963), in A.H. Whits
(ed), The Philosophy of Action, (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1968), p. 86
5° Ibid., p. 89
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how the events in question are identified end described is a natter of
explanatory procedure, The status,, however, of causal statements as
synthetic or analytic depends on the second, find not on the first of
these matters."*" In other words, given a causal connection between two
events, A mid B , one could replace * A 1 , the original
description of the antecedent event, by the description 'the cause of
B ' . If this were done, the statement 'the cause of B caused B 1
would, be analytic, but from this it does not follow that the terms
'the cause of B 1 and • B * are not understood to have separate
referents between which a causal connection holds. Merely to point
out that an intention and its resultant action are only describabl© in
theory-loaded terminology is therefore no reason to think that they
ere not actually quite distinct tilings.
A different version of what is often called the 'logical
connection argument' is advanced by Georg H. von Wright . Instead
of following Melden in saying that an intention to do something
cannot be the cause of an action because it cannot be described in
words that are unrelated on the conceptual level, von Wright argues
that an agent's intention is nothing over and above his 'aiming
behaviour', because one cannot verify whether he has a certain
intention apart from verifying that his action is in fact directed
2towards a certain goal. For von Wright , to say that a person intends
1. D. Davidson, op. cit., p. 90
2. G.E. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, (fioutledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1971), p. 94ff
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to do something is just a way of saying that a particular bodily
movement of the individual in question is recognisable, by means of
criteria governed by socio-cultural rules, as_a piece of meaningful
behaviour purposively aimed at the realisation of some goal."*"
It was stated as the first objection to Helden that it is
simply false to identify an intention to bring about some end, with the
subsequently initiated action, nevertheless, even if this is accepted,
one still has to face von Wright's contention that one cannot verify
that a person possesses on intention apart from verifying that he does
in fact act in a certain way.
But can one not directly ascertain an agent's intention just
by asking him (or by inquiring of people who have asked him) ? This,
surely, is the natural way to go about this. Von Wright however denies
that this is a permissible method of establishing what an agent intends,
for when one asks such a question the response is not just a set of
2
sounds but a meaningful reply. This cannot be taken to indicate an
agent's intention, von Wright claims, because one has no way of
checking that an agent means by his uttered sounds what one takes him to
mean by them: "verbal behavior does not in principle afford more direct
3
access to the inner states than any other intentional behavior" .
Here, one is again faced with an exceedingly perplexing line
of argument. It is of course true that an explanation of any kind of
phenomenon whatever can be put into an infinite backward regress if the
1. G. 11. von Wright, op. cit. „ p. 114ff
2. Ibid., p. 112f
3. Ibid., p. 113
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inquirer so wishes. He can demand, that one explain the elements of the
original explanans by reference to further explanantia and so on
without end. But, unless one is involved in discussion with a complete
sceptic something substantial is always taken for granted, and one then
explains the explanandum-phenomenon in question with reference to what
the inquirer is prepared to accept without expl;ination. With human and
social phenomena it is part of one's fundamental conception of the
subject-matter , that one is concerned with meaningful phenomena, i.e.
one supposes (virtually without question) that one is dealing with words
and not mere sounds or ink scratches, goal-directed actions and not mere
physical reflexes.^* Fat once this is accepted as a presupposition (as
it has to be if human and social inquiry is even to start) , it is clear
that one can ask an agent what goal he seeks to realise and then treat
his reply as indeed providing a direct indication of the intention
behind any subsequently initiated action. It is to be readily
admitted that as a method of verification, this method does not and
cannot give conclusive evidence (but where does this ever exist in
empirical science?) because it is always conceivable that the agent is
not telling the truth, or at the time of asking he may not be fully
clear in his own mind as to what exactly he does want. But to say as
much in no way appears to damage the claim that generally an agent's
intention can be ascertained without having to witness the action
initiated as a result of it.
1. This feature of human and social phenomena will receive extensive
attention in section (iii) of this chapter.
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Even if there is nothing philosophically objectionable
in the thesis that intentions are causes of actions, when mention is
made of 'human causation' (or 'social causation* ) what is usually
meant, is not the relationship just discussed, but the relationship that
holds between the environmental conditions (both physical and social-
institutional) against which agents both develop intentions to achieve
particular goals and also decide on the specific means of pursuing their
chosen goals, mid the actions subsequently initiated. In what ways is
this form of causal connection similar to, and in what ways does it
differ from, the sort of causal connection that holds between purely
physical phenomena?
In both the physical and human realms, it is normally the
case that the term 'cause' is used to refer to an event, an occurrence
or a 'happening' of some kind, however, although this is undoubtedly
what is generally meant, it is not correct to think that only
'happenings' can justifiably be called 'causes* . All explanations
have to refer (explicitly or implicitly) to initial conditions, for
without the presence of these the explanandum-phenomenon could not
occur. Thus, provided that it is a relevant initial condition, a
'static* or unchanging state of affairs is just as much a cause of a
particular phenomenon as the 'operative' event whose occurrence
renders a set of circumstances sufficient to 'bring about' the effect
in question.'" Therefore, to give an example from the field of physical
1. This same point is to be found emphasised, in a slightly different
context, in 'The Notion of an Historical Event' - a symposium by
K, Gruner and W.H. Walsh , The Aristotelian Society, (Supplementary
Volurao XLIII, 1969), pp. 141-152 and pp. 155-164 , respectively.
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causation, the existence of oxygen in the air is, strictly speaking, a
cause of a forest fire no less than, say, the operative event of the
sun's rays shining through the glass of a broken bottle. And,
similarly, to give an example from the area of human causation, the
existence of the societal institution of language is, again strictly
though pedantically speaking, a cause of an agent's action no less than,
say, the 'happening' of another person's request that he do something.
It can thus be agreed that causation in the physical and
human worlds is similar in that in both, the sufficient set of causes
includes continuant states of affairs as veil as operative events. In
both areas, of course, when one picks out one particular element as the
cause (i.e. the most interesting or important member, from one's own
point of view, of the sufficient set of causes) this will be, more often
than not, an operative occurrence rather than a static initial condition.
But on occasions when a single event is so selected to be called the
cause, one must not be led by the connotation of exclusivity
associated with the use of the definite article to think that that one
element on its own is causally sufficient to 'produce1 the phenomenon in
question.
Physical causation however differs in an extremely
important way from human and social causation. In the physical world,
given a causal law and the fulfillment of the appropriate initial
conditions, the explanandum-phenomenon has to occur. One could say that
it is 'compelled* to occur, or that it could not but occur; for it is
a characteristic of physical causation that it involves 'necessity' .
But it Is precisely this feature of causation in the physical world that
is lacking when environmental conditions (or particular changes in them)
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cause agents to act in certain ways.^" For this reason causing a natural
event to take place (eg. causing a change in the volume of a gas by
altering the temperature) is something rather different from causing
the action of an agent to take place (eg. causing an individual to buy
more of a good by increasing the purchase tax on a substitute good) .
In the field of human and social affairs causal antecedents never
'necessitate1 or 'compel' their consequents in this sense.
If one seeks the causes of particular actions, it must be
recognised in advance that one is not attempting to explain the actions
of 'abstract' or unsocialised agents. What one is anxious to uncover
are the more or less immediate causes of the actions of individuals who
possess minds that have been thoroughly moulded (not, of course,
determined down to the last detail, since one allows that agents have
a measure of autonomous free-will) by the social and institutional
setting into which they were born and in which they continue to live.
All forms of social inquiry, therefore, have to presuppose that the
agents whose actions are under investigation have been affected (in ways
whose details cannot be computed with precision.) by some social
2
environment. If it is to be granted that one is dealing with
socialised individuals acting within a set of societal conditions, one
can then proceed to identify the kinds of factors that cause agents to
pursue particular goals and to make particular choices regarding the
1. G.II. von Y/right, op. cit., p. 69 end pp. 145-150
2. The denial that social inquiry has to presuppose socialised
agents is the position known a3 'methodological psychologist' .
Tiiis will be examined and criticised in chapter V *
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achievement of their goals. These factors consist of such things as
the persuasion of others, the existence of opportunities for self-
advancement , the normative pressures of a prevailing moral code, the
threat of sanctions, the inducement of rewards or the fact that certain
actions are juot traditionally performed by occupants of particular
1
institutional positions. It needs to be emphasised again, that these
kinds of factors, although they are correctly described as environmental
causes of actions, do not 'force8 an agent to act in the way that a
billiard ball is 'forced' to move when struck by another. Social causes
operate either by persuading an agent to pursue a particular objective,
or by circumscribing the range of possible actions whose free initiation
appears to an agent to be likely to result in the successful realisation
of his desired goal.
Vhen one person coerces another to do something (eg. when
a criminal hold3 up a iaan at gunpoint and orders Mm to hand over his
wallet) what is exemplified is not an instance of causal nscessitation.
If an individual is threatened with physical violence, he cannot be
'made' (in the sens© of 'causally compelled') to act. Ee may of course
decide to do what his assailant requires, but he will only do this if he
thinks that the alternative (i.e. death or disablement) to doing what he
is ordered to do, is not the preferable option. I<n agent, even when
1. There is an "enormous group of persons whose public actions are
their own only in a significantly restricted sense ... (because they
act) in situations where both the objectives to be pursued and the
methods of pursuing them are largely determined for them" .
- W.H. Walsh, 'Pride, Shame and Responsibility', in The
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 78, January 1970,
p. 7
under the most extreme pressure, can always in principle choose not to
co-operate, and if he so chooses there is no way by which he can be
*forced* to act. If the limbs of an individual's body are physically
moved against his will, the manipulator mid not the agent performs an
action. Thus, provided one is talking about the cause of an agent's
action, what one takes to be the cause is only operative if it is
mediated by the agent's own mind; unless an individual decides to do
something, any movement of his body that may take place is not an
action (and hence a. fortiori cannot be a causally necessitated action) »
In human affairs, environmental circumstances (physical, social or
human) cannot 'compel' an action to take place; bodily behaviour that
is causally necessitated by a physical stimulus (eg, the jerk of a
leg after the knee-cap has been given a smart blow) is not an action
at all, but a mere reflex.
On the topic of the distinction between human and physical
causation, the sociologists Robert Maclver and Charles Page write;
"There is an essential difference, from the standpoint of
causation, between a paper flying before the wind and a man
flying from a pursuing crowd. The paper knows no fear and the
wind no hate, but without fear and hate the man would not fly
nor the crowd pursue. If we try to reduce fear to its bodily
concomitants we merely substitute the concomitants for the
reality experienced as fear. We denude the world of meanings
for the sake of a theory, itself a false meaning which
deprives us of all the rest. We can interpret experience only
at the level of experience. Social changes are phenomena of
human experience and in that sense meaningful." 1
In this citation the central point that is struggling to emerge is this;
when particular environment conditions are identified as the cause of an
1. ILK. Maclver and C.R. Page, Society, (Kacraillan, London, 1950, edit.,
1964), p. 628 (authors' italics)
action, it is presupposed that it is possible to construct a
teleolo/cical explanation to provide information on the intervening links
in the chain of events that starts with the conditions and terminates
with the action in question. In other words, the statement
' (the change in) conditions C caused action A *
presupposes a wider statement that provides either a rational or a
rationality explanation of the action under consideration. That is,
it presupposes, respectively, either
'in virtue of (the change in) conditions C , agent X
adopted the intention to achieve goal G , and then
tried to realise this by means of action A 1 ,
or
'in virtue of (the change in) conditions C , agent X
decided that the appropriate way to achieve goal G was
by means of action A ' .
These last two formulations should make it clear that an environmental
condition can only cause an action if the acting agent interprets it as
meaningful^". and hence relevant in some way as regards either his choice
of goal or his selection of means to achieve some previously intended
goal. This very point is to be found well emphasised in another work
by Maclver , where he writes: "the chain of physical causation does
not need mind except for its discovery. The chain of social causation
2
needs mind for its existence." .
1. In the section immediately following, the important connection
between social causation and the intrinsic meaningfulness of all
human phenomena will be further discussed.
2. R.II. Ilaclver*, Social Causation, (Ginn and Company, Boston, 1942),
p. 26J
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On. the occasions when a social scientist is confronted
with a specific individual, he explains the agent's action by providing
a teleological explanation of the sort required by the inquirer. When
however the explanandum-phenomenon consists of (or is the social
consequence of) the actions of a large number of anonymous but typically
socialised individuals (eg. consumers, suppliers and investors who are
understood to act within a certain sort of institutional setting) , an
explanation in causal form is a shortened and simplified substitute for
an explanation overtly in teleological form. Suppose an inquirer wants
an explanation of why the quantity demanded of a particular kind of
commodity has increased, and in reply an economic theorist tells him
that the phenomenon is caused by a price reduction.^" This explanation
makes no explicit mention of the aims and beliefs of the individuals
whose actions are represented by the demand schedule of the kind of
good in question. However, on investigation, the explanation will be
found to rest on the supposition that if a commodity becomes cheaper
in price relative to other goods, then normally this induces consumers
to develop the intention to increase their consumption of it.
Although it is exceedingly common in the social sciences
to find statements that deal explicitly only with the causal relations
that hold between a number of theoretic 'variables' (eg. the level of
demand, the level of supply and the market price) without making any
reference to the conscious aims of individuals, if any such causal
statement is fully unpacked a teleological explanation will emerge. For
causal explanations which connect environmental conditions to actions,
1. See chapter II for an example of a fully laid out micro-economic
explanation.
are based upon ideological explanations involving reference to the
conscious purposes and aims of the agents who initiate the actions in
question. And because of this, explanations that deal with phenomena
which concern human and social causation, ere justifiably considered to
be of a different order from those that deal with phenomena in subject-
matters where only physical causation prevails.
(iii) Scientist arid Social Science
Up to now, as regards the field of human find social
phenomena, attention has been directed at the proper way to formulate
explanations of actions, those of either single agents or of a large
number of individuals. It is however not true that the social sciences
are concerned only with the explanation of actions. To a considerable
extent (perhaps even for the most part), the social sciences are
concerned to show why certain kinds of social interactions lead to the
occurrence of certain sorts of social consequences. In many social
investigations, it is simply assumed that agents have conscious aims and
that they attempt to realise these rationally, while the main interest
is concentrated on the question of whether the initiation of these
actions in the given institutional context has any social consequences,
and in particular whether it has any consequences that were not intended
by the agents themselves. In general, therefore, when they are not
involved with explaining actions, the social sciences are interested to
ask and to answer the following question: 'From what purposive action,
or set of interacting purposive actions, does this phenomenon arise as
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the (intended or unintended) social consequence in these societal
conditions?'^" .
The precise way this question should be answered in
practice depends upon what area of social phenomena is under
investigation, and hence upon what specific social science is called
upon to provide the desired explanation. Before one attempts to reveal
the differences among the various social sciences, it will be helpful
to consider what, if indeed anything, gives one the right to call the
social sciences •sciences' . To put this a little more exactly, is it
the case that the- study of men's actions, and the study of the general
characteristics of the social order that result from the interaction of
many men's actions, fall within the realm of what can legitimately be
called 'scientific* inquiry?
In the English language the words •science' and
•scientific* are profoundly ambiguous; happily however the ambiguity
does not extent to the respective antonyms, namely, 'non-science' and
'non-scientific' on the one hand, and 'pseudo-science' and 'un¬
scientific' on the other. 'Science' in the first sense (i.e.
contrasted with 'non-science' ), means either a particular type of
subject-matter or the use of a particular form of explanatory schema;
•science' in the second sense (i.e. contrasted with 'pseudo-science' ),
means a body of systematic knowledge (pertaining to any subject-matter
whatever) that is gained by the use of a method of inquiry appropriate
to the basic nature of the phenomena under investigation.
1. Chapters II and ¥ of this discussion will elaborate and defend the
methodological appropriateness of this general question of inquiry.
The first mentioned (and narrower) of these two senses has,
on the whole, been, favoured by *ordinary' linguistic usage since about
1831 - the date the British Association for the Advancement of
1
Science was founded® In the popular mind, the term 'science* is
used to denote either the physical and. other natural sciences, or
'generalising* or theoretical disciplines.. In the latter of these two
cases, common usage follows the spirit of J.S. Mill's dictum: "Any
facts are fitted, in themselves, to be a subject of science, which
2
follow one another according to constant laws" . In contrast, the
second mentioned (and, incidentally, the original and etymologieally
rr
correct ) sense of * science* has a wider meaning; provided a body of
knowledge has been acquired by systematic application of a method of
explanation appropriate to the subject-matter, it can bs classed as
•science* » On the wider understanding of what constitutes science it
is as unscientific to attempt to explain the actions of individuals by
subsuming them under nosological laws, as it is to try to explain
physical processes and phenomena by exhibiting their intentions and
motives. Thus, it is as unscientific to fail to treat agents as agents,
as it is to treat purely material objects as agents.
1. F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, (The Free Press,
Glencoe, Illinois, 1952, edit., 1964), p. 207
2. J.S. Kill, op. cit., p. 552 (i.e. Bk. VI, Ch» III, sec. l)
3. .Robin G. Collingwood (1839-1943) reminds one tliat the use of the
word 'science' in the narrow sense is "a slang usage, like that
for which 'hall* means a isusic hall or 'pictures' moving pictures,
.... (for) in the traditions of European speech .... the word
•science' moans any organised body of knowledge" .
- R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History. (Oxford University press,
Oxford, 1946, edit., 1966), p. 249
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If one now has to make a choice on the matter, it is better
to opt for the second rather than the first of these identified senses
of the word 'science* . First, on the former sense the phrase 'social
science1 is fundamentally incongruous, while on the latter sense there
is no awkwardness in holding that the social sciences are (or, more
cautiously, can be made to be) genuine sciences, A second reason for
deciding in favour of the wider meaning of the term 'science* , is that
its explication appears to relate closely to what Earl Popper and
others have persistently argued, namely, that all scientific practice
(social as well as natural) is united by a firm rejection of naive
inductivism. No scientific inquiry proceeds by mechanically 'drawing
out' explanatory accounts and theories from a 'theoretically
uncontaminated' mass of collected facts, for the simple reason that
whatever the area of investigation, there are just no such things as
•pure* or 'protocol' facts completely devoid of any theoretic import,
Even in order to ascertain the facts in terms of which the problem one
is trying to solve is formulated, one must entertain (at the very
minimum) some metaphysical view as to the fundamental nature of the
phenomena before one. Since one never escapes the need . to employ
1. K.ii. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, op. cit., p. 59n et al.
K.li. Popper, The Poverty of Ilistoricism, op. cit., p. 121
K.ii. Popper, Conjectures end .Refutations, (lioutledge and Kegan Paxil,
London, 1963, third edit., 1969), p. 46 et al.
N.Ii. Hanson, patterns of Discovery, (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1953, edit., Iy6l), especially Chapter I ('Observation')
and Chapter II ('Facts'), pp. 4-30 and pp. 31-49, respectively.
ultinate presuppositions, is it not therefore natural to hold that
scientific (as opposed to unscientific) forms of inquiry are
»
characterised by the employment of appropriate presuppositions?
As well as classifying sciences as either natural or social,
it is also open to one to categorise thera as nomothetic or
idiographic . In attempts to raake clear the nature of this second
division, it is often said that while nomothetic disciplines deal with
kinds of events, idiographic sciences deal with singular or particular
events. Although putting the matter this way is illuminating to a
certain extent, it is also highly misleading; all sciences explain the
occurrence of single events that are 'unique* in the sense that if all
their properties (i.e. literally, all their spatial and temporal
properties as well as all their substantial ones) were taken into
account then they would each be found to be dissimilar in at least one
discernible respect. To understand the difference between nomothetic
and idiographic sciences it is necessapy to realise that the phrase
•the occurrence of an event' may mean either,
(a) th© occurrence of a specific spatio-temporal
phenomenon, or,
(b) the occurrence of a specific spatio-temporal
instance of a phenomenon of a certain kind .
All sciences are concerned to explain specific events. A science is
nomothetic if, with reference to phenomena within its own domain of
inquiry, it explains examples of (a) by showing that they are examples
of (b), which are then explained (if physical events) by subsumption
under a universal or probabilistic nosological law, or, (if social
events) by subsuraption under a generalisation (deduced as a theorem
from a social theory"1") . A nomothetic discipline is therefore one
that explains particular events by showing why they, qua events of a
2
recurrent kind, occurred. In contrast, a science is idiographic if
1. The term •theory* is yet another ambiguous word that requires brief
explication. First, there is the sense given it in ordinary speech
(eg. as in 'this is pure theory, not proved fact' ) where the term
refers to statements whose truth values have yet to be determined. In
this sense also, in both the social and natural sciences, it means
'hypothesis* or 'conjectured system of causal connections'. Secondly,
one has the sense where the word means 'principle of operative
procedure', and this is then contrasted with actual working procedures.
One would have something like this meaning in mind if, for example,
one talked about what a piece of industrial relations legislation
was supposed to lead to ('the theory*) , and compared it to what one
thought it actually would lead to ('the practice') .
Thirdly, there is the important sense where 'theory' means 'formal
theory* . Formal theories can be divided into two groups, the criteria
for the division being the rigour or otherwise of the syntactic
structure in which the empirical content of the theory is embedded,
(a) A rigorous formal theory consists of a small number of fundamental
postulates from which one can deduce laws or generalisations as
theorems. An example of such from the physical sciences, is the
deductive system of statements that comprises the Newtonian theory
of mechanics, while a social scientific example is micro-economic
price theory. All syntactically rigorous formal theories, whether
applicable to 'simple' or 'complex' phenomena (this distinction to be
made a little further on in the main text) , are amenable to
matheraatical exposition, (b) A less rigorous, or syntactically 'loose',
type of formal theory, examples of which are Darwinian evolutionary
theory and Freudian psycho-analytic theory, consists of a small number
of related basic statements in terms of which 'explanations of the
principle* upon which the phenomena in question appear, are given. It
should be noted that while theories of sort (a) are found concerned
with both 'simple' and 'complex' phenomena, theories of sort (b) are
only found concerned with 'complex* phenomena.
An extensive analysis of the concept of a theory is given by:
— A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, (Chandler, Scranton, Pennsylvania,
1964), pp. 294-510
2. Despite the etymological connection of 'nomothetic* with 'noraological',
it is not satisfactory to define nomothetic disciplines as those that
employ sui generis nomological laws. For if one says this, one is
committed by a definition to the conclusion that no social science can
be nomothetic. To take the term 'nomothetic' in the way suggested in the
main text, allows for the possibility that disciplines that deal with
phenomena not determined by nomic, causation can be nomothetic sciences.
Nevertheless, the linguistic disharmony is to be regretted.
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it explains examples of (a) by showing that they were brought about
by the occurrence of a unique configuration of specific elements
interacting within a particular environment. If the idiographic
science in question is a natural discipline, then each of these elements
should be shown to be examples of (b) and then explained by the
employment of a nomothetic natural science. If the idiographic science
in question is a social science, then each of these interacting elements
should either be explained teleologically, or be shown to be examples of
(h) arid then explained by the employment of a nomothetic social theory.
In the field of natural science, physics and chemistry are
the outstanding nomothetic sciences, while the historical sciences of
nature such as cosmology, geology, mineralogy, oceanography and
physical geography are clear examples of idiographic disciplines. A
geologist, for example, would not explain a specific mineral deposit by
reference to a sui generis law of rock formation, but he would try to
demonstrate how the particular situation before Ma resulted from a
unique interaction of a constellation, of single influences, each of
which could be explained by the theoretical sciences of physics and
chemistry. Certain natural sciences, such as zoology, are partly
nomothetic and partly idiographic. A zoologist is a nomothetic
scientist when he explains the homeostatic properties of an organism
of a known species with reference to the functioning of its partial,
processes, but he is an idiograpMc scientist when he examines the
ecological structure of a particular geographical region.
¥hen one turns to the social sciences, Mstory appears
immediately as the very paradigm, of an idiographic discipline. If an
Mstorian wants to explain, say, a revolution ™ that is a particular
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revolution - he does not explain it ju3t in so far as it is a
revolution (i.e. just in so far as it is the overthrow of a government
by violent or other unconstitutional means) and not some other kind of
event. He would try and explain why the specific event in question
should possess ail those properties he considers interesting and
important, and not just why it possesses the aspect in virtue of which
it is classified as a 'revolution* . Thus, if an historian were
explaining the occurrences of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the
Spanish Revolution of 1936* the Chechoslovakian Revolution of 1948 and
the Greek Revolution of 1967, he would not do it by reference to a sui
generis social •law* concerning the occurrences of revolutions in
general, in the way a chemist would explain four cases of the expansion of
different volumes of gas with reference to the Boyle-Charles gas law.
Instead, the historian would attempt to explain each of the above
events by showing that they were intricate complexes of a large number
of inter-connected elements, and that these complexes occurred within
a particular space-time interval because the interacting agents
concerned behaved in certain ways within the particular social
environment prevailing at the time in question.
In addition to history, the idiographic social sciences
include among their number the subjects of sociology, social
anthropology, political science and their many variants. Hunan
psychology is, perhaps, best regarded not as an idiographic science,
but as one which hovers on the borderline between idiographic and
nomothetic status. (Many of its practitioners claim that the sociology
of contemporary society deserves a status similar to that accorded here
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to psychology, but this claim brings in its wake strong and cogent
opposition."'*) However, whatever the correct classification for all
the disciplines just mentioned should in fact be, at the present time
the only social science that is incontestably nomothetic is economics.
This discipline studies the actions by which scarce resources (both
human find physical) are or might be allocated towards the alleviation
of diverse and conflicting human needs and wants, and the direct
2
societal consequences of the initiation of such actions ; hence, e.
phenomenon is described as 'economic* if it is involved in a process
of valuation for the purposes of exchange. Because such valuations
can be given in money terras (i.e. as market prices), the objects and
activities upon which the market mechanism bestows a value can be
measured quantitatively. Since economics is unique among the social
sciences in having a notion of a precise respect in which its
explananda-phenomena can be viewed as similar (economic phenomena are
similar in that they are all possessors of some measure of monetary
valuation), it is thus the only social science in a position to
construct empirically applicable theoretical accounts of the ways the
various types of phenomena it investigates are determined.
1. For example, supported by a battery of examples, Alfred R. Louch
shows that to date all attempts to produce a nomothetic sociology
have resulted in "triviality, redundancy and tautology" .
- Kxplsnation and Human A.ction, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1966), p. 9 and
pp. 9-19
2. L. Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science, (Hacmillan, London, 1932), p. 15
That economics is a theoretical science is something that
has long been recognised. In a well known passage in his The Scope
and Method of Political Economy John Reville Keynes (1852-1949) urges
his fellow economists not only to regard their subject as "a branch of
ethics .... (seeking) to determine economic ideals" or "an art ....
(seeking) to formulate economic precepts" , but also "to recognise as
fundamental a positive science .... which is concerned purely with what
is, and seeks to determine economic laws""*" . For J.H. Keynes , this
positive science constituted the "fundamental" part of his social
1. J.K. Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy, (Macmillan,
London, 1891), p. 36
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science, and indeed he held that "the conception, of political economy
as a theoretical, abstract and deductive science"^ was how the subject
2
should be spoken of "in the main" . But granted that economics does
employ (and has employed for a considerable time) formal theories, this
is not sufficient to ensure that it is able to produce explanations of
specific events equal in detail and precision to those produced by, say,
Hevtonisn mechanics.
It will «be argued at length in the third chapter of this
discussion, that there is a third way of viewing scientific disciplines,
namely, as those that deal with 'simple* and those that deal with
'complex' subject-matters, A 'simple' science (dealing with a 'simple'
subject-matter) is one that is concerned to explain phenomena brought
about by a small number of kinds of causal variables, while a 'complex'
science (dealing with a 'complex' subject-matter) is one that is
concerned to explain phenomena caused by a large number of different
kinds of factors and influences. Although economics is a syntactically
•rigorous* nomothetic science (i.e. one that explains events of
recurrent kinds by subsuming thera under generalisations derived as
theorems from a small set of theoretic postulates) , to be such it lias
to limit itself to giving explanations that involve only the few most
important kinds of determining causal factors at work in its domain of
inquiry, because this is an area of complex phenomena. Thus, while both
physics and economic theory employ rigorous mathematical formalisms, the
1. J.N. Keynes, op. cit., p. 9
2. Ibid., p, 15
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former (as a simple discipline) is able to show in detail why a specific
event of a particular sort occurs, but the latter (as a complex
discipline) is able just to outline the principle upon which a certain
kind of event occurs. In Friedrich A. Hayek's language, physics can
provide 'explanations of detail' , but economics can only give
'explanations of the principle'^- .
No science (whether it be natural or social, nomothetic or
idiographic, simple or complex) is able to deal with all the properties
of its explananda-phenomena, although clearly an idiographic science
will concern itself with a substant.ially larger number of the properties
of a specific event than will a nomothetic science. Since, needless to
say, all sciences investigate only those selected aspects of particular
phenomena that are deemed to be of general interest or are relevant as
far a3 the explanation of their occurrences are concerned, all sciences
must employ 'principles of identity' that provide inter-subjectively
2
ascertainable criteria for calling specific phenomena the 'same* as
other specific phenomena. As a direct consequence of the differences
1. An analysis of F.A. Hayek's theory of explanation in complex
phenomena, vail be given in chapter III .
2, In order to avoid any possible confusion, it is best to state
explicitly that the term 'same' is ambiguous: it has a 'qualitative*
and a 'numerical' sens®. In the former sense, when the word is
applied to two distinct phenomena, it means 'similar in a certain
respect' (and when applied to one phenomenon at different times it
means 'unchanged in a certain respect over the period in question').
In the latter sense, when the word is applied to two (or mors)
purportedly different phenomena (eg. the Morning Star and the
Evening Star) what is meant is that the two (or more) phenomena are
in actuality just a single phenomenon (eg. the planet Venus). It
should be obvious that in this discussion, the word 'same' is
intended in the qualitative sense.
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already mentioned between the subject-matters of ths social and natural
scienceb> the social sciences require kinds of •principles of
identity1 (to be employed with reference to the •elements' whose
descriptive terms enter into the explanatory accounts offered by those
disciplines) of a quite diverse character from those used by the
natural sciences.
The precise nature of the difference between social and
natural scientific 'principles of identity' has been succinctly
expressed by Peter Winch . (To cite Winch with approval on this
particular point, does not commit one to upholding in its entirety his
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general thesis"'" as to what properly constitutes social scientific
activity.) In the third and fourth chapters of his controversial
monograph, Winch makes much of the fact that "two things may be called
•the same* or 'different* only with reference to a set of criteria
2
which lay down what is to be regarded as a relevant difference" .
1. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy,
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 195Q, edit., 1970) .
Winch's general aim (to which one can give considerable support)
is to attack the notion that in the social sciences "we must follow
the methods of natural science .... if we are to make any significant
progress" . (p. l) Winch argues that while natural science is
characterised by the method of explanation that subsumes events under
nosological laws, the social sciences casinot (and therefore should not
try to) b© concerned to seek causal connections. His overall thesis
amounts to the position that there is a sharp contrast to be made
between (a) causally determined events, and (b) rule-governed or
rule-guided actions (pp. 51-52), and that social inquiry, per
definitionem, is properly concerned just with (b) and not with (a).
Ee argues thus: "to discover the motives of a puzzling action i£ to
increase our understanding of that action; that is what 'understanding'
means as applied to human behaviour", (p. 78, Winch's italics) And
since "the notion of meaningful behaviour is closely associated with
notions like motive and reason" (p. 45, Winch's italics)» to learn
"what a motive is belongs to learning the standards governing life in
the society in which one lives" . (p. 83)
There is much in Winch that one can find to agree with. In
criticism, however, two points are here in order: (l) the social
sciences are not concerned simply to elucidate the raeaningfulness of
the actions of single individuals, but (presupposing actions to be
meaningful) are concerned to explain social phenomena produced,
intentionally or unintentionally, by the interaction of a large number
of purposive actions, and (2) it is perfectly legitimate to claim that
the social sciences deal with 'causally determined events' so long as
one bears in mind that one is referring to instances of social and not
physical causation.
An excellent, but little known, critique of Winch that both
praises and takes him to task at the correct points, is :
- Karl-Otto Apel, Analytical Philosophy of Language and the
Geisteswissenachaften, Foundations of Language, Supplementary
Series, Volume 4, (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht,
Holland, 1967), pp. 33-57
2. P. Winch, op. cit., p. 108
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Winch then proceeds to argue that the relation of a social
scientist to his 3ubject-matter is not at all like the relation of a
natural scientist to his subject-matter. For the latter, because "the
♦things' in question are purely physical the criteria (of identity)
appealed to will of course be those of the observer. However, for
the social scientist, the subject-matter consists of human actions and
the societal repercussions of the interaction of many actions. But
because the operative causes of such events are conscious agents, they
themselves entertain views, and formulate interpretations, of their own
actions and of social phenomena that appear within the bounds of their
own society. Therefore, if a social scientist is to treat such events
as social phenomena (as, ex hypothesi, he must) then he :
"
.... has to take seriously the criteria which
are applied for distinguishing 'different' kinds of actions
and identifying the 'same' kinds of actions within the way
of life he is studying. It is not open to him arbitrarily
to impose his own standards from without. In so far as he
does so, the events he is studying lose altogether their
character as social events," 2
For a natural scientist, what are to count as his 'facts' , are
determined by prevailing theoretic considerations which lay down the
physical criteria that are to be adopted in deciding what phenomena are
to be taken as 'similar* and what as 'different* . But for a social
scientist, 'principles of identity' can employ neither physical
criteria nor any criteria (even if non-physical) that are simply those
1. P. Winch, op. cit., p. 108
2. Ibid,, p. 103 (Winch's italics)
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of the social inquirer's own choosing; the identification of the
objects of the social sciences requires reference to the conscious
intentions and interpretative ideas of those actually living in the
society under investigation. Although social phenomena possess physical
properties, they are not of relevance to social science in so far as
they are physical, but only in so far as they are meaningful to the
agents in whose society they occur.
The denial of the view that the social sciences, prior to
any attempt to provide explanations, have to recognise in what way
societal phenomena are understood as meaningful by those living in the
society under study, is the position F.A. Hayek labels "scientisia"^ .
Before this is discussed further, let it be stressed yet again that in
the social sciences what is important as regards the causation of actions
and other societal phenomena, is not what the causes (whether these be
actions or prevailing environmental conditions) are in physical terms,
but what the acting agents think they are; also, one is not primarily
interested in the physical characteristics of the explananda-phenoraena
in question, but rather in their intentional or ideational
properties.
In direct opposition to the methodological procedures
advocated by a scientistic approach, Hayek argues that any truly
effective attack by a social science upon a particular social problem,
has to proceed by first recognising that human and social phenomena
cannot even be identified, let alone explained, in either purely physical
terms or in terras that are not intimately connected with the way the
1. F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, op. cit., p. 15
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agents concerned liajjpen to think about them,. Take, for example,
concepts such as 'sale* , 'purchase* , •crime' , 'puoishaent* , *tooI* ,
'instrument' , 'word* , 'sentence* or *book* ; it is indeed the case
that "careful logical analysis of these concepts will show that they
all express relationships between .... at least three terms, of which
one is the acting or thinking person, the other some desired or imagined
effect, and the third a thing in the ordinary sense""*" . It is in fact
not possible to explicate social concepts "without using some terms
such ae * suitable for* or * intended for* or some other expression
2
referring to the .... mental attitudes of men towards the things" the
concepts are used to denote. It thus follows that one is quite unable
to "distinguish in physical terras whether two men barter or exchange
or whether they are playing some game or performing some religious
3
ritual" , and therefore unless one "can understand what the acting
people nean by their actions any attempt to explain thorn .... is bound
to fail"4 .
Since only what agents know or believe can shape intentions
within the minds of human beings, an agent*s action is not caused by the
physical qualities of the actions, institutions and material objects
comprising his environment, but by what appear to him to be the
substantial properties of what he takes to be his environment, then,
however, a social inquirer such as an ancient historian or an
anthropologist desires to explain an action (or a social phenomenon
1. F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, op9 cit., p. 27
2. Ibid., p. 27
3. Ibid., p. 31
4. Ibid., p. 31 (italics added)
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that results from the interaction, of actions) within a society in which
live individuals whose conceptualisation of the 'nature of the world'
is very different from his own, it is often not an easy business to
ascertain the ideational criteria by which the societal phenomena axe to
be identified in that society. Nevertheless, since (one assumes) the
vast majority of human beings possess minds that are structurally the
Game and differ only in specific content, if the investigating social
scientist perserveres long enough with his inquiiy he will in time just
come to understand the 'world outlook' of the agents whose general
conceptual scheme differs so much from his own. It is worth noting that
this particular matter doe3 not constitute a problem (acute or otherwise)
for all social scientists. For some, notably those economists and
sociologists involved with questions relating to contemporaiy society,
the 'principles of identity1 which they employ in their non¬
professional moments are more or less the same as those used by the
agents in the society whose features they are concerned, qua social
scientists, to explain. Such social scientists are therefore most
unlikely to encounter a conceptual clash between how they view the
society in question, and how the acting agents see it.
An economist (or any other investigator of contemporary
society) must not delude himself that he is a species of physical
scientist just because he, unlike the historian or social
anthropologist, does not have to employ a system of concepts for
identifying social phenomena that is different from the one he is
accustomed to use in his own private life. For a social scientist in
this position the 'understanding* is merely presupposed, but the need
for it does not thereby vanish. One can cite Hayek again: "that the
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objects of economic activity cannot bo defined, in ....(material) terras
but only with, reference to a human purpose goes without saying. Neither
a 'commodity* or an 'economic good5 , nor 'food® or 'money* , can
be defined in physical terms but only in terms of views people hold
about things. . Thus, even though a social, scientist may not have to
undertake a conscious inquiry into the details of the meaningfulness of
the phenomena he is concerned with, it still remains true that all social
explanation is explanation of meaningful phenomena. This happens to be
the case even if the precise nature of the 'meaning* is unproblematic
and is thus either unrecognised or else implicitly taken for granted.
The position that denies that it is scientifically
appropriate for explanatory purposes to treat human and social
phenomena as meaningful, or to look upon them as different in any way
from the sort of phenomena with which the physical and natural sciences
2
deal, has its ardent advocates. One of the foremost adherents to the
•ptysicalist* approach to social questions, is the sociologist George
A. Lundberg . Despite the fact that Lundberg's methodological
doctrines are obviously dated by their close attachment to inter-war
positivism (they have been aptly described not only as "scientistic"
but as "the 'last word* in simplism of this species" ) , they are well
worth examining as a clear articulation of a widely prevalent ethos.
1. F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, op. cit., p. 31
2. A. Inkeles, What is Sociology?. (prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., 1964) *, pp. 39-42
3. F.H. Knight, On the History and Method of Economics, (The University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956, edit., 1963), p. 227
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Par although Lundberg as such may appear preposterous (even, 'as dead
as the- dodo', as far as current first-order historical and sociological
practice is concerned) , in some form or other the basic metaphysical
tenets upon which he seeks to operatet pervade, and are deeply ingrained
in, much of present day thought, especially popular thought.
Lundberg is highly contemptuous of Maclver's assertion
(quoted earlier*) that a fundamentally different kind of causation is
exemplified when a piece of paper is blown by the wind and when a man
is driven by fear to flea before a pursuing crowd. He considers that
a scientific inquiry must recognise that "the principle of parsimony
requires that we seek to bring into the same framework'the explanation
of all flying objects"'" . Although, Lundberg readily admits, the
idea that the some general laws may be applicable to both physical and
social phenomena "may seem fantastic and inconceivable to many
2
people" , from the scientific point of view;
"
.... a paper flying before the wind is interpreted as the
behavior of an object of specified characteristics reacting
to a stimulus of specified characteristics within a specified
field of force. Within this framework we describe the man and
the crowd, the paper and the wind. The characteristics of
these elements, and they may be specified to any degree
desired, would never be the same in any two cases of wind and
paper or of men and crowds. But it is the faith of science
that sufficiently general principles can be found to cover
all these situations " 3
A little further on, Lundberg claims that as far as the explanatory
procedures generally adopted by the social sciences are concerned, "the
1. G.A. Lundberg, foundations of Sociology, (Macmillan, Hew York,
1939)» p. 13 ~ (italics added)
2. Ibid., p. 13
3. Ibid., p. 14 (Lundberg's italics)
51.
error lies in assuming that the telio character or purposiveness which
we like to attribute to societal behavior is an intrinsic character of
the behavior rather than our way of describing it" . Thus, in short,
2
Lundberg argues that because the physical sciences made great
advances when they abandoned the teleological form of explanation, it
is simply the retention of this type of explanation that is preventing
a similar advetnee within the social sciences. And therefore, Lundberg
considers, it is very likely that the '•next great developments in the
social sciences will cose not from professed social scientists but from
3
people trained in other fields" .
One can usefully begin one's critique of this scientistic
polemic, by remarking that the 'telic character* of human behaviour
is not merely a property 'attributed* just by a 'way of describing
it' . The truth of the matter - something surely less open to doubt
than the fact that the Earth is not a saucer carried on the backs of
four white elephants — is that men possess conscious minds and are
capable of rational action. The 'purposiveness' of human behaviour
is therefore an inherent and not an imputed characteristic. Secondly,
it can be said that the positive explanatory procedure Lundberg
suggests borders on the philosophically naive. If men's actions are to
be explained as purely a 'response* to an environmental 'stimulus' ,
then the question has to be raised of what kind of 'principle of
identity' is to be employed in deciding what are to constitute the
elements that are-to be connected, namely the 'response* and the
1. G.A. Lundberg, op. cit„, p. 21
2. Ibid., p. 8
3. Ibid., p. 13
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• stimulus* .
If one is intent on employing a consistent physicalist
method, then it is permissible only to us® 'principles of identity*
that rely on purely physical criteria* Instead therefore of concerning
oneself with actions, institutions and other social phenomena, one is
entitled, logically, to dead, .just with constellations of physical
particles and to explain the movements of such configurations as
causally 'necessitated* locomotion, within a series of tins co-ordinates*
But this is exactly what Lundberg fails to do when he turns his mind
to first-order social problems* In, for example, Chapters XI end XII
(treating, respectively, the demographic characteristics of populations,
and the spatial aspects of society) he discusses numerous topics
including the various death rates'*"(due, among other factors, to
accidents, suicides and homicides) , the rates for different sorts of
crimes^ , the rates for school truancy^ and the distribution of those
4
receiving public relief from state funds . But phenomena of these
kinds, as has been previously argued at length, cannot be identified
by purely physical criteria, but only by reference to what the agents
living in the situation under observation happen to think.
Although Lundberg explicitly vows to employ a physicalist
explanatory procedure, by resorting to the use of 'principles of
identity* that employ ideational criteria, he shews that he is irx fact
unwittingly taking for granted the intrinsic meaningfulness of his
1. G.A. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 442
2. Ibid., p. 483
3* Ibid., p. 484
4. Ibid., p. 486
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explananda-phenomena. Bat to do this is implicitly to presuppose that
the individuals in the society under investigation are purposive agents,
and are therefore distinct (in this very notable respect) from the
entirely 'inert* physical processes studied, by the natural sciences.
Thus, extraordinary to relate, Lundberg ends up affirming by his
actual practice, a conception of the nature of social phenomena which he
rejects when he engages in philosophical discussion on the explanatory
procedures he thinks he uses in Ms own first-order investigations.
In a single sentence, what is it that differentiates the
subject-matters of the social, from those of the natural sciences? The
reply is that men, quite unlike physical phenomena, are rationally
purposive agents and are moved to act because their minds interpret
the behaviour of other men and their own environmental conditions in
certain ways, and that hence their actions and the features of their
various social orders, cannot be explained within the natural scientific
framework of noraic causation. As has just been observed in the case of
Lundberg , social scientists who cannot bring themselves to accept
explicitly that there is this difference between the human and physical
realms, nevertheless undertake their own concrete investigations on the
presupposition that men are indeed deliberative, self-interpreting
creatures. The reason why, despite any methodological protestations to
the contrary, social scientists operate in this way is that in order to
obtain any increment to social knowledge, the methods of investigation
and procedures of explanation have to be appropriate. The penalty for
methodological dogmatism (i.e. an unbending determination to apply
some inflexible explanatory schema before one has contemplated whether
or not it is appropriate to the type of phenomena under scrutiny) in
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the social realm (or indeed anywhere), is a failure to achieve any
pertinent and interesting results. Hence, it can be said that in the
social sciences (as with other sciences) the subject-matter, in a
metaphorical sense, 'forces' those inquiring into its features to
treat it in a way that is in accordance with its basic nature. And
granted this, it is thus understandable that those who explicitly
advocate scientistic procedures, do not put them fully into practice.
It is also understandable, albeit very unfortunate, that when the
disciples of scientism violate their own professed precepts in this
fashion, any concrete results thereby obtained tend to be credited not
to the methods of inquiry they in fact used, but to those they thought
they used.
Since to be fruitful in social inquiry, one has to regard
agents as agents (and not simply as non-conscious, non-purposive
physical objects) and social phenomena as social phenomena (and not
purely as electron-proton configurations), is it not more sensible to
display openly the required metaphysical presuppositions, than to
ridicule these and then to pretend that they can be successfully
suppressed? Whatever may be achieved by this latter course of action,
one can be certain that it will not be the avowed goal of making the
social sciences more and more scientific by the progressive elimination
of obscurantist features. For scientism itself leads to a form of
unscientific obscurantism more penetrating (and far harder to dislodge)
than any it may happen to replace. The scientistic as distinguished
froia the scientific view is not an unprejudiced but a very prejudiced
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approach which, before it has considered its subject, claims to knovr
w 1
what is the most appropriate way of investigating it.
1. P.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, op. cit., p. 16
XI PURPOSIVE ACTIONS AID BKSOLTAHT SOCIETAL PHEHOKENA
(i) Intended and Unintended Consequences
The general aim of the social sciences is both to account
for the actions of specific individuals and institutions, and to trace
the overall consequences for society that are produced by particular
actions or the intersection of sets of purposive actions. As far as
economics is concerned, one is interested, more narrowly, in devising
formal theories which will enable one to demonstrate what social
consequences will result when individuals (and households, firms and
other institutions), operating within a particular type of societal
framework, consciously attempt to satisfy their needs and wants by the
allocation of scarce resources that have a number of competing potential
uses. Economic theory assumes that individual agents and institutions
each possess a specifiable hierarchy of conscious goals, and then
attempts to work out the actual societal consequences of their rational
pursuit. But how is the term 'actual* , as used here, to be
explicated?
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Karl Popper asserts that ''the main task of the
theoretical social sciences .... is to tra.ce the unintended social
repercussions of intentional, imraan actions'^ ; and, in. a similar vein,
P.A. Hayek claims that the aim of the social sciences "is to explain
2
the unintended or undesigned results of the actions of many men" .
Why is it, one immediately vrants to ask, that these two authorities
appear to place all emphasis on the unintended, rather than, as seems
strictly more accurate, the intended or unintended social consequences
of men's actions? Since it is hardly plausible to maintain that no
social phenomena occur more or less exactly ass deliberately sought by
the acting agent or agents, it would be quite arbitrary to lay it down
that intended social phenomena do not come within the province of the
social sciences. One should however beware of making too much of the
wording of citations when removed from the context in which they are
to be" found. That Popper and Hayek in their extensive writings
frequently omit to mention the intended consequences of actions, one
must take to be their way of stressing that (owing to the immense
intricacy and complexity of the inter-connections within the social
world) the unintended rather than the intended societal consequences
of human activities bulk larger among the phenomena worth investigating.
And that also, it is the unintended rather than the directly intended
results of action, which do not admit of an easy or obvious
explanation but can only be accounted for with the aid of a penetrating
!• K.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit., p. 342 et
passim (popper's italics)




One of the great virtues of recommending that the social
sciences should be constantly on the look-out for 'unintended social
consequences, is that this acts as a firm bulwark against the opposing
position that holds that every (or, perhaps, less strongly, every
important) social phenomenon can be explained as the intended result of
the action, of some person, group or institution that consciously brought
it about in order to achieve some desired goal. It is possible to
identify at least two different forms, one far less subtle than the
other, of the view that this is the basic mould into which all social
explanations should be pressed. The crude variant is customarily
called the 'conspiracy theory of society' ; this will be examined in
just a moment. The more sophisticated version of tins general thesis
is often called the 'design theory of institutions* . This theory is
characterised not so much by an uncomprising denial that unintended
consequences of actions exist (although some expositions may involve
just this), but rather the assertion that even if such phenomena do
occur, they are of but little use for serving vital human purposes,
and hence it is always rational to replace spontaneously grown systems
of social order with societal structures that have been consciously
planned to fulfil some specific function. But more will be heard of
the design theory later.
For advocates of the conspiracy theory, the explanatory
task of the social scientist is similar to that of the police detective.
He-has to regard every undesirable social event (i.e. every social event
that is disliked and is thus unwanted by the majority of those living in
the society in question) as caused by a criminal action, and his duty is
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to find and expose the culprit responsible. If, on the other hand, the
explanandum-phenoraenon is socially desirable, the duty of the social
scientist is equally clear. On such occasions he has to make sure that
members of society fully understand and appreciate that the occurrence
of the event is due to the beneficence of the governiaexit, dominant
political party or whatever institution, group or individual he thinks
deserves to be awarded the credit. Is can be discerned, one of the
main features of the conspiracy approach is its low level of theoretic
import; whether an event is deemed desirable or undesirable, an
explanation of its occurrence is held to be very simply obtained. All
one has to do is to scrutinise the event's prominent attributes, and
then discover who would want, welcome or benefit by its occurrence, and
who therefore is most likely to have engineered it by direct design; for
conspiracy theorists would argue that since whatever happens in the social
world comes about as the result of someone's plan, once a pereon (or
group) has been found who benefits from th8 event in question, who else
but that person (or group) would have brought it about?
The example that Popper gives of a thoroughly
disreputable conspiracy theory1 is the one propagated by Josef
Goebbels (1897-1945) on behalf of the German Nazi party. Goebbels
1. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, op. cit.,
p. 94ff
K.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit., p. 123ff >
p. 341ff
(popper never claims that political or social conspiracies are not
hatched. Such things obviously occur, but the important point to grasp
is that as soon as conspirators start to transform their plans into
action, this is liable to bring about repercussions they had not
intended. These unintended results may prevent the consummation of the
conspiracy, or ensure that the final state of affairs is far different
from the one originally aimed at. )
60.
believed he could prove that the defeat of Imperial Germany in 1918 and
the subsequent economic depression, were misfortunes resulting directly
from the calculations of International Zionist Capitalism , an
allegedly powerful world-wide movement led by a mysterious group of
individuals, known collectively as 'The Learned Elders of Zions »
This theory of the Zionist plot is, of course, nothing but a tissue of
fabrications.*'" Nevertheless, it remains, for the record, not only the
most notorious of all conspiracy theories, but also, not unsurprisingly,
the raost extreme. However, when, a critique is directed against the
. version most marked by excess, there is always the possibility that the
doctrine in question could be substantially rehabilitated in a weaker
form that manages to escape some, if not most, of the original criticism.
1. An historical note.
The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion was a document,
published in Tsarist Russia in 1903, which contained the purported
minutes of twenty-four meetings said to have been held in Basle in
1897, the time of the first Zionist Congress. At these meetings, it
was alleged, plans were made to overthrow all existing political
order and then to establish a world government under Zionist control.
The utterly spurious character of The Protocols was clearly
established in 1921 by Philip Graves, Constantinople correspondent
The Tines. He demonstrated that the document was a clever forgery,
compounded by the Russian secret police from two main sources: (i) a
satire by Maurice Joly on Napoleon III, published in 1864 and entitled
Dialogues aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu, and (ii) a weird
novel, Biarrits (l868), by Hermann Goedsche. More recently, John S.
Curtis, supported by a committee of prominent U.S. historians,
published An Appraisal of the Protocols of Zion (1942), in which the
document was subject to a thorough, and critical analysis, and pronounced
to have no claim whatsoever to authenticity.
For further details of this and other theories relating to
the supposed Zionist world conspiracy, see ;
— K.S. Pinson, 'Anti-Semitism', in The Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 2,
•(Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, edit., 1968), pp. 81-90
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On® must therefore ask whether showering scorn on. the notion, of a
Zionist world conspiracy,, is indeed sufficient to discredit entirely all
formulations of all types of conspiracy theory. In particular, does
this manoeuvre overthrow a re-interpretation, of the general conspiracy
thesis which advances not an all-embracing explanatory claim, but
instead a partially normative claim that for every social phenomenon,
someone (or some institution) can be found who is responsible for it
(whether or not that agent (or institution) did in fact plan and/or cause
it) ? To answer this question, one needs to examine more closely what
is involved in calling a social phenomenon an 'unintended
consequence' ,
This raatter can be usefully approached through the
methodological investigations of the sociologist Robert K. Herton into
the appropriate manner for sociologists and social anthropologists to
explain the continuation or 'hozaeostatic' survival of whole societies or
cultures. Kerton suggests (quite acceptably) that when social
anthropologists wish to account for the continued survival of a society,
or the survival of a substantial aspect of a society, they ought to
produce statements that describe: (i) the social processes or events
which are 'functional' , i.e. the processes which constitute the
(horaeostatic) mechanism by which the culture in question remains intact,
and (ii) the habitual and repetitive activities (eg. the continual
practice of certain customs, rituals, magical acts etc.) which bring
about the said functional consequences , Such repercussions of the
initiation of standardised actions are known as either 'manifest' or
°latent8 functions ; the former are "those objective consequences
contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are
2
intended and recognised by participants in the system8® , while the
latter, correlative^, are "those (societal consequences) which are
3
neither intended nor recognised" .
Herton*s characterisation of latent functions as phenomena
that are the unintended and unrecognised functional consequences of
institutional, activities, suggests strongly that it would b© illuminating
1. It is very important to see that here the explananda-phenomena are
the consequences which result from the practice of certain customs or
rituals, and not these activities themselves, the occurrences of which
are to be explained ideologically, i.e. with reference to the reasons,
aims and professed goals of the agents who participate in the actions
in question. At this point in the discussion the methodological
propriety of what can be called 'strong8 functionalism (which purports
to explain the occurrence of institutional activities just by pointing
to the fact that their societal consequences are functional) cannot be
considered. The matter will however be taken up in chapter V —
'Individualism, Holism and punctionalisn* .
2. U.K. Herton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (The Free Press,
Hew York, 1949, 1966 enlarged edition), p. 105
5. Ibid., p. 105





At once one can dismiss the possibility of the appearance of phenomena
of type (b) - it is surely a conceptual absurdity to consider that
any phenomenon could be intended and yet- unrecognised. Also, there is
no need to be concerned with phenomena of kind (a), for? in the contest
of the momenty thess arc? quite unproblematic. It ir however necessary
to distinguish between those social phenomena that are both unintended
and unforeseen, and those that are unintended but nevertheless foreseen,
A phenomenon is unintended simgliciter, if it is not
deliberately sought, i.e. if it is additional to, or differs noticeably
from, the result the actions were consciously initiated to realise. If
the agents concerned were ignorant of the fact that their attempt to
achieve a certain goal was liable to produce a different result or to
cause other phenomena as well, then each of these would be correctly
described, as a consequence of sort (d) . However, if the occurrence
of a particular unintended phenomenon did not come as a surprise to the
initiators of the causative actions in question, then this would be an
instance of a phenomenon of sort (c) .
Much of the practical value of social scientific inquiry,
especially of economics, lies in the fact that once a social phenomenon
has been successfully explained, society is then provided with the
requisite knowledge either (if* the phenomenon is deemed undesirable) to
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reform the social conditions in such a way as to prevent its
appearance* or (if the phenomenon is held to be desirable) to maintain
those aspects of the societal structure that are necessary for its
continued persistence. This sort of knowledge is particularly valuable
when it enables governments to see (and thus, hopefully, to prepare
their electorates to acceptJ) that the simultaneous conscious pursuit
of a number of different goals may be empirically impossible within
the prevailing social conditions, because the unintended consequence
of the pursuit of one of them conflicts with the (full) achievement of
one or more of the others. How, granted all this, the door is open for
looking anew at the worth of ths conspiracy theory of society, when
modified as a theory dealing with the allocation of responsibility for
the occurrence of societal phenomena.
If a man intends to bring about some event, recognises that
any action of his to this end will produce on unintended consequence in
addition, and yet still decides to proceed with his action, then clearly
he is responsible for the occurrence of that unintended result. A
similar line of reasoning applies as far as governmental (or
institutional) responsibility is concerned. If a government attempts to
achieve something, foresees that this will bring about something else,
and if that event then occurs as a direct result of the action to
achieve the intended goal, then, although the phenomenon is unintended,
the government is to be blamed (or praised, as the case may be) . Also,
if a number of private individuals act together in a certain way, and if
the government recognises that this form of activity will produce a
(intended or unintended) socially detrimental effect, it is rightly to
bs held responsible, if it neither forcibly prevents the actions
altogether, nor tries to alter the relevant social conditions with the
aim of preventing the unwanted phenomenon* When a government could have
acted to prevent a disaster and yet did not, or when it itself acted in
knowledge that the undesirable unintended consequence that resulted from
its own actions was very likely to have occurred, is it all that
mistaken to regard the government in the light une would if it had
intended to inflict the unwanted phenomenon upon society at large ?
Here, one is entitled to hesitate to give a definite
answer* what one can say on the general level, is that the growth of
social scientific knowledge tends to widen the area for which
responsibility can be assigned; for if (say) an institution has the
requisite knowledge and authority to influence social events for the
better or for the worse, then it cannot avoid some responsibility for
what happens within society. This claim is phrased in cautious terms,
because it is a grave mistake to think that perfect knowledge of all the
detailed causes of social phenomena can ever be gained. Within fields
of complex order, only 'explanations of the principle* on which its
constituent phenomena appear, are obtainable.^
However, whatever may be one's final verdict on the value of
the normative variant of the conspiracy theory, one can agree, to return
once more to the explanatory version, that while one may not be able to
1. As stated before, a critical examination of F.A. Hayek's conception
of 'explanation of the principle* in complex phenomena, will be given
in chapter III .
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disprove formally"5" the statement 'every social phenomenon is the
intended result of some consciously premeditated plan* , one is qui.to
unable to accept it as true. Actual social scientific practice 'forces*
one to accept as a basic truth concerning the nature of the subject-
matter, not the conspiracy theory's contrary (*no social phenomenon is
the result of conscious design'), but its contradictory ('at least one
social phenomenon is not the result of conscious design') , If one is
interested in providing true social explanations, it is essential to
realise that, in the words of Hayek , "the insight that not all order
that results from the interplay of human actions is the result of
2
design is indeed the beginning of social theory" . It is thus
surely undeniable that the concept 'unintended consequence' is among the
most crucial notions used by the propositions of any analysis purporting
to give a comprehensive account of what happens within a given realm of
social events. Therefore, when one is faced with a social phenomenon
for which one wants to obtain an explanation, one should not ask
oneself 'llho worked to bring this about?* , but should ask instead a
wider question that embraces this, namely, 'From what purposive action,
or set of interacting purposive actions, does this arise as the intended
or unintended social consequence in these initial environmental
conditions?' •
1. The characteristic features of statements which are neither amenable
to verification nor to falsification in a formal maimer, will be
discussed in chapter IV .
2. F.A. Hayek, The Confusion of Language in Political Thought, (The
Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1968), p. 10 (Hayek's
italics)
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To press home the point that the aforementioned is the
scientifically appropriate question for social scientists to ask,
sections (ii) and (iii) of this chapter will be devoted to giving
two examples from economic theory of the wa.y the interaction, of the
independent actions of many individuals can produce social phenomena
that are not intended by the acting agents themselves. These examples
are (a) the explanation of the frequent price instability liable to
occur in free markets for primary products, and (b) the explanation of
the Keynesian *paradox of thrift1 phenomenon .
(By way of parenthesis, a point of philosophical interest
that is worth raising, is that the word 'consequence® (or
'repercussion') , as it occurs in the phrase 'unintended consequence•
(or 'unintended repercussion*) , is ambiguous in a way that does not
appear to have been recognised by Popper or Hayek (or indeed by any
of those traditionally associated with the general methodological
approach that urges social scientists to pay particular attention to
the undesigned results of men's actions) . As it operates within the
phrase in question, the term 'consequence' may mean an unintended
phenomenon that is a causal result of an agent's purposive action,
or one that is a logical or conceptual result.* For the most part,
certainly, unintended consequences are brought about causally (eg. the
economic phenomena to be discussed later on) , but there is
nevertheless, a small residue of social phenomena that appear as a
matter of conceptual necessity. One can without much difficulty think
1. I owe this idea to Professor H.B. Acton (University of
Edinburgh) .
up simple end non-technical examples of both sorts, An example of a
causally produced unintended phenomenon may be observed to occur in an
auction room where, say, valuable paintings ere on sale. If a man
enters and starts to bid for some article, this action is likely to
cause the other eager bidders to raise the level of their ova offers.
Thus, although for the man in question it is no part of his intention
to raise the price at which the work of art he wanted could be obtained,
his action of entering the 'market place6 as an active and determined
participant is nevertheless likely to cause this to be the actual result.
An example of a conceptually entailed unintended result occurs when a
man decides on the most convenient time to obtain his lunch from a self-
service cafeteria. If he decides not to go at one o'clock because the
queue is then so long, but to go at half past one instead, he achieves
his intended result (obtaining a meal without a long time-wasting delay)
but his not appearing at one o'clock has the unintended consequence
that many cf those who do go at that time face a slightly shorter
queue. Eut this is not something caused by the agent's action; for if
he joins the queue at half past one rather than at one o'clock, it is a
logical consequence that the queue at the earlier time contains one
less person than it otherwise would have done. )
Hot only are occurrences of specific single phenomena to
be correctly accounted for as the unintended consequences of the
interaction of many actions directed towards a variety of goals, but
also whole societal structures and institutions (eg. language, common
or private law, the market price system) owe their existence and
persistence to the fact that they arose and continued to function
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although none of the acting agents bad intended that this should be the
case. Situated diametrically opposite, however, to the view that "the
independent- action of many men can produce coherent whole3, persistent
structures of relationships vrhich serve important human purposes without
having been designed for that end"'*" , lies what was called earlier
this chapter the 'design theory of institutions* ; this maintains that
"no result of the action of many men can show order or serve a useful
2
purpose unless it is the result of deliberate design" . Hers, therefore,
one has a straight confrontation between two conflicting analyses of
social processes. On the one hand, there is the account which holds
that a considerable amount of social order originally appeared, and was
subsequently maintained, q-aite spontaneously as the unintended result of
the many different actions of free men; and that, in time, such order
proved not merely helpful, but actually indispensable for the
realisation of much that civilised individuals came to desire. On the
other hand, there is the approach that insists that whenever one finds
important purposeful arrangements or organisations in society, these
should be explained largely on the supposition that there was a time
when they were consciously designed and then deliberately instituted to
serve specific ends.
It is seriously to trivialise the question at stake here,
to think of the controversy relating to the design theory as a purely
1. F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolut5,on of Science, op. cit., p. 80
2. Ibid., p. 80
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•academic* problem concocted by Hayek in 1942^, and then developed and
2
publicised by Popper two years later . (it is of course a plain
3 4
historical fact that in recent times Hayek and Popper have been
very much to the fore in leading the debate on this issue,) for ous'b
view of how to settle this methodological controversy, carries with
it far-reaching implications concerning the extent to which it is both
rational and desirable to place economic and other social processes
1, P.A. Hayek, 'Scientism and the Study of Society* -
- Part I in Economics, Vol, 12 (Hew Series), Ho, 35,
August 1942, pp, 267-291
- Part II in Econoraica, Vol, 2 (Hew Series)» Ho, 37,
February 1943, pp, 34-63
- Part III in Economics, Vol, XI (Hew Series), Ho, 41,
February 1944, pp, 27-39
(The above ore published as the first half (i.e. pp, 13-102) of The
Counter-Revolution of Science, op. cit. .)
2, K.iU Popper, *The Poverty of Eistoricism* -
- Part I in Economica, Vol. XI (Hew Series), Ho. 42,
Kay 1944, pp. 86-103
- Part II in Econoaica. Vol. XL (hew Series), Ho. 43,
August 1944, pp. 119-137
- Part III in Bcononica, Vol. XII (New Series), No. 46,
May 1945, PP. 69-89
(The above are published as The poverty of Historicism, op, cit, .)
3. P.A, Eayek, passim, but especially -
(a) •Individualism: True and False1 (1946), in Individualism and
Economic Order, (fioutledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949),
PP. 1-32
(b) •Kinds of Nationalism1 (1965) and 'The Results of Human Action
but not of Human Design8 (1967), in Studies in Philosophy,
politics and Economics, (Routledgo and Kegan Paul, London,
1967), pp. 82-95 and §6-105, respectively.
4. K.R. Popper, passim, but especially -
(a) The Open society and its Enemies, Vol. II, op. cit., Chapter
24 (i.e. pp. 224-258)
(b) 8Utopia and Violence8 (1948), 'Towards a Rational Theory of
Tradition* (1949) cad 'Public Opinion and Liberal Principles'
(1955), in Conjectures and Refutations, op, cit., pp. 355-363,
120-135 and, 347-354, respectively.
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under a system of unified central management.
Belief in a predominantly design theory of social
explanation, engenders an 'engineering state of raind* which is
favourably disposed to the view that societal institutions and processes
are optimally serviceable to human interests (and hence worthy of
retention) ,, only if they have been deliberately created for the overt
purpose of forming the means whereby specific human desires are to be
satisfied, and if they then remain under conscious control to ensure
that they continue to serve the particular functions for which they
were intended in the first place. By way of contrast, acceptance of a
mainly 'unintended consequence' type of analysis, inclines one to the
position that provided spontaneously arisen systems of social order
operate, on the whole and for the most part, more effectively than
would any empirically possible alternative arrangements produced by
direct design, they should be allowed to remain largely intact (but be
subject to conscious adjustment whenever this is deemed necessary) .
Deciding between these two approaches need be neither
arbitrary, nor a matter of blind, unthinking prejudice. If one
considers the problem sensibly, the choice seems clearly to hinge on
whether in fact an undesigned and spontaneously functioning system of
social order is more, or is less, purposeful with regard to the
efficient satisfaction of the needs and wants of society's members,
than an overall structure consciously designed to fulfil the same
general function. And to this, one is able to give an answer. Perhaps
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the decisive reason, why a largely spontaneous "polycentric^ system
of social order (i.e. a system of unintended order resulting from the
actions of agents motivated by their own aims, and guided by their own.
understanding of their particular situational circumstances) is likely
to be more effective in serving the vast number of diffuse and differing
goals sought by members of society, is that such a system of mutually
adjusting relationships can be sufficiently complex to be responsive to
all the numerous and varying human wants. It can be precisely this,
because it is able to draw upon and utilise the requisite knowledge
distributed over, and only accessible to, the millions of separate
2
individuals and institutions whose countless needs require satisfaction.
By comparison, a •monocentric' system of social order (i.e. a system
of consciously created and directed order resulting from the actions of
agents motivated not by their individual decisions, but by the particular
commands of a central agency) , can necessarily only be as intricate
(and thus, adaptable and flexible) a structure as will actually permit
3
of management by the controlling body.
The first person to be generally credited with arguing that
a social order which is mainly the result of spontaneous and unintended
growth, may indeed be highly purposeful in serving men's varied interests,
is the Dutchman Bernard handevil le (1670-1733) «• It was against the
conception that a serviceable social order can only result from conscious
1. H. Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1951), p. 170ff
2. Ibid., pp. 111-122 and 180-192
3. Reference will be made again to this point, in chapter III .
design* that Kandeville in 1714 posited the paradox of 'private Vices
Publick Benefits' in his The Fable of the Bees , This book begins
with, a reprint of a work that Kandeville first published nine years
earlier* a 435-line satirical allegory entitled 'The Grumbling Hive: Or
Knaves Turn'd Honest' , It is this short piece of verse, in which the
description of the life within a beehive acts as an analysis of the
economic life of early eighteenth century England, that first gives
expression to Kandeville's profound insights into the operation and
functioning of social processes,"1"
The inhabitants of Kandeville's hive are all addicted to
the vices of luxury, avarice, prodigality, pride and vanity, but though
the underlying motives for their self-interested actions may be
considered reprehensible at one level, the hive does not come to grief
as a result of the sins of its numerous members; on the contrary, the
overall result of all their actions produces the desirable state of
affairs of an economically prosperous civilisation. The reason is that
these vices promote material development, by creating desires which the
bees see they can satisfy to their own benefit if they become
1, In his history of the doctrines given by those whom he takes to
be the precursors of his own view regarding the danger of 'under¬
consumption* , it is interesting to find that John Kaynard Keynes
(l83>~1946) assigns Mandeviile a high and honourable place,
- J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,
(Hacmillan, London, 1936, edit,, 1957), pp. 359-362
74.
manufacturers and tradesmen. In this flourishing community, although :
"
... every Part was full of Vice,
Yet the whole Mass a Paradice;11 1
Bandeville, therefore, does not condemn the bees for their vices j the
prosperity of the hive as a whole depends on, and results from, these
same self-seeking actions of its constituent members. Indeed, even %
" The Worst of all the Multitude
Did something for the common Good." 2
For, Kandeville argues, even the activities of criminals have the good
3
effect that they provide lucrative work for many - lawyers, goalers,
turnkeys, sergeants, tipstaffs and locksmiths - and they in their turn
are then in possession of the wherewithal to indulge their appetites for
luxury.
The general approach that Kandeville expounds in his own
fanciful and picturesquely exaggerated manner, lies at the heart of all
subsequent attempts to achieve a sound form of social inquiry. Later on
in the same century, Kandeville • s main theme provides the foundation
for classical economics.
It is precisely to the discovery that societal phenomena
such as the market economy can arise which are not intended, but which
may then prove the only feasible means by which men can achieve their
1..P. Earth (ed), Kandeville - The Fable of the Bees, (Penguin, London,
1970), p. 67
2. Ibid., p. 63
3. Ibid., p. 71
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separate and conflicting goals, that Adam Saith (1725-1790) alludes,
in his famous reference to the activities of the 'invisible hand' *
Despite the ridicule and abuse that has been, and still often is,
showered upon Saith , he, more than anyone else, deserves to be
considered the originator of systematic social theorising. In the
following passage, Smith advances the thesis that is foundational to
all forms of sound social scientific investigation; namely, that
frequently men unwittingly establish a spontaneous system of
polycentric order, and then subsequently realise that to make use of
this structure is a more effective way to achieve their many goals, than
any alternative means available to them. Saith writes;
"
.... every individual necessarily labours to render
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. ... he
intends only Ms own gain, and he is in tiiis, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
wMch was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the
worse for the society that it was no part of it. By
pursuing Ms own interest he frequently promotes that of
the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it. M 1
Here, Saith contends that (for the Britain of Ms day), if the desired
aim is to produce the Mghest national income possible ('to render the
annual revenue of the society as great as possible') at the given stage
of technological development, then the rational tMng to do is to
encourage extensive division of labour by permitting each individual to
adjust Ms own actions, in whatever way he see3 fit, to the spontaneous
1. E. Cannan (ed), Adam Snith — The Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, 1776,
(Methuen, London, edit,, 1961), pp. 477-478 (i.e. Bk. IV, CM 2)
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price system arising (within the moral and legal framework) from the
actions of all the other individuals. Salthis bold claim that a,
competitive market economy is the most technically efficient means known
to man of providing for human needs and wants ('of promoting the public
interest'), rests on the astute observation, that the operation of a
market price system doe3 not require anyone to undertake the task of
consciously co-ordinating the actions of each individual to the actions
of all the others. In a free econoray such co-ordination is achieved
more or less automatically when each individual seeks 'only his own
gain', not in the abstract, but in response to public indicators (eg.
prices, costs, profit rates) which emerge as the unintended consequences
of the like actions of all the other participants within the economy.
As well-informed commentators"*' have taken pains to stress,
it is no part of Smith's argument that a spontaneous or self-generating
social order is ipso facto a perfectly functioning social order. Smith
in fact fully recognises that an unintended social structure may possess
features that are unwanted, and that if this should be the case, men are
fully entitled to make conscious alterations to the system to remove its
1. For example,
- E. Vfnitiaker, A History of Economic Ideas, (Longmans, Hew York, 1940),
pp. 158-159
- A. Gray, The Development of Economic Doctrine, (Longmans, London,
edit., 19677, p. 148f£
•undesirable characteristics,. Smith merely argues that a purposeful, and
well co-ordinated social order., does not necessarily imply the existence
of an orderer (here, the price mechanism of a market economy provides a
conclusive counter-example to the contrary claim of the design theory) ;
and to eay that specific social phenomena are produced by the actions of
men, is not to say that they must therefore be the result of conscious
design.
Although it is methodologically appropriate for all the
social sciences to follow Kandeville and Smith in giving due
recognition to the likelihood of both specific phenomena and purposeful
systems of polycentrie order arising quite spontaneously without any
conscious direction, the clearest and most spectacular examples of the
employment of the concept •unintended consequence* are to be found
within economic theory. The rest of this chapter will thus be devoted
1, Although Smith champions the use of the spontaneous price mechanism
as the most effective means for achieving material prosperity, hs is
fully aware that an industrial society based upon the free division of
labour has its own special (unintended) evils. He declares that when a
man*s employment comes to be confined to the performance of just a few
very simple operations, his whole character and life are impoverished
in certain ways. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems ...
to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social and martial
virtues. But in every improved and civilised society this is the state
into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people,
must necessarily fall unless government takes some pains to prevent it. **
Smith then goes on, in his discussion of education, to give his firm
support to State action undertaken for the explicit purpose of removing
these unwanted consequences of labour specialisation, consequences,
incidentally, which later generations were to name 'alienation*
— E. Canaan (ed), Adam Smith - The Wealth of Rations, Vol. II, 1776,
(liethuen, London, edit., 1961), p. 302 (above citation), and
PP. 503-309 (i.e. Bk. V, Ch. 1, Pt. 3, Art. 2) .
to illustrating how social scientific explanations typically operate, by
giving two examples taken from economic science. (it is to be observed
again that although economics is distinguished from the other social
sciences by being the only theoretical social science, its explanatory
approach is similar to that of the other social sciences because it frames
its explanations as answers to the same general question of inquiry.)
(ii) Example (a) - The Phenomenon of Price Oscillation
The scientifically acceptable way to account for a social
phenomenon, is to trace back its causal antecedents to the set of
consciously purposive actions from which it arose (as the intended or
unintended eonsequence) within the prevailing societal conditions and
circumstances. The first of the two examples illustrating explanations
falling into this common, structure, concerns the occurrence of certain
instances of price instability. More precisely, the questions one is
seeking to answer are; 'Why is it that in free markets, the prices of
many agricultural goods and other primary products tend to oscillate
between a high and a low point from year to year, and that these limits
are liable over time to become increasingly separated? From what sort
of behavioural interaction does this kind of phenomenon result?' .
A solution to this perplexing problem is to be provided by
that branch of economic theoiy that deals with the way relative prices
are determined within a free-market society. It is reasonable to
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niii.in.talu that 1micro-economic price theory' , as this part of economics
is usually call ed,, has no competitor as the most advanced and best
developed of all social scientific theories. In his well known text-
hook, the economist Richard Lipsey pays it the very highest
compliments. This theory, he asserts, "is beautiful in its simplicity
and yet unusual in its wide range of real-world applications, ibr
all its shortcomings, the theory of the determination of price by
demand and supply is one of the finest examples of a theory that is
both simple and powerful."* .
At the very heart of this social theory, one finds the
fundamental premise that "when time and the means for achieving ends
are limited and capable of alternative application, then behaviour
2
necessarily assumes the form of choice" . Individuals (and also
households, firms and other institutions) cannot satisfy all their wants
and desires to the fullest possible extent, because it is an empirical
impossibility to supply all the goods and services that would be
required to do this. In the face of this basic fact of scarcity,
without which there would be no economic activity, the supply produced
to satisfy the deraand for one particular type of good, 1ms necessarily
to be limited, if other kinds of goods and services are to be supplied
to satisfy other sorts of demand. Ceteris paribus (i.e. if there is
no government intervention, and a state of free competition prevails),
1, II.Go Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive Economics, (Weidenfeld and
Kicolson, London, second edit., 1966), p. 104
2. L. Robbins, op. cit., p. 13 (Robbing' italics)
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ths way the various factors of production (that is, the available
•units® of land, labour and capital) are used for productive purposes,
is decided by the demand decisions of consumers expressed through the
mechanism of the market price system. The final equilibrium price of
one sort of commodity, that is the price at which neither a shortage
nor a surplus develops, is determined both by the level of demand for it,
and the level of supply of it. The total demand for a good ~ the total
quantity demanded per time period - at a particular price, is the sum
of all the separate demands of all consuming individuals mid
institutions. Likewise, the total supply of a commodity at a particular
price, is the addition of the various supply flows per time period
produced by all firms making that typo of good.
Each individual's demand for a particular sort of commodity
is dependent upon a number of variables, such as (i) the ruling or
current price of the good, (ii) the ruling prices of other goods, and
especially those of substitute and complementary goods, (iii) his own
level of disposable money income, and (iv) his tastes and preferences .
Similarly, each firm's supply of a good is a function not only of the
first two and last mentioned of these factors, but also of (a) the
current state of technology, and (b) the price and availability of
land, labour and capital . But as far as the theory itself is
concerned, one examines the general connections holding between the
variables 'quantity demanded' , 'quantity supplied' and 'ruling
price' as if all factors influencing the levels of demand and supply
remain constant over time.
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Micro-economic theory assumes that the conscious aim of
each consumer is the maximisation of his satisfaction, and that this is
rationally achieved, when, equal money expenditures on the last units
obtained of each of the different kinds of goods purchased, yield equal
amounts of satisfaction. Suppliers are likewise held to be rational;
since each individual supplier is held to be anxious to maximse his
profit, it is assumed that he will therefore produce goods up to the
level at which the marginal cost of the last good produced equals the
marginal revenue obtained from the sale of that last good."* Also, it is
assumed that if the price of any one sort of good should rise, then
some suppliers would substitute, in place of the kind of good they were
2
producing, production of that relatively more scarce sort of good.
From these assumptions about the actions of consumers and
suppliers of goods, two important general conclusions about the
1. Thus, the upward sloping portion of any individual supplier's
marginal cost curve can be regarded as his short-ran supply curve.
The market supply curve for a good of a certain sort, is the result
of the horizontal summation of all the individual supply curves.
2. This statement is true, both when suppliers are operating in
conditions of 'pure competition1 and when they are in conditions of
•monopolistic competition* .
behaviour with which micro-economics is concerned, can be given?
(a) Provided all other influences on demand remain constant,
the total demand for any one type of product will vary
inversely with any change in the ruling price - i.e. quantity
demanded is a decreasing function of price.
(b) Provided all other influences on supply remain constant,
the total supply of any one kind of product will vary
directly with any change in the ruling price - i.e. quantity
supplied is an increasing function of price.
Graphical curves representing the schedules of the quantities demanded
and supplied of any one type of good through the range of possible
ruling prices, can be drawn to illustrate statements (a) and (b) .
On any such graph, it is usual for 'quantity* to be measured along the
abscissa (the horizontal axis) , and 'price* to be measured up the
ordinate (the vertical axis) .
In figure 1, curve ]) , the market demand curve (produced,
by the horizontal summation of all individual demand curves), slopes
continuously downward from the left to the right, while the curve S ,
the market supply curve (produced by the horizontal summation of the
supply curves of all separate producers), slopes continuously upward
1. These conclusions offer good descriptions of the behaviour of
consumers and suppliers as they act towards 'normal * goods. One does,
however, meet 'abnormal' cases of demand and supply?
(i) Demand is directly related to price when a consumer of low
income has to purchase a minimum quantity of a good to stay
alive. If its price rises, this may leave the consumer too
poor to spend the remainder of his income on anything other
than a few more units of the vital good in question.
(ii) Supply is inversely related to price when a supplier attempts
to maintain constant the absolute level of Ms total income,
by supplying more if the price falls, and by supplying less
if the price rises.
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from the left to the right. Oxie should notice that a change in the
quantity demanded (or supplied), is to be distinguished from a change
in the level of demand (or supply) . The former is a change due to a
change in the ruling price. If (figure I.) the price changes from Gp^
to Op.,., j then there will be a change in the quantity demanded from
FU.l
0qi to Oq^ . The latter is change in demand (or supply) due to an
exogenous"*" change in one of the variables, apart from the ruling price,
determining the level of demand (or supply) . If (figure 2.) the ruling
price remains constant at Op^ a change in, say, consumer tastes could
result in an increase in the level of demand, represented by a shift in
the demand curve from D to , such that consumers would demand.
quantity Oq^ instead of Oq^ •
1, Economists usually refer to dependent and independent variables as,
respectively, 'endogenous®, and 'exogenous® or 'autonomous variables'.
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One more major feature of market demand and supply curves
needs to be mentioned, before one can attempt to give an adequate
explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. The 'coefficient
of price elasticity of demand (or supply)1 is the numerical measure
which indicates the percentage change in quantity demanded (or
supplied), compared to the percentage change in price. Thus %
£
, (or ^ ) «* $ change in quantity demanded (or supplied)& S
change in price
To condense the matter greatly, the demand for (or supply of) a
commodity is said to have zero, unit, or infinite price elasticity, or
to be price inelastic or elastic, if, respectively, the quantity
demanded (or supplied) does not change as price changes, changes by the
same percentage, is infinite at one particular price, changes
proportionately less as price changes, or changes proportionately more
as price changes."'"
In a market situation represented by demand and supply
curves, the price at which these curves intersect, if they do so at all,
is the equilibrium price. If such a price emerges in a market, then
that price is unique; a commodity never has more than one equilibrium
2
price per market. From the basic behavioural patterns assumed so
1. Strictly, since demand is usually inversely related to price, the
coefficient of price elasticity of demand should, in normal cases,
be negative. Convention, however, allovrs one to drop the '(-1)* ,
with which the numerical measure is a product.
2. In certain abnormal conditions, one does have more than one
potential equilibrium price per market, eg® when one has a backward
sloping supply curve of labour, and this intersects the employers'
demand curve for labour at two wage levels.
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far - the lower the price the greater will be the total quantity
demanded and the smaller the total quantity supplied, and, the higher
the price the smaller mil be the quantity demanded and the greater the
quantity supplied •- it follows that if there is an interaction and
the ruling price is a disequilibrium price, then a position of
equilibrium will tend to establish itself.
This tendency to gain or to restore an equilibrium
position when in a disequilibrium position, results from a spontaneously
functioning feedback mechanism. If (figure 3.) the ruling
disequilibrium price was Op^ the quantity demanded would be les3 than
, while the quantity supplied would be greater than this amount.
The suppliers would therefore discover that at this price they would be
left with an unsold surplus at the end of the time period in question.
On the reasonable supposition that they would all prefer to sell at a
reduced price than to risk not selling anything, they would each reduce
the price from Op^ • As the price was lowered so the quantity
demanded would increase, and as the ruling price approached price Op^ ,
86.
so the difference between the quantities demanded and supplied would
approach vanishing point. Thus, one can see that an unintended result
of the interaction of consumer and supplier behaviour in a market for a
particular commodity, is, at the minimum, a strong tendency for that
market to be self-co-ordinating and self-adjusting; it will tend to
6correct8 any disequilibrium price that emerges as the ruling price.
In the preceeding argument, the word 'tend8 has been used
extensively. In the market represented by figure 3® it would in fact
be the case, for reasons that will become apparent in a short time, that
the spontaneous feedback mechanism is not only necessary but is also
sufficient to ensure that from a position of disequilibrium, an
equilibrium price would, ceteris paribus, be achieved. Nothing however
in the construction of price theory, justifies the inference that in all
cases of price disequilibrium the feedback mechanism (the undesigned
effect of the intersection of the rationally purposive actions of
consumers and suppliers) is sufficient to achieve an equilibrium price.^
But the tendency for the market to 'correct' a disequilibrium situation,
is always present, as an unintended consequence, when demand and supply
actions are causally related to the level of the ruling price, in the
way described.
On the assumption that the feedback mechanism is sufficient
to restore a loot equilibrium, the method known, as 'comparative static
equilibrium analysis' enables one to 'explain in principle' the
occurrence of a wide range of economic and related social phenomena. In
1. G.C. Archibald and R.G. Lipsey, An Introduction to a Mathematical
Treatment of Economics, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967),
pp. 273.-502
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static analysis, one starts from one equilibrium position, hypothesises
some change, and then compares the theoretic resultant with the old
equilibrium position. From the differences between these two positions,
one obtains an idea of what would happen in society, if the theoretically
supposed change were actually introduced. In such cases, given the basic
theoretical structure, one just thinks through the consequences of the
proposed change by determining how the market mechanism would react.
However, to explain the phenomenon of price oscillation,
static analysis, with its assumption of the sufficiency of the feedback
mechanism, is inadequate. To account for an instance of this kind of
explanandum-phenomenon, one requires to construct a slightly more
complicated dynamic theoiy to show how the variables 1quantity
demanded1 , *quantity supplied' and 'ruling price' behave in between
the introduction of the original change, and the subsequent attainment,
if any, of a new equilibrium position.
As well as abandoning the sufficiency assumption regarding
the operation of the feedback mechanism, one needs to adopt the
additional premise that a change in the ruling price elicits a change
in the total quantity supplied after a one period time-lag. As an
assumption for a theory of the markets of most manufactured (or
secondary) products this would be unsatisfactoiy, for often an increase
in the level of demand for industrial commodities can be met almost
immediately by an increase in supply due to the utilisation of spare
capacity or by increasing overtime working. However, with other types
of goods, notably agricultural and other primary products, the respective
markets would in fact take a longer time to respond to an increase in
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price, sometimes a whole year would be required."*" For the theory
relating to the markets of such kinds of goods, the assumption of this
additional supposition is acceptable.
Assuming, therefore, a one period time-lag in the alteration
of the quantity supplied, two main explanatory accounts are available.
In figure 4® the original equilibrium is at price Op , with quantity
supplied Oq . But during time period t , one supposes, the level of
supply temporarily contracts because of a harvest failure. This is
illustrated by movement of the supply curve, from S to . The new
ruling price is Op^ , and the quantity supplied is Oq^ . Given a one
period time-lag between a price rise and the causal effect on the
1. G.C. Archibald and R.G. Lipsey, op. cit., p. 298
ALso,
- R.G. lipsey, op. cit., pp. 139-159
— P.A. Samuelson, Economics, (KcGraw-IIill, Chicago, sixth edit.,
1964), pp. 396-398 and pp. 399-423
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quantity supplied, it can be seen, that during time period (t *b l) ,
ceteris paribus, the quantity supplied, in response to tiie ruling prico
Op^ of time period t , will be Oq^ . But in period (t f l) in order
to soil quantity Qq^ , the price will have to fall to Qp^ . In time
period (it* 2) , because of the fall in price from Op^ to Op^ in
period (t -4- l) , quantity Oq^ will be supplied. But if that quantity
is supplied, demand for it will bid the price up to Op^ ... etc. . One
can draw 'up a table to illustrate the various quantities and prices i
Time period Quantity supplied Price
t Oq Op
t + 1 Oq Op
t + 2 Oq^ Op.^
etc.
In the kind of market represented by figure 4. , and whose time periods
are detailed by the above table, the feedback mechanism i_s sufficient to
renew an equilibrium once a previous one has been disturbed. The price
oscillations will over time become smaller end smaller, and eventually
quantity Oq will be supplied at price Op . The graphical
representation of markets of this sort, is known as a •convergent (or
stable) cobweb1 .
The explanation of why the feedback is sufficient to restore
a lost equilibrium in markets of this kind, is that such markets are the
unintended results of the interaction of actions comprising a level of
demand thai is more price elastic than the level of supply ; as price
alters, the percentage change in quantity demanded alters more than the
percentage change In quantity supplied. Thus, the percentage increase in
price due to the supply of a shortage is less than the percentage decrease
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in price required to sell a supplied surplus. But since each surplus is
supplied following from the price increase due to a previous shortage,,
each oscillatory cycle starts from a ruling price nearer than the one
before it to the equilibrium price. Therefore, the size of the price
oscillation gradually gets smaller ana smaller with the passing of time,
as can be seen by inspection of the relevant graph.
The second and contrasting type of market, is illustrated
by figure 5. «- Here, the market is represented by what is called a
^divergent (or unstable) cobwebr . Suppose that the original equilibrium
price is Op , and that quantity Oq is supplied. If, in time period
t , this equilibrium is disturbed, the new quantity supplied will be,
say, Qq^ at price Gp^ . On. the basis of a one period time-lag in
supply, price Op^ in period t would elicit the supply of quantity
0q2 in period (t ~h l) . But in this period, such a quantity could only
be sold if the price were Op^ , ... etc. . Exactly the same table as
for the stable sort of market, outlines the time periods and price
oscillations of this unstable type of market.
With divergent markets, the price oscillations grow larger
and larger as time proceeds. The feedback mechanism, although operative,
fails to be successful. The explanation why this should be so, closely
parallels the previous explanation why convergent markets are stable.
In an unstable market, the interacting behaviour of consumers and
suppliers is such, that as price changes, the percentage change in
quantity supplied alters more than the percentage cliange in quantity
demanded. This means that the percentage increase in price folio1.ring
from a shortage, is more than the percentage decrease in price necessary
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to sell a supplied surplus. But since each, surplus is supplied
following in time from, the price increase due to a previous shortage,
the ruling price oscillates each cycle further and further away from
the equilibrium price.
Since this analysis of unstable markets is generally
applicable to free markets for primary products (the supply of such
commodities is both subject to periodic time-lags, and to unpredictable
and sudden alterations due to adverse weather, or animal or plant
disease, and the demand is liable to bo less price elastic than the
supply^) , one is thus able to use it to give an 'explanation of the
principle' upon which price oscillations tend to pervade such markets.
The phenomenon of price oscillation, to emphasise this point again, is
not something maliciously engineered by somebody, but is an occurrence
that appears as an unintended consequence when certain sorts of actions,
each directed towards its own goal, intersect in a particular type of
societal environment. But once this fact becomes known, that most
influential of institutions, the government, is then in a position to
act rationally if it wishes to take effective steps to neutralise the
unwanted aspects of the resultant situation.
Indeed, it is because economists have successfully accounted
for the explsnanduia-phenomenon in question, that governments in most
western (i.e. non-communist) nations find it necessary to intervene
actively in the free markets for agricultural and other primary products.
This policy of intervention, is consciously designed to stabilise the
1. E.G. Lipsey, op. cit., p. 117 and 142
market by ruling out price oscillations and, as far as possible, changes
in the quantity offered for sale (not necessarily the same thing as the
quantity produced), from year to year. The desired stabilisation is
achieved by such measures as government controlled marketing boards,
guaranteed price support, direct subsidies to producers, variable import
tariffs, and numerous kinds of programmes intended to limit or increase
compulsorily the actual supply of certain goods at particular times."*"
(iii) Example (b) - The 'Paradox of Thrift' phenomenon
For a second example of the way in which deliberate action
can produce unintended consequences ox a striking kind, ve shall examine
the phenomenon known to economists as the 'paradox of thrift" . But
before this paradox can be reached, it is necessary for us to direct our
energy to seeking an answer to the following two-part question: 'If
there is some unused capacity in the economy, what would happen if,
ceteris paribus, many individuals decided to save a larger proportion of
their incomes than they are now doing? Ire a large number of individuals
able simultaneously to increase the absolute level of their saving if
this should be the intention of each of them?' . To obtain a reply to
this double question, one cannot employ the micro-economic price theory
X» P.A. Samuelson, op. cit., p. 405ff
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that was used in the previous section.
The main task of micro-economics, is to explain the
arrangement of the relative prices of those commodities and cervices,
demanded and supplied within a market economy, that it is called upon
to examine. But the question under consideration, at the moment, is not
concerned with the problem of the connections between the prices and
commodities to be found in the various parts of an economy. The interest
is rather in discovering the causal relationships (if any) which hold
between aggregate variables such as total employment, total expenditure,
the levels of saving and investment, and the average level of all prices.
The formal theory that has been painstakingly developed over many years
to deal with such high level societal phenomena, is called 'maero-
economic theory' . It must not however be thought that because macro¬
economics deals with 'wholes' , it operates in violation of the general
principle that in any sound social inquiry all operative changes must be
traceable to the deliberative actions of individuals, groups of
individuals and institutions. The fundamental mode of theoretical
analysis employed by macro-economics is methodologically identical to
that used by micro-economics; indeed one "should think of micro and
macro variables as representing a continuum of more or less aggregated
data ranging from the expenditure of a single individual on a single
commodity to the total expenditure of all households in the world on all
commodities""1" . Macro variables are thus not anything other than simple
aggregations of properties predicable of (anonymous but typically
1. R.G. Lipsey, op. cit., p. 558
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socialised) individuals living in the society under investigation. For
this reason, there may he tines when it is as difficult to draw a clear-
cut line between what is a micro- and what is a macro-economic
phenomenon, as it is to tell of certain shades of colour whether they
are more properly described as blue or ae green.
Hacro-economic theoiy obtains its explanatory ability by-
treating the whole economy as a circular flow of income, This flow runs
from households and individuals to firms and businesses in return for
goods and services purchased, and then runs back again from films and
businesses in the form of wages, salaries, rent and dividends for
productive services rendered. The Gross National Income (equal to the
money value of the Gross National Product ) is the total flow of money
1
income per time period paid to all individuals and firms. The GNX
(hereafter called simply the ^national income* ) in time period t is
equal,, ceterla paribus, to aggregate expenditure, or the total flow of
money spent by individuals and firms, in time period (t + l) . Aggregate
expenditure at any time period is itself, ceteris paribus, the determinant
of the national income at a later time period.
But other things may well not be equal. There may be
additions to the circular flow of income, such as investment expenditure,
government spending, and payments made from abroad for the purchase of
exported goods. Likewise, there may be withdrawals such as saving,
taxation, and money used to buy imported goods. If in any period
1. The Net National Income (MUX) is equal to the money value of the
Net National Product (llNP). MNI equals the value of the GNP minus
a suia deducted to the value of capital depreciation and indirect
taxation.
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additions to the flow should exceed withdrawals, this will cause, via
the 'multiplier'^, an increase in the volume of the flow in succeeding
periods of time. Conversely, if in any period of time, withdrawals
should exceed additions, this will cause a contraction in the circular
flow of income in following time periods.
The whole economy is said to be 'in equilibrium' , if
there is nothing operating to cause the circular flow of income to
increase or decrease in magnitude ewer tine. This occurs whon
withdrawals from the circular flow equal additions in any time period,
in economy is thus in equilibrium when national, income equals aggregate
expenditure over successive time periods, i.e. 1^" II _^ .
To turn this general conception of the economy into a
serviceable explanatory account, one first makes the simplifying
assumption that oil additions and withdrawals, except for saving ( S )
and investment ( I ) , balance, and that S and I are determined
independently of each other. Secondly, one supposes that within the
economy there is not full utilisation of all the factors of production
of each sort, and that any increase in aggregate expenditure (which
constitutes the total level of demand) will be net by increasing the
total supply of goods by bringing into productive use previously idle,
or underemployed, factors. Prom, this second assumption, it follows that
1. The 'multiplier' addition (or subtraction) is the product of the
original addition (or subtraction) ana the reciprocal of the marginal
propensity to save. Since the MPS is, by definition, (l - the
marginal propensity to consume), it can be seen that the 'multiplied*
amount (to be added or subtracted) is obtained by using 'a/l-r' -
the formula for a geometric progression to infinity where r <1 .
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the level of employment, or use of labour factors, is a rising function
of aggregate expenditure.
Within the structure of the theory, the level of aggregate
expenditure in tirse period (t l) is, by definition, made up from the
investment expenditure in that period and. from that part of the national
income obtained in period t that is not withdrawn in period (t+1)
but is spent, or consumed, on goods and services in that period. Thus,
as far as the theory goes, it is analytically true that B, . is
equivalent to . It is also true by definitional identity
that the national income in one period will either be saved or consumed
in the next period, that is, Y, is equivalent to S, ,-b C. , . On the% v*X V*\L
understanding that it is a "fundamental psychological law, upon which
we are entitled to depend with great confidence both a priori from our
knowledge of human nature and from the detailed facts of experience, ...
that XRQTL S.IT0 disposed, as a rule and on the average, to increase their
consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the increase
in their income""'" , one infers that as national income rises, the
average propensity to consume (APC) - the percentage of total income
that is not saved — falls.
o
In figure 6. the 45 degree line is called the •linear
aggregate supply function* , and every point on it represents a
2
potential equilibrium because at every such point . On this
1. J.K. Keynes, op. cit., p. 96 (Keynes* italics) . See chapter V
of this present discussion for an analysis of what *psychological*
means in the citation in question here.
2. E.G. Lipsey, op. cit., pp. 545-593
P.A. Samuelson, op. cit., pp. 221-249
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graph, and similarly with figure 7. , the level of the flow of
expenditure in time period (t -r l) is measured up the ordinate, while
the level of the flow of national income in time period t is measured
along the abscissa® The level of investment expenditure is assumed in
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the short run"* to be autonomous it is represented by a horizontal
line at level Ob parallel to the abscissa® Consumption spending,
since it is an increasing function of the level of income, is represented
by the curve C which rises upwards and to the right, but becomes
flatter at the top in accordance with the demands of Keynes'
'fundamental law' . If national income were to drop below the level Oa ,
total consumption expenditure in the following period would exceed it,
for many individuals would start to borrow or live off past savings to
maintain something of their accustomed standards of living® At all levels
of national income beyond Qa , the level of consumption in one period is
less than the level of income of the previous period, since individuals
start to save once their incomes rise beyond a certain point. The curve
1. In the long run the main deterainants of investment expenditure
ere two in number, (i) the rate of interest, and (ii) the marginal
efficiency of capital. The first of these depends upon the quantity
of money (decided by the Central Bank) and the liquidity preferences
of investors. The EEC is the rate of discount which would make the
present value of the flow of expected returns just equal to the
supply price.
The basic factors of the theory are spoken of in the following
passage s
"we can .... regard our ultimate independent variables as
consisting of (l) the three fundamental psychological factors,
namely, the psychological propensity to consume, the
psychological attitude to liquidity and the psychological
expectation of future yield from capital-assets, (2) the wage-
unit as determined by the bargains reached between employers
and employed, and (3) the quantity of money as determined by
the action of the central bank; so that, if we take as given
the factors specified above, these variables determine the
national income .... and the quantity of employment."
- J.M. Keynes, op. cit», pp. 246-247 . For the account of the
determinants of investment, see pp. 135-174
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3 represents the level of total saving, and its position, is determined
at each point by the vertical distance the curve C lies below the
aggregate supply function. Finally, the aggregate expenditure function,
C-M , is represented by a curve lying vertically above curve C by an
amount equal to the level of investment. On tho graph, the equilibrium
level of income, which gives rise in the succeeding period to expenditure
Od , is Oe . At this level S — I and, thus, because there is nothing
to cause the flow of income per time period to increase or to decrease,
Y.~ E. , .t t*l
The level of employment, as previously noted, is a function
of aggregate expenditure or demand. To be more theoretically precise,
and to use the vrords of ICeynes himself, "the volume of employment is
determined by the point of intersection of the aggregate supply function
with the aggregate demand function"'' . Since one is interested in the
connection between the level of saving and the level of employment, one
must therefore investigate how changes in the former effect changes in
the level of aggregate expenditure.
If the average propensity to save (APS) were increased for
some reason, this would, per defi.nltionea, mean a decrease in the APG •
1. J.M. Keynes, op. cit., p. 89
\
In figure 7., an increase in the level of total saving —




by moving curve S to position . When this occurs, the consumption
function (omitted) and hence the aggregate expenditure function must
fall, in the latter case from C + I to (c + i)1 . Consequent upon
this, aggregate supply is reduced, and employment falls from the level
associated with aggregate expenditure level Od to that associated with
level Od^ .
Thus, given the assumed conditions and circumstances, this
analysis demonstrates that the level of employment is to be expected to
rise as the level of total saving falls, and to fall as this rises. One
now has the answer to the first part of the double question asked at the
beginning of this section. The answer is that a change in the level of
employment can be expected to result, if a large number of individuals
decide to alter (in the same direction.) their private levels of saving ;
and that, more specifically, the resultant change in the volume of
overall employment, can be expected to take place in the opposite
direction to the average alteration of all the individual levels of
saving.
To answer the second part of the double question, one simply
follows through the line of argument already started. Unless other
things do not reraain constant, it is not possible (except in the very
short run) for a sizeable number of individuals simultaneously to
increase the absolute levels of their private saving, by increasing the
percentage amounts of their current incomes that are not, within a short
time, spent on consumable goods and services. For as soon as a
substantial fall occurs in the proportion of the national income that is
consumed, this, ceteris paribus, has the effect of putting the circular
flow of income into disequilibrium by making the magnitude of the
current flov; of withdrawals exceed that of the current flow of additions
(i.e. I^E, , because Y,> E, , because S, ,> I,., ) . Once the
t' "C+.L t t+1 ——— t+1 t+L
circular flow of income is in disequilibrium, this sets in progress a
causal chain that, via the 'multiplier' effect, contracts the volume of
the national income (and hence the quantity of employment) per
successive time period ; this contraction in volume continues until a
new equilibrium position is reached (eg. point Oe^ , in figure 7.) at
which the increased percentage of the national income saved, is equal,
in absolute terms, to what it was previously, namely, a flow equal in
magnitude, per time period, to the flow of investment expenditure.
If those who suffer (because of unemployment) the decrease
in individual incomes consequent upon the fall in the level of na tional
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income, are among those who originally decided to increase the absolute
levels of their private saving, then the conscious attempts of those
individuals to save more, produces the unintended consequence of their
actually saving less in absolute terras. This then, at last, is the
phenomenon of the 'paradox of thrift® - intended higher saving results
in unintended lower saving,^ Although its explanation requires a
substantial amount of theoretical reasoning, it is hardly open to dispute
that tliis paradox is one of the finest examples, if not the finest
example, known to the social sciences, of a set of purposive actions,
each one of which is directed towards the achievement of the same goal,
producing an unintended repercussion. The consequence which actually
results, is the exact opposite of what is deliberately sought- by those
who for their own reasons initiate the causative actions in question.
Once a social situation has been analysed, and an important
feature of it explained as an unintended result of a certain kind of
behavioural interaction, the acceptance of what at first may seem a
rather surprising account, can have immense results for the general good
of society. With reference to the second of this chapter's two examples,
if most social scientists had properly understood the 'paradox of
thrift* phenomenon during the inter-war years, much of the miseiy and
human wretchedness of that period could, doubtless, have been entirely
obviated. A realisation of the causal connections holding between the
levels of overall employment, aggregate expenditure and total saving,
1. P.A. Samuelson, op, cit., p. 236ff
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would have prevented economists from advising successive British
governments to implement schemes to effect savings and cuts in public
spending,when unemployment stood as high as twenty per cent of the
labour force.
However, even granted that the practical benefits to bo
gained by making use of social scientific knowledge to undertake
judicious and thoughtful reform are not inconsiderable, the 'empirical
success' of every sort of social inquiry is widely held to be
•inferior' , when compared to the quality of explanatory ability that
can be achieved by, say, the science of theoretical mechanics. It is,
for instance, frequently asked why economics cannot predict (for a given
societal environment) the precise effect on a particular price of a
certain change in consumer tastes, in the way physics can predict (for
a specified set of conditions) the exact velocity to be reached at a
certain time by a particular moving body. Does this (admitted)
inability on the part of the social sciences, indicate a deeply rooted
deficiency in the methods of explanation hitherto employed, or is it
that the idea that this inability is a deficiency is what requires to
be corrected? This is the question upon which the discussion centres
in the chapter immediately following.
1. A.J. Youngson, Britain's Economic Growth, 1920-1966, (Allen and
Unwin, London, 1967), pp. 294-298
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Ill TUB EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION 0? COHPIKEX PHENOMENA
(i) Science and Complexity
One way in which it is philosophically illuminating to
classify scientific disciplines is by reference to the comparative
simplicity or complexity of their respective subject-matters* Proa the
startj, two important points need to be borne in mind. ItLrst, within this
context the term 'comparative1 muet be strongly emphasised because no
range of phenomena should be considered simple or complex simpliciter ;
the distinction between simplicity and complexity should be seen instead
in terms of relative positions in a continuum. And secondly, it should
be noted that sciences , as opposed to their subject-matters , should
be called •simple' or 'complex' only derivatively ; thus, a simple
science is a discipline that deals with a simple subject-matter, while a
complex science is one that deals with a complex subject—matter.
Therefore in the first instance, simplicity and complexity should be
understood as properties of phenomena, and not as syntactic features of
theories developed to explain phenomena. To investigate the wider aspects
of this distinction, this chapter has a two-fold task to accomplish :
(i) "to explicate the concepts 'simplicity* and 'complexity* (as they
are applied to the various sorts of expisnanda-phenomena) , and (ii) to
examine the methodological problems encountered in the scientific
investigation of domains of complex phenomena,.
In analysing what is properly meant by the phrase 'field
of irreducibly complex phenomena' „ one is concerned not so much with the
intrinsic difference between social and natural phenomena, but with what
distinguishes the phenomena studied by the 'exact8 physical sciences
(such as physics and chemistry) , from those studied by both the social
sciences and the 'inexact* natural sciences (such as meteorology and
evolutionary biology) » To accept that points of considerable difference
are to be found between simple and complex phenomena, does not of course
commit one to a scientistic metaphysics ; indeed, one of the reasons
(as will be shown) that the subject-matters of the social sciences are so
complex (even more complex than the subject-matters of the biological
sciences) is that they deal with actions and. other meaningful phenomena®
Thus here, while continuing to recognise that human and social phenomena
differ from all natural phenomena in the significant fashion stated in
the fix'st chapter, attention will be concentrated on the features that
the subject-matters of the social sciences have in common with those of
many of the natural sciences, and on the features that specifically
differentiate such phenomena from those within the domains of inquiry of
the exact physical sciences®
The first matter to be considered is the question of the
precise way the central, but nevertheless rather vague, notions of
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•simplicity* and •complexity' should be understood. In the second of
his two articles on explanation, F.A, Hayek writes:
"The distinction between, simplicity and complexity
raises considerable philosophical difficulties when applied to
statements. But there seems to exist a fairly easy and adequate
way to measure the degree of complexity of different kinds of
abstract patterns. The minimum number of elements of which an
instance of the pattern must consist in order to exhibit all
the characteristic attributes of the class of patterns in
question appears to provide an unambiguous criterion," 2
It is clear that by 'abstract pattern* , Hayek means "typical,
structure of causal order* , and that by • minimum number of elements'
he means 'minimum number of kinds of determining elements" . The
fundamental criterion suggested here by Hayek is certainly not the only
way by which, the degree of comparative complexity of various sorts of
causal formations can be estimated. However, the basic idea contained in
this pannage serves as an excellent initial position from which it is
possible to elaborate further on the nature of the distinction in
question, A more extensive analysis of the criteria by which systems of
order can be characterised as 'simple* or 'complex' , can be provided
1, F.A. Hayek, 'Degrees of Explanation', in The British Journal for the
Philosophy of science, Vol, VI, No, 23, November 1955, pp« 209-225,
and 'The Theory of Complex Phenomena', in M. Bunge (ed), The
Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, (The Free Press, New
York, 1964), pp, 352—349. Both articles are reprinted with additions
in F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, op.
cit,, pp. 3-21 and pp. 22-42, respectively. All references will
be to this last work.
2. F.A. Hayek, Studies, op. cit., p. 25
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along the following lines. A doraain of inquiry contains phenomena of the
simplest degree, if it is the case that:
(s) Every determining factor (of a specific instance of the sort
of phenomena under investigation), is classifiable into one
of a snail ('conceptually manageable') number of lands.
(b) The relevant properties of the referents of each kind of
theoretic variable are homogeneous; that is, as far as the
theory is concerned, the interacting elements are
qualitatively differentiated by the quantitative magnitudes
of their pertinent properties (thus, any particular element
is substitutable for any other of the same kind that
possesses on identical quantitative magnitude) .
(c) The constituent entities or processes of any aggregate
structure are additively (or summatively) organised; hence,
any such structure exhibits as its properties only those
v/hich can be exhaustively resolved into the quantitative
'relationships of extensionality* holding between its
component parts.
By ascertaining how for these three criteria are true of the different
types of encountered explananda-phenomena, one is able to produce an
objective (i.e. en inter-subjectively acceptable) classification of
subject-matters as more or less simple, or as more or less complex.
If these criteria are applied to the phenomena with which it
iB concerned, classical mechanics appears as the simplest of all sciences.
This is easily shown. The first criterion of simplicity requires specific
phenomena to be of such a nature that they are amenable to explanation by
a complete theory containing a 'conceptually manageable' number of
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different variables.'*" (a theory is said to be 1 complete' if it takes
into account all the various lands of factors vhose interaction is
pertinent to the determination of each specific occurrence of the sort
of phenomena under investigation.) In Newtonian mechanics, only three
kinds of variables are required, namely, 'mass' , 'length' (or
•distance5) and 'time' . If one desires to explain the movement of a
physical body, then the explananduia-phenomenon is such that nothing
3
other than determining factors classifiable into one or other of these
1. This must be modified slightly. In order to satisfy the first
criterion of simplicity, phenomena must be of such a nature that they
can be explained with a high degree of accuracy under a significant
range; of conditions by taking into account their dependence upon
factors which can be theoretically classified into a small number of
kinds, and by neglecting minor disturbances due to the overall
influence of elements of other sorts. Thus one finds that even laws
relating to simple phenomena are frequently stated with reference to
idealisations. Actual deviations from what happens with 'pure cases'
of the explanandum-event in question can be made negligible within
specifiable circumstances; when deviations occur, however, if they
are not due to unnoticed instances of the kinds of variables to be
found within the law itself, then they are due to the operation of
instances of the kinds of variables to be found within the formal
theory from which the law is derived,
It is an unfortunate feature of this discussion that no
sooner does one start to analyse one topic, then many others 'crowd
in' and demanded to be attended to. One can however only examine one
main topic at a time; hence the need to provide constant cross-
references.
The use of ideal types in the natural and social sciences is
a topic that will be examined in chapter IV, section (iii) »
2. N. Feather, Mass, Length and Time, (Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh, 1959, Penguin, London, 1961), pp. 1-55
3. It is precisely this fact that ensures that explanations within
Newtonian mechanics (and other areas of classical physics) are unique
among natural scientific explanations, in that they alone can
successfully instantiate the strict formal structure demanded by
Hempel's original formulation of the deductive-nomological theory of
explanation. Therefore, as was mentioned previously in the first
section of the first chapter, it is profoundly misleading to treat
the 'logic of Newton's frincipia* as paradigmatic of the
methodological procedures of the natural sciences generally.
three kinds will be found to be at work. Similarly, the second criterion
is well satisfied; each member of the set of the small number of
variables employed by the science of mechanics, lias as its referent a
quantifiable and homogeneous element and no further differentiation into
types of mass , length or time is ever required. Also, the only
qualitative difference (as fair as the theory needs to be concerned)
between separate factors of the same kind, relates to the quantitative
magnitudes of their relevant properties.
Finally, the phenomena studied by classical mechanics
satisfy the third criterion of simplicity; it is indeed possible to
resolve a mechanistic configuration into a set of constituent
relationships, each member of which can be examined in detachment froia
the rest and then brought together again in a purely summative manner.
Suppose one were analysing a system composed of just tiro celestial
bodies; say a sun and its planet; in this case, the relationship
holding between them (viz., that given by the inveree square law of
/ *• \
gravitational attraction, F — Bim2 ' ^ ' describes the pattern of
order that is typical of the aggregate sfracture so formed. If further
bodies were subsequently added, then the relationships between each of
them and the rest would be given by the same law (plus the parallelogram
rule for the addition of vector forces). Indeed, no matter how many
bodies were involved, the general system of order exemplified by the
aggregate structure so compounded, would be given by the law describing
the relationship between just two bodies. In other words, the whole
system would contain no properties that could not be comprehensively
resolved into the set of external relations holding between its component
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entities. In a mechanistic system, the •internal' constitutions of the
individual parts are not affected by (and hence in turn do not themselves
affect) the wider structure of which the parts enter as components; in
such a structure, the characteristic type of order that prevails is
amenable to portrayal by a theory employing the same number of kinds of
variables as required to account for the type of order present when only
two entities or processes interact.
So much for the archetypal simple science of classical
mechanics; one now has to inquire whether or not these three criteria
of simplicity are satisfied by human and social phenomena.. If the
criteria are not satisfied, then the conclusion must be drawn that the
social sciences do indeed deal with phenomena that are intrinsically ana
inherently complex. Before however one attempts to discern if this is
the case, one is duty bound to examine a certain claim that is commonly
argued with reference to this very point. T'he claim is that to suggest
that there is any discipline which differs radically from the exact
physical sciences in that its subject-matter consists of irreducibly
complex phenomena, is to advance something thoroughly 'obscurantist1




Ernest Nagel argues that it is in appearance only that the
fields of behavioural and social study are complex. He writes:
"
.... the complexity of a. subject-matter is at best not
a precise notion, and problems that appear to be hopelessly
complex before effective ways for dealing with them are
invented often lose this appearance after the inventions
have been made. .... after Newtonian mechanics was
developed, properly trained students were able to analyse
motions of bodies that some of the best minds of preceding
generations found too complex for human understanding." 1
Adolf Grunbaum is of much the same opinion. He likewise draws upon an
analogy between the apparent complexity to those living before the modern
era of the subject-matters of the physical sciences and the ease with
which one can explain events in these areas now, and between the social
2
sciences now and the social sciences at some future date. Grunbaun
likens the behavioural sciences, which have to cope with a vast
proliferation of different factors, to the state of natural philosophy
before the rise of modern physical chemistry. The idea that the human
sciences deal with intrinsically complex subject-matters, is compared to
the notion that it is impossible to produce a theoretical classification
of the enormous and seemingly unsurveyable variety of physical substances
in terms of a small number of basic atomic elements. Griinbaum's
conclusion is thus a curt dismissal of the view that in actuality the
phenomena studied by the social sciences are complex - "this argument
rests its case on what is not known, and therefore, like all such
3
arguments, it has no case" •
1. E. Nagel, op. cit., p. 505
2. A. Grunbaum, 'Causality and the Science of Human Behavior* (1952), in
E. Feigl and 11. Brodbeck (eds), op. cit., p. 770
3. Ibid., p. 770
Although, the appeal to the history of physics coupled vith a
very general prognostication of what will happen to the study of society
in the unspecified future gives the argument of bagel and Gruhbaum
a certain air of plausibility, the approach is nonetheless fundamentally
unsound* In referring to the history of the exact physical sciences in
this fashion, these two philosophers are guilty of begging the question at
stake, namely whether in fact social phenomena, are simple and whether it
is (as they imply) only the 'immaturity* of the present state of
social inquiry that prevents one realising .this today* For* unless there
are reasons independent of the history of physics for thinking that social
phenomena are not complex, the analogy from the development of this simple
science to the future development of the social sciences is of little
worth* Despite a great show of confidence in their position, Hagel and
Grunbaum advance not single reason (apart from their analogy which,
as just stated, presupposes the conclusion to be established) for their
judgment that it will be 'only a matter of tine1 before societal
phenomena can be accurately explained by means of theories containing a
small and completed number of kinds of variables. What in fact Kagel
and Grunbaum do, is to prescribe a priori that all types of phenomena
must be essentially simple in nature; but this is nothing more on their
part than the forceful assertion of a dogmatic metaphysics. Since all
that is known of social reality leads one to the opposite position (this
remark will be substantiated in a moment) , one is therefore bound to
reject the claim advanced by Hagel and Grunbaum on the ground that
no relevant evidence is presented in its favour.
Having said this, it is of course incumbent upon one to
indicate the respects in which social phenomena fail to satisfy the
113.
criteria of simplicity* and hence the extent to which, there are rational
grounds for considering suc-h phenomena to be irreducibly complez. First*
to take criteria (a) and (b) together,, it is manifestly false that
human, and societal phenomena arc brought about by causes which can be
classified into a very small number of kinds, and that these factors
are both homogeneous in character and always amenable "to quantitative
measurement. Suppose one takes human actions; events of this sort are
brought about by such a multiplicity of separate factors (many of which
are non-quantitative or* at any rate, have eluded extensive measurement
up to the moment) that a theoretical classification of them into a few
homogeneous kinds is just not possible* Moreover, it vail be recalled
that in the first chapter it was pointed out thai the causes of actions
do not function under* nomological laws, but operate only mediately via
interpretations in the minds of those notoriously idiosyncratic
creatures, free agents. The fact that men's actions occur as the result
of interpretations of environmental, conditions rather than as the nomic
effects of these conditions, adds immensely to the heterogeneity and
iEsnensurabiliiy of the determinants of human actions. Taking now
societal phenomena, the operative causes of these are the significantly
different actions initiated by individuals motivated by their appraisals
of their own local situations; such phenomena are therefore not at all
like simple physical phenomena which are brought about by homogeneous
elements acting according to the parallelogram of forces. In the social
sciences, even when (as in economics) one does have a formal theory that
is able to classify many of the large number of different actions at work
in a 'polycentric system of unintended order' into a small number of
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kinds, the variables of tho theory are neither complete (hence the
constant reliance on a 'ceteris paribus* clause), nor, obviously arc their
referents homogeneous. Thus, whether one takes actions or societal events
as one's explanancla-phenomena, by their failure^ to satisfy the first two
criteria alone such phenomena are palpably complex.
Secondly, to examine the extent to which criterion (c) is
applicable to social phenomena, it is not the case that tho properties
of a social aggregate are exhaustively analysable into the external
relations between its component agents. For in contrast to what is true
of an intrinsically simple constellation, reference to the overall social
structure is required in order to explain those features of the
constituent agents vMch dispose them to act the way they in fact do.
Society is not composed of the additively organised extensional relations
2
between unsocialised agents, is the way that a eolar system is composed
of the additively organised extensional relations between elements whose
substantial properties do not depend on the larger structure of which
they form the parts. In. order to account for the activities whose
interactions bring about the overall properties of society, one has to
refer to the societal conditions which affect the minds and personalities
of those individuals who initiate the pertinent causative actions. The
social relations that hold between individuals living together in a
society, ere therefore not purely extensions! but are in addition partly
1. Much of the second and third sections of this chapter will be devoted
to presenting a greater elaboration of the reasons why social phenomena
fail to satisfy criteria (a) and (b), and to examining the implications
of this fact for the study of husuan and societal phenomena.
2. Reference to this extremely important point will be made again both
in the following section of this chapter, and in the second section of
chapter V .
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constj.tuti.ve of the participating agents; for they would, not ho the
individuals they are, if they were not part of the wider structure whose
specific features form the explananda-phenomena. Indeed, since the
relationships that hold between social phenomena are those of mutual
interaction and mutual determination, the relationships between the
constituent elements (i.e. single individuals and institutions) are no
less important than the elements themselves for it is in their inter¬
relations that social phenomena are what they are-."*" This point does not
have to be taken any further at the moment. One ought just to stress
that by their failure to satisfy the third criterion of simplicity,
social, phenomena must again be pronounced 'complex* ; the type of order
that is characteristic of such phenomena is not resolvable without
remainder into the set of external relations holding between its numerous
components as these would exist in isolation.
If one accepts that the three aforementioned criteria
adequately define 'inherent simplicity' , then there can be no doubt
that social phenomena are not simple. This conclusion cannot be lightly
dismissed as 'subjective' ; for provided the criteria are accepted, the
intrinsic complexity of human and societal phenomena can be conclusively
established.
Classical physics operates by seeking functional connections
that can be fully described by two- , three- or four-variable
equations; and within a limited sphere (eg. the subject-matters of
terrestial and celestial mechanics, optics, acoustics and
1. L. von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, (Alien Lane The Penguin
Press, London, 1971), p. 54
1phenoraenological' thermodynamics) the explananda-phenomena are of such
a nature that this particular procedure is methodologically appropriate.
That this is the case can be traced to the brute fact (for conceivably
matters could have been otherwise) that events within these domains ,jn.at
are constituted by (and hence resolvable into) linear causal chains
involving the behaviour of isolable atomic units. But on no account
should it be considered that unless this state of affairs happens to
prevail, scientific inquiry cannot proceed. In areas where phenomena
prove to be characterised by an irreducible complexity of relate&ness,
the scientific approach does not attempt an a priori demonstration to the
effect that in actuality no important sorts of phenomena could possibly
ba intrinsically complex, but openly accepts that many phenomena are
indeed as complex as they first appear to be, and then sets about
exploring the implications of this fact. And, with reference to social
phenomena, it is precisely to this task that on© now turns.
(ii) The Analysis of Social Complexity
If one is concerned to explain a specific event within a
domain of complex phenomena, the 'empirical success' of one's efforts
is likely to be less spectacular than would result if one were to direct
one's activities to explaining an event within a domain of simple
phenomena. For in older to gain scientific understanding of fields of
complex phenomejia, one has to work (as a matter of empirical necessity)
with theories that have a considerably smaller factual content than
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theories of essentially simple phenomena. In Hayek's terminology,
which has passed into general philosophical currency, within fields of
simple phenomena one is able to achieve 'explanations of detail' ; but
within fields of comparatively complex phenomena ("where the number of
significantly interdependent variables is very large and only some of
them can in practice be individually observed"1) one is able to produce
2
only 'explanations of the principle® . An 'explanation of the
principle' gives information on the occurrence of the major instances
of the most important kinds of factors that bring about a specific event
of a certain sort, but does not (and cannot) provide information on the
occurrence of all the separate instances of the complete number of kinds
of factors that are relevant to the full determination of the (exact
quantitative magnitudes possessed by the) pertinent properties of the
3
specific phenomenon in question.
Even though Hayek is probably correct to claiis that with
social phenomena "individual events regularly depend on so many concrete
circumstances that we shall never in fact be in a position to ascertain
4
them all" , the division between an 'explanation of the principle' and
an 'explanation of detail' is best thought of not as absolute, but
rather as one of degree. But to say this, does not make the distinction
nugatory; something that is a matter of degree is not, ipso facto.
trivial or uninteresting. The mere fact that in borderline cases it is
difficult to demarcate decisively these two types of explanatory
1. F.A. Hayek, Studies, op. cit., p. 8
2. Ibid., p. llff
3. Ibid., p. 14ff and p. 28ff
4. Ibid., p. 34 (italics added)
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procedure, does not render this particular distinction illusory,
trifling or unimportant. In practice, the division amounts to a
considerable difference in the extent of obtainable 'empirical, success* ;
namely, the difference between being able to explain a specific event
only in so far as it is a member of a vi.de range of occurrences of a
certain type, and being able to explain a specific event as a particular
instance (or, more accurately, as an instance of an extremely narrow
range of particular instances) of the class of events in question. (The
parenthesis is required in the previous sentence because, strictly, even
Iievtonian mechanics cannot produce explanations of specific occurrences
that are one hundred per cent accurate; even this discipline, the
simplest of all sciences, can produce explanations of specific occurrences
just in so far as they fall within a small quantitative interval.) It is,
however, somewhat misleading to compare 'explanations of the principle'
with 'explanations of detail' in this manner, as if they were in some
sense direct competitors and one had to make a choice between the
employment of one procedure or the other. 'Explanations of the principle'
(which, by reference to just the main causal factors operating in the
area under investigation, enable one only to explain "the appearance of
a pattern of a certain class""*" or "the general character of higher-level
generalities" ) are not in meaningful competition with 'explanations of
detail' . Although, to be sure, an 'explanation of the principle'
would give far less in the way of empirical information than an
• explanation of detail* if applied to a simple phenomenon, in areas of
1. F.A. Hayek, Studies, op. cit„, p. 24
2. Ibid., p. 29
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complex order where 'explanations of detail* can have no application,
'explanations of the principle' constitute the only effective explanatory
procedures®
Although the social sciences cannot produce 'explanations
of detail' , this should lead one neither to disparage tho achievable
'explanations of the principle* as contributions to human knowledge,
nor to underestimate their value for the successful direction of the
actions of those who seek to produce social reforms in a rational manner*
The illustrations of social explanations worked out in sections (ii)
and (iii) of the previous chapter, demonstrate that the ability of such
explanations to reveal the way the social world hangs together is
considerable* Although, as will b© remembered, the examples did not show
how to account for the precise properties possessed by specific events,
they showed that it is possible to trace with reasonable effectiveness
the main sorts of purposive actions whose interaction gives rise to
1
individual phenomena considered as instances of particular types.
Frequently social scientific explanations in indicating just
the main instances of the predominant kinds of factors that regularly
bring about occurrences of a given sort, pay only scant attention to the
fact that phenomena in the social world are complex partly because their
substantial properties are dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, on
1, While economic theories, unlike theories developed in other areas
of social inquiry, can employ mathematical formalisms to express their
empirical contents, this does not mean that economics deals with
phenomena that are intrinsically simple. A formal rigorousness of
syntactic structure is not to be identified with the ability to
produce 'explanations of detail' ; whether a science can produce
these or not, depends on the intrinsic complexity of relatedness
between the causal factors at work in its field of investigation*
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the general system, of inter-relations into which, they enter. Little
attention is paid to this aspect of social events, because it is held
that to include a 'ceteris paribus* clause in the explanatory account
legitimates inter alia the assumption that the extent of mutual
determination is small enough to allow the event under- consideration to
be explained as if there were siraply a relationship of linear dependence
between it and its operative causes and initial conditions. But is this
assumption ever unjustifiable, even taking into reckoning that what one
is concerned to produced is an *explanation of the principle' ?
The answer to this lias a bearing of importance on the
question of the degree to which * orthodox' micro-economic price theory
is in fact applicable to all the phenomena to which it is seemingly
applicable. As will be recalled from the second chapter, when this theory
is used, to analyse what takes place in the market for a specific type of
good when all the consumers and producers of it implement their plans to
buy and sell, it is normally supposed that while the ruling price per unit
of the good and the quantities bought and sold per time period are
endogenous (or 'dependent') variables, such factors as consumer tastes
and preferences, production possibilities, the availability of factors of
production and all other prices (especially those of substitute and
complementary goods) are exogenous (or 'independent') variables. The
usual approach of micro-economic theorists — the analysis of a single
market on the assumption that the price of the commodity in question can
change without causing significant repercussions that reflect back on
itself — is known as 'partial (or 'particular') analysis' . 'Partial
analysis' (as is illustrated by example (a) in chapter II) proceeds by
abstracting a single phenomenon from the field of mutually determining
societal phenomena, and then explaining the event as the primary and the
more or less immediate social consequence of the initiation of some set
of interacting purposive actions; any other repercussions these actions
may have on the markets for other goods, and in particular any
reflections from changes in these markets back onto the levels of demand
and/or supply of the good whose market is under analysis, are ignored.
If the reverberations of a single change in price are small
and widely diffused, then (with reference to the particular market under
consideration) it is satisfactory to suppose that there is a rigid
distinction between those factors which determine and those which are
determined. But for each different market, the comparative adequacy of
the 'partial* approach is a purely empirical affair; in order to guage
the degree of applicability of 'partial analysis' , one has to have
some idea of (i) the strength and range of the repercussions of an
adjustment of the pertinent market on other sectors of the economy, and
(ii) the ramifications that changes in other sectors have on. the market
in question. Since all goods are economic substitutes in the sense that
they are all competitors for consumers' disposable monay incomes, no
market can adjust in complete isolation; any one change in price must
disturb the prevailing price in at least one other market. But one can
be sure that the smaller the effects that result from an adjustment
within a market to processes outside it, and the smaller the 'echoes'
back again, the more accurate (the 'less inaccurate') will be the
•explanations of the principle1 provided by 'partial analysis' ,
Because 'partial analysis' only devotes meagre attention
to matters arising from the mutual determination of prices, this type of
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approach is inadequate to answer the interesting question ' Is there a
set of relative prices for an economy such that the total quantity
demanded (per tine period) of each sort of commodity, just equals the
total quantity produced (per time period) of each?4 . To reply to this
question and to indicate how the details of the set of equilibrium prices
might he discerned, one lias to turn to 4general equilibrium analysis6
(a 4system-analysis' type of approach to micro-economic phenomena
pioneered by the economists Leon Walras (1854-1910)"'" and Vilfredo
Pareto (1848-1925) ) . In contrast to what is of overriding concern
to 'partial analysis' » 'general analysis' is not content to
investigate merely the primary effects on a single market of some
initial change, but seeks to explain economic phenomena as they occur
5
within a field of price inter-relationships,, To discover whether there
is a set of prices (and if there is, what it is) at which the markets
for all goods clear per time period, the 'general' approach aims to
establish a system of simultaneous equations showing the mutual
interactions holding between the relative prices of all commodities and
1. E. Boll, A History of Economic Thought, (Faber and Faber, London,
edit., 1966), pp. 591-394
2. Ibid., pp. 408-414
5. The difference between 'static analysis' (i.e. where one assumes
that the market feed-back mechanism is sufficient to restore or replace
an equilibrium price lost after a disturbance) and 'dynamic analysis'
(i.e. where one tries to show how the variables 'quantity demanded' ,
•quantity supplied' and 'ruling price' behave in between the
introduction of the original change, and the subsequent attainment, if
any, of a new equilibrium position), is a distinction that cuts accross
the distinction between 'partial' and 'general analysis' .
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factors of production.'5'
The basic features of this forsa of analysis are suitably
revealed by an examination of a simplified version. Let it here be
supposed that (i) the total supply of each type of commodity is fixed
and given, and that (ii) the total quantity of every sort of good varies
not only x<?ith its ruling price, but with the ruling prices of all the
other kinds of commodities, (therefore if there are n sorts of
commodities, the total demand for any one type is mutually determined
by the prices of all of them. If ' , Dg , .... Dq * stand,
respectively, for the total quantities demanded of each kind of good
and 'p. , P0 » .... p * for their prices, the followingjl ti n
equations (or rather, equation-forms) of demand can be constructed*
Df — ( Pf t * «... PQ )
D2 ~ f2 ^ pl » p2 Pn ^
Dn ~ fn ^ P1 ' P2 ' * ' * * Pn ^
By supposition (i), the quantities supplied of each type of good
(represented, respectively, by • , .... sn * ) sr® hnown,
1. fi. Dorfman, The Price System. (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, K.J.,
1964), pp. 105-125
W.S. Vickrey, Microstatics, (Harcourt, Brace & World, Hew York,
1964), pp. 209-267
W.J.L. Byan, Price Theory, (Macmillan, London, 1953, edit., 1966),
pp. 241-257
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and hence if there is a set of equilibrium prices, they must be those
that satisfy the following;:
£»1 =: f-^ ( p P« * * • - " PQ )
Sp se fg ( t * <•<=«■* Pa J
o- ft* e- <• »v f- & c- c c• c & c « f e
Sn ™ fn ^ P1 ' P2 p * * * ' Pn ^
But since one has now n simultaneous equations with n unknowns, this
gives one a determinate solution; in other words, there is a set of
relative prices such that if they prevailed, the whole economy would bo
in *general equilibrium' (i„e„ would be in that state at which neither
a surplus nor a shortage of any sort of good emerged) *
To produce, however, a numerical calculation of what exactly
constitutes the set of equilibrium prices is quite another matter. If
one were able to collect all the relevant data (concerning such things
as consumers' wants, tastes and preferences, the levels of all- disposable
money incomes, and advances in scientific technology and changes in
production possibilities) to enable one to discover the precise
properties of the relations * , f^ , ...» ' , and if one
were able to gather all this quickly enough to keep pace with the
incessant change characteristic of social phenomena, then one would be
able to obtain a numerical calculation of what prices would have to
prevail if the economy at any particular instant in time were to b©
consciously placed in the state of 'general equilibrium' . But not
only can these antecedent conditions not be satisfied, but also, as
Pareto wryly remarks, "si on pouvait vrairaent connaitre toutes ces
"equations, le seul raoyen accessible aux forces humaines pour les
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resoudre, ce serait d'observer la solution pratique que donne le
✓ 1
marche" . Thus, not only can the requisite numerical data not be
collected, but even, if one were in a position to formulate the details
of the pertinent price equations, the only way they could be solved to
ensure that they remained currently relevant to the rapidly changing
conditions would be by observing the solution arrived at by the market
price mechanism.
On the topic of •general analysis* , the economist
Jjipsey speaks scathingly. With reference to a theory involving demand
equations similar to those just examined, he writes that "in practice
such a theory will prove to be useless because wg will not be able,
within the foreseable future, to obtain sufficient empirical knowledge
of the way in which the demand for any good is influenced by the prices
2
of most other goods"* . This judgment however is much too harsh.
Certainly, 'general analysis* in taking into account the inter¬
relationships between the prices in the economy as a whole, does not
have the concrete applicability of the *partial analysis' typically
1. V. Pareto, Manuel d'&conomie politique, (v. Giard & E. Briere,
Paris, 1909), p. 234
The above is the French translation frora the Italian (originally
published in 1906), and is the most accessible edition of the book for
English-speaking readers. The work is renowned because it introduces
the use of indifference curves (which wer-g not commonly employed by
theoretical economists until the 1930s) to analyse what Pareto calls
•ophelimite' (i.e. the ability of commodities to render satisfaction).
In the abovementioned edition, pages 539-671 contain the famous
appendix where the theory of 'general equilibrium' is mathematically
treated, and where the Paretian system of siicultaneous price equations
is presented.
2. R.G. Lipsey, op. cit., p. 502 (Lipsey's italics)
employed by 'orthodox1 micro-economic price theory,, But scientific
theories are not only 'tools* ; one of their main sources of value
lies in the extent to which they are true of the phenomena whose features
they are meant to explain. Although 'within the foreseable future' one
will not be able to use 'general analysis' for explaining in detail
the processes by which human actions determine relative prices and the
methods and direction of production,, the theory serves to illustrate the
kind of coherent order that forms itself within the area under
investigation. Indeed, 'general analysis' , by illustrating at a high
level of generality how a system of ordered relationships forms itself
on the principle that all prices influence the demand for any one type
of commodity, is a paradigmatic example of a theory providing only
• explanations of the principle' . It thus makes a definite contribution
to button knowledge and the scientific understanding of society, even if
it cannot be employed in practice to explain specific economic
arrangements as anything more than phenomena that do not fall outside
the wide range of occurrences decreed by the theory to be empirically
possible.
For the vast majority of social scientific investigations,
the general field of inquiry is the complex system of order that arises
when each individual (and institution) within society is moved to act
not merely by his personal relationships with a few others, but, and far'
more important, by his impersonal relationships to the various resultants
of the social interactions of people about whom ho knows (and needs to
know) nothing specific. If is by means of the enormous amount of
information spontaneously generated and impersonally conveyed by
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structures such as the price mechanism, that millions of separate
individuals and institutions in seeking to satisfy their many different
needs and wants unconsciously co-ordinate their various actions. It was
maintained in. the second chapter that from, the point of view of
technical efficiency a predominantly polycentric system of economic
order in which each individual acts in response to the public indicators
of prices, costs and profit rates that emerge as the unintended
consequences of the like actions of the other participants within the
economy, is superior to a mainly monocentric system in which the
activities of each individual are adapted to the actions of those of all
the others by a process of conscious co-ordination. This important
point will now be discussed further.
If it is to be serviceable in any way, a system of economic
organisation must provide some means for deciding three very basic
matters, namely, (a) what commodities are to be produced and in what
quantities, (b) by whom and with what i*esources, and in what
technological manner goods are to be produced, and (c) for whoia goods
are to be produced. In order to solve what is sometimes called the
•central economic problem1^ it is essential that there be some
communication device for pooling the requisite knowledge possessed by,
and for co-ordinating the purposive efforts of, the millions of diverse
individuals within society. To investigate the question of whether a
largely monocentric system of economic order is able to handle the task
of gathering, collating and then transmitting the necessary information
1. P.A. Saimielson, op. cit., p. 14f
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more or lees effectively than a largely polycentric alternative, one
will here compare the logically conceivable cybernetic capabilities of
1
the respective idealisations of both sorts of system. In other words,
one will here undertake a comparative estimate of the complexity of
relatedneaa that would hold between the participants in a completely
monocentric system (i.e. a system that makes no use whatsoever, not
even in a highly attenuated form, of a pries mechanism) , with that which
would hold between the participants in a purely polycentric system
(i.e. a system in. which no individual consciously co-ordinates or directs
any actions other than his own) . Thus, in order to settle the question
of whether a mainly monocentric system of order is likely to provide a
more or less technically efficient solution to the 'central economic
problem' than a predominantly polycentric system, one will examine
whether the idealisation of the former sort of system would be able to
function as a more or less effective cybernetic system than would the
idealisation of the latter sort.
A fully developed monocentric system is to be conceived as
a hierarchical structure in which information (relating to the various
needs, wants and tastes of all individuals, and the available raw
materials, human skills, productive resources and means of physical
distribution) flows upwards, and in which instructions (relating to the
details ox how much and which of alternative goods and services are to
be produced, their manner of production and from what materials, and in
what way the national, product is to be distributed among the different
1. As mentioned previously, ideal types will be further discussed in
chapter IV, section (iii) ,
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constituent individuals) are transmitted downwards. At the summit of
this hierarchy resides the s commanding intelligence* that receives
information fro®, and issues specific orders co-ordinating the actions
of, his immediate subordinates; in turn, each of theia receives
information from, and gives appropriate instructions to, their immediate
subordinates, and so on right down the pyramid of authority. At the
bottom tier, the ultimate subordinates both feed information about their
local situations and about their own personal wants to their immediate
superiors, and perform the particular tasks these superiors assign to
them. Thus, the solution to the 'central economic problem' that is
chosen by the central agency after he has collated all the 'bits' of
information passed to him through the recognised channels, is than
realised by the consciously co-ordinated and directed efforts of the
ultimate subordinates, (it is to be noted, that neither unauthorised
mutual -contacts, nor short-circuits in the upward flow of information,
are possible. This means, for example, that no two agents are permitted
to undertake man-to-man bartering of their allotted rations of the total
output, in the way that soldier's in the army exchange cigarettes for
bars of chocolate. Any grievance or dissatisfaction with the operation
of the system (or indeed any relevant piece of information) that an
agent may happen to possess can be conveyed only to his immediate
superior, who can pass it only to Ms immediate superior and so on until
the matter reaches the very top where it it duly considered. If this
general condition is not observed, then the system ceases to be purely
nionocentric.)
In contrast to this state of affairs, under an entirely
polycentric system individuals interact with each other on their o*m
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initiatives, subject only to laws which apply uniformly to all. Their
actions are not determined by the specific commands of a central
authority, but by an impersonal and general form of guidance which
operates on each agent when he finds that to earn a living or to obtain
the commodities and services he needs and wants, he has to adjust himself
to the various societal resultants that emerge spontaneously from the
activities of everyone else. Thus in such a system, it is private
preferences expressed through the price mechanism and their coming to the
attention of profit-seeking entrepreneurs that constitutes the process
which solves, more or less automatically and without central direction,
the 'central problem' of what is to be produced, how it is to be
produced and how the total output is to be shared. But which type of
system is the more efficient, and precisely what is the connection
between the relative efficiency and the relative complexity of a system
of economic relationships?
Let it be supposed that c is the number (assumed to be
finite) of distinct orders per time period that the central agency
of a completely monocentric system is able to issue in x'esponse to
information received, and that the 'span of control' (i.e. the
'relations adjustable per time period') of each superior subordinate
in the system has as its capacity the number c also.^* If this span
of control is fully utilised throughout, each tier of the pyramid will
contain c-times more people than the one above it, and 1/cth of those
in the tier below it. Furthermore, if the number of tiers is t , then
1. The argument of this paragraph borrows heavily from H. Polanyi, op.
cit., pp. 111-122 .
the total number of individuals ( H ) comprising the elements in the
whole system, is given by;
3. 3 t-\
H = 1+c + c + c-f-.... c
The important fact however, is not the total number of agents but the
total number of relations that are capable of adjustment per time period
for each of those situated at the bottom of the chain of command. This
number ( r ) , as con be discerned easily by inspection, is given by the
formulas
r = c x ( N - c*~')
That is, the total number of relations adjustable per time period for
each individual at the base of the pyramid is c-time3 the number of all
those issuing directives of any sort, divided by the number of ultimate
subordinates. If one lets c take the value 3 * a&d t the value 4 ,
then this gives a value of 40 for H , and 27 for c4~' ; and if one
then substitutes these last two values in the above formula, this gives
a value of 39/27 for r . It is also the case that given a value of
3 for c , r takes a minimum value of 1 when t takes the value
2 , and as the value of t increases r asymptotically approaches the
value 3/2 . The exact quantitative values are here unimportant, but to
employ a set of them enables one to see that it is a characteristic of
the administrative ability of a system of strict monocentric order, that
en increase in its size "leaves the number of relations per capita
which can be adjusted between the p3rsons whoso actions it ultimately
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governs, practically unaffected11''' . Iii other words, as such a structure
is extended in size the ratio of the total number of adjustable relations
to the total number of ultimate subordinates remains virtually constant.
From the fact that the complexity of relatedness of the
channels of contact between agents in a completely nonocentric system of
economic arrangements is limited by the number of conscious adjustments
that the central agency (in response to information fed to him) plus his
subordinates (in response to instructions given to them) can effectively
make per time period, one is able to draw an inference regarding the
operational efficiency of a predominantly monocentric system to the extent
to which it is in fact raonoeentric, Hamely, the larger such a system
grows and hence the greater the variety of goods and services its members
desire, the more inefficient an organisation it becomes, for every
increase in size brings with it the necessity to suppress or ignore
larger and larger amounts of critical information,,
It is precisely because there is no upper limit to the
complexity of relatedness that can prevail in a completely polycentric
economic system employing a de-centralised method of co-ordinating the
actions of its participants, that such a structure is not merely able to
achieve a more efficient allocation of commodities and productive
resources compared to a purely monocentric system of the same size, but
is able to maintain its standard of cybernetic efficiency as it expands.
For it is a feature of a fully developed polycentric order (and also of
a largely polycentric order to the extent to which it embodies
1, M. Polanyi, op, cit., p, 117 (folanyi's italics)
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polycentric features) that the ratio of the total number of relations to
the total number of its participants increases proportionately with the
size of the system. This is easily shown. Even if a single individual
cannot manage to make more than c conscious self-adjustments per time
period, provided that he adjusts his actions rationally (as a consumer or
as a producer, or as both) to the impersonal 'signals* of prices, costs
and profit rates (that provide 'bits' of information concerning the
relative scarcities and surpluses of every sort of good, resource and
factor of production), he does in fact, whether he is conscious of it or
not, co-ordinate with reasonable effectiveness his own activities with
all those which played a part in the spontaneous generation of the
'information bearing indicators* in question. Therefore, although c
may indeed he the number of the limit of an agent's acts of conscious
adjustment, the total number of relations mutually adjustable per time
period through the impersonal functioning of the price mechanism may be
hundreds of thousands, or even millions, times c »
If a judgment is based on the degree of technical efficiency
with which the vast number of different needs and wants of members of
society can be served, it is hardly a matter of great contention to claim
that a polycentric structure of social order is decisively superior to a
monocentric system. Recognition however of this fact in no way implies,
as was well stressed in the second chapter, that therefore one should
not consciously strive to eradicate the particular shortcomings,
deficiencies and undesirable phenomena that are admittedly present
within an economic system based on the free operation of the market price
mechanism. It was also emphasised in the second chapter that in order
for any programme of social reform to be rational; there must exist a
well corroborated social theory to indicate from what sorts of actions
the unwanted phenomena one desires to eliminate result as the (intended
or unintended) consequences in the prevailing environmental conditions.
But even when one has gained the requisite social generalisations; it
should be remembered that the social sciences cannot provide, and never
will be able to provide, knowledge of the exact details of all the
causes of social phenomena.
If it is accepted that as a matter of fact society is
composed of a large amount of spontaneous polycentric order, then, ipso
facto, it ought to be clear that social inquirers are effectively
prevented from providing 'explanations of detail' in the manner of
physical scientists. For in a polycentric social order, the mutually
interacting efforts of millions of different individuals (each motivated
in the pursuit of his interests by his situational appraisal of his
local circumstances of time and place), are too significantly diverse
and the complexity of their incessantly changing inter-relationships too
great, to be 'captured1 in detail by a theory employing a
'conceptually manageable' number of kinds of variables. Social
theories, therefore, have no alternative but to employ variables that
refer to heterogeneous factors, and to treat the overall structure of
relations in which these elements participate as if it were simpler than
it in fact is. When all this is understood and the implications for the
conduct of systematic inquiry fully grasped, is it not then almost self-
evident that within the social sphere empirical necessity dictates that
only 'explanations of the principle' can be produced?
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(Hi) Socio! Prediction and its Limits
It. is a widely held view that the process of prediction is
identical in respect of logical status to the process of explanation.
That these two processes are formally symmetrical in character is, for
instance, asserted by Hempel and Oppenheia who proclaim that "an
explanation is not fully adequate unless its explanans, if taken account
of in time, could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon
under consideration „ Once the ambiguities of the texts 'px-ediction'
have been unravelled, there is indeed a sense of the word for which this
claim is largely correct, but only as a matter of fact. For since,
under the same meaning of 'prediction* , there are occasions where one
can explain certain phenomena but cannot predict them, the explanatory
and predictive processes cannot be logically identical. This point will
be made clear in due course.
An explanation informs one why a known event in the present
or a recognised event in the past, occurred. A prediction gives
information regarding a phenomenon which occurs in the present but which
is as yet undetected, or about an event which is to occur in the future.
It can also provide details of a past event whose occurrence has hitherto
been unnoticed; a prediction of the past is called a 'poetdiction' ,
1. C.G. Eempel and P. Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 323
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or, more commonly, a 'retrodiction' «. This section, however, will
be concerned only to explicate the concept 'prediction of the future' .
This notion is ambiguous because it may refer to either (i) a
hypothetical prediction, ' or (ii) a categorical prediction. If one
prefers Popper's language, then one can call these two different kinds
of prediction, respectively, a * technological prediction' and a
3
'prophecy' , The former is en assertion that if an antecedent event of
a certain sort takes place within a specific type of initial conditions,
then this will cause the occurrence of a consequent phenomenon of a
particular kind (i.e. 'If p in S, then q') . A categorical prediction,
on the other hand, is an assertion that since a certain typo of situation
is extant, therefore it will, with all likelihood, be followed by a
consequent event of a certain sort (i.e. 'Since (if p in S, then q) and
p in S, therefore q') . Because a hypothetical prediction is involved
in the making of a categorical prediction, one will examine predictions
of kind (i) first, and then later analyse predictions of kind (ii) ,
In the natural sciences, if by 'prediction' one means
'hypothetical prediction' , then the explanatory and predictive
processes are symmetrical. Thus, if one can offer an exact explanation
of the occurrence of a specific event (as in classical physics), or if
1, W.H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History, (Hutchinson,
London, 1951, third (revised) edit,, 1967), p, 41
2, The term 'hypothetical prediction' is taken from:
- K. Scriven, 'Explanation and prediction in Evolutionary Theory', in
Science, Vol. 130, Ho, 3374, August 28th 1959, p. 477f
3, K.B. popper, The Poverty of Htstoricisa, op. cit,, p. 42f
one can offer a probabilistic explanation of the occurrence of a specific
event (as in particle physics)» or if one can offer an •explanation of
the principle' of the occurrence of a specific event qua instance of a
wide range of possible events (as in evolutionary theory), then in each
of these cases one can predict the same. In the social sciences, many
predictions are identical in nature to the now familiar •explanations of
the principle* » hhen however, the predictor is part of the same society
to which his predictions refer, he may find that in making ex ante facto
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predictions he encounters phenomena which are ineradicably
indeterministic*" despite the fact that once they have occurred, they can
X. Indeterminisa is the position that determinism is false®
Unfortunately, the torn 'determinism' is highly ambiguous and stands
for a variety of different doctrines, which include: (a) theological
determinism, (b) logical determinism, (c) ethical determinism,
(d) metaphysical or ontological determinism, (e) scientific or
predictive determinism, and (f) methodological or programmatic
determinism. The first three are beyond the brief of this discussion.
The last is the recommendatory precept that one ought to seek
until one finds the complete set of antecedent causes of the
explanandiaa-phenoraenon in question. Metaphysical determinism is the
position expressed by the statement 'every event has some cause' % in
chapter IV, section (i) , the logical status of this and other
'mixed quantifier' statements will be examined.
Scientific or predictive detemini sin is however normally
the doctrine at issue (as it is at the present moment) when the general
word 'determinism' is uttered. To call a phenomenon 'deterministic'
(in this sense) is to claim that it in logically possible to predict
its occurrence with any desired degree of precision. This sort of
deteimnism is of course at the basis of the celebrated ('notorious'
would perhaps be a more appropriate word) view advanced by the French
astronomer and mathematician, Pierre Simon de Laplace (1749-1827) .
He claimed that given the relative position of every particle in the
universe and the laws of interaction between them at any one instant of
time, an infinitely powerful mind would be able to predict (i.e. to
predict categorically) every event within the bounds of the universe at
any time in the future, and also to retrodict the same at any time in
the past. Despite the fact that they embody the virtual apotheosis of
scientism, Laplace's own words possess an hypnotic fascination that
has dimmed little vdth the passage of time. He writes:
"We ought .... to regard the present state of the universe
as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one
which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which
could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and
the respective situation of the beings who compose it — an
intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to
analysis - it would embrace in the same formula the movements
of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the
lightest atom ; for it, nothing would he uncertain and the
future, as the past, would be present to its eyes."
- Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace, Essai. philosophique sur leg
probabilities, (1814), trans, from the sixth French edition by
F.W. Truscott and F.L. Emory, A Philosophical Essay on
Probabilities, (Dover Publications, New York, 1951), p. 4
be satisfactorily explained.
Hypothetical social predictions are used to determine
either (a) what (intended or unintended) consequences would result if
certain actions were initiated within given societal conditions, or
(b) what sort of actions would he required in the given conditions if a
desired result is to be produced or if an unwanted situation is to be
brought to an end. To begin with, let it be supposed that one faces no
greater difficulty in making such predictions than one would if giving
ex post facto * explanations of the principle' .
A 'prediction of the principle' nay be controverted on
any occasion of application for one or both of the following reasons:
(l) the particular social generalisation derived fron the formal theory
in question may be false, and (?) the initial social conditions
explicitly assumed to prevail may not all have been satisfied, and hence
either a required necessary condition is lacking, or at least one
important operative cause not among those which the theory overtly takes
into account is at work. Because social scientific predictions, like
social explanations, have to be stated with reference to a 'ceteris
paribus' clause, in the event of an apparent refutation the following
problem arises. When one is using a theory which enables one to trace
only the major instances of the main kinds of causal factors operating
in a complex social situation, hov? does one decide, in the face of a
discrepancy between the theory's implications and factual observation,
whether to attribute the divergence to temporary causes allowed for
by the 'ceteris paribus' clause, or to consider that the divergence
falsifies (0110 or more aspects of) the formal theory employed to produce
the prediction in question? In order to decide whether a particular
theory should continue to be accepted (as corroborated) or rejected (as
falsified)j one has to find a way of distinguishing refutations due to
reason (2) from falsifications of en inadequate theory due to
reason (l) «,
It should be noted that this problem, does not exist just for
social inquirers (and for those who investigate comparatively complex
natural phenomena) ; for even, as mentioned previously, within classical
physics one cannot obtain one hundred per cent agreement between
empirical observations and theoretical predictions. However, the problem
is far more acute for social scientists than for physical scientists. In
the social sciences, inquirers are restricted to the employment of
'predictions of the principle' , and this weakens their confidence that
they are ever justified in firmly accepting or rejecting the theory from
which -their predictions were derived. On the other hand, in the exact
physical sciences where inquirers can ascertain (and often control as
well) all the instances of a small and complete number of kinds of
variables, experimental results can frequently be used to give a clear
decision on whether a given theory or hypothesis should stand or fall.
With a simple physical theory, when one predicts that a specific event
will possess a certain quantified property one also, as a matter of
strict logical implication, predicts that nothing other than this will
occur; thus, the number of possible falsifying instances is extremely
large, and hence with a theory of such high empirical content it is not
difficult to decide whether one's predictions are correct or incorrect.
But in the social sciences there can be no crucial experiments, A social
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scientific theory which predicts that an event will fall within, a wide
range of possible instances of a certain type, logically implies only
that an occurrence of a kind outside the expected range %.a.ll not take
place. Rore, the number of falsifying possibilities is far smaller, and
therefore the social, scientist (to a considerably greater extent than
the physical scientist) has the difficulty of deciding what is to count
as a significant test of his predictions.
A clean-cut solution to the problem of what constitutes a
meaningful test of a social prediction would, no doubt, be desirable;
unhappily, one has to admit that no answer can be produced that possesses
the attribute of authoritative decisiveness, What can be claimed is that
if phenomena habitually fall within the expected range, this provides
justification for holding that the theory from which the prediction was
derived correctly captures the main causal inter-connections operating
in the domain under investigation. Similarly, it is justifiable to claim
that a social theory is falsified if the divergences between its
predictions and. the subsequently observed events are persistent and
gross. These claims are couched in indefinite terminology, but the lack
of precision is unavoidable: it springs from the fact that in the social
sciences one deals with 'predictions of the principle' which rely upon
'ceteris paribus' clauses that cannot ba unpacked in detail. The inherent
unspecificity of these qualifying clauses ensures that expressions such
as 'habitual', 'persistent' and 'gross' (when employed to describe the
concomitance, or lack of it, between a theory's logical implications and
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empirically observed, facts), cannot be given precise meanings which would
command universal agreement. In the final analysis, therefore, whether
a particular social prediction is held to be correct or incorrect is a
natter of pragmatic judgment; for each individual case, one must decide
by appraisal whether the set of divergences over a period of time from
the theoretically expected is *acceptable* or not. There is no
definitive methodological rule.
A little earlier it was asserted that in certain
circumstances social phenomena yet to occur are indeterainistic, even
though there is no difficulty surrounding their explanation after they
have occurred. With the explanatory process, one attempts to account for
the occurrence of a specific phenomenon by determining its antecedent
causes. But since the causes of an explanandum-event lie in the past
(either the very immediate past if the event in question lies in the
present, or the more distant past if the event itself lies in the past) ,
the set of causes is closed for all time. Even if one is never able to
ascertain in detail all the causes of a specific event, anything that was
a cause remains a cause, and nothing that was not a cause can subsequently
become a cause. The causes of what has occurred or of what is now
occurring are totally •fixed1 ; thus, the explanatory process seeks to
discover the settled causes, whatever they may in fact be, of particular
social phenomena. However, since social events are not determined by
nomic causation, a prediction concerning a future social occurrence has
as its object a phenomenon whose set of causes may prove to contain a
number of (social) factors of a quite novel sort.
Because of the openness of the kinds of factors determining
future social phenomena, social scientists perpetually face the
possibility that their predictions may become 'self-reflexive' . In
the extreme cases, such predictions are either self-refuting or self-
fulfilling c With the former, the act of publicising a prediction to
the effect that if certain sorts of actions are initiated within a given
set of conditions then, a certain, consequence will emerge, itself becomes
a causal factor such that when the antecedent actions take place the
expected consequent does not appear, although it otherwise would have
occurred. With the latter, the publication of a prediction becomes a
causal factor such that when the antecedent actions are initiated the
predicted event actually appeals, although it othexnd.se would not have
occurred.
Speaking of the ability to possess the property of self-
reflexivity, the sociologist Herton claims that "this characteristic
of predictions is peculiar to human affairs. It is not found among
predictions about the world of nature .... So far as we know, the
meteorologist's prediction of continued rainfall has until now not
perversely led to the occurrence of a drought .... (and) predictions of
p
the return of IIalley's comet do not influence its orbit."" . In the
first chapter of this discussion, good grounds were found for rejecting
the scientistic approach to social questions. It follows from the
rejection of scientism that the reason why self-reflexive predictions
are indeed 'peculiar to human affairs' is that the act of making and
publicising a prediction is a social event, and as such is not the kind
1. R.K. Herton, op. cit., p. 183
2. Ibid., p. 477
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of phenomenon that plays a part in the causal determination of a purely
physical event. It is this point that is wholly neglected in the often
cited attempt by Adolf Grunbaum to rebut Kerton's contention that
self-reflexive predictions are 'not found among predictions about the
world of nature' .
Against the observations of Herton , Grunbaum asks one to
consider a situation in which a computer predicts that, on its present
course, a missile will not reach its target, and in which communication
of this information to the missile in the form of a new set of
instructions causes it to alter its course and thereby to hit its target,
contrary to the computer's original prediction.^ But by no stretch of
the imagination is this an acceptable counter-instance, namely, an
example of a self-reflexive prediction concerned with a purely physical
phenomenon. If one is speaking accurately, then a computer (qua physical
object) is no more able to make and disseminate a prediction than a
cluster of celestial bodies is able to tell the time; publicising a
prediction and telling the time are meaningful activities, and the
ability to perform them is only ascribed to physical objects (and hence
to human artifacts qua physical objects) metaphorically, and in any case
only in so far as a human mind chooses to interpret their physical
•outputs* in a manner that relates to the purposive activity of men.
In his final paragraph, Grunbaum concludes by saying that it is
unavailing to object to his counter-example on the grounds that it
involves the behaviour of an artifact, because "physical artifacts ....
1. A. Grunbaum, 'Historical Determinism, Social Activism, end Predictions
in the Social Sciences', in The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, Vol. VII, No. 27, November 1956, p. 239f
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fall entirely within the purview of physical laws,;1 * But this remark
is simply false. The notion of an artifact is only apparently purely
physical, but is actually partly intentional. For a description of a
machine is incomplete unless it specifies (a) its original purpose and
what it can be used for, and (b) its operational and structural
2
principles. But to describe these, involves the use of intentional
concepts which have no place within the formulation of physical laws;
a machine, therefore, cannot be described by reference to just the laws
of physics (although its functioning is of course founded upon physical
laws) . Hence, even if a computer could be said literally to make
predictions, Gixmbaum's argument would still fail because in order to
identify the referent of the concept 'computer* one has to employ
ideational criteria, the use of which presupposes a conscious human
mind.
If a social scientist makes a prediction from a perspective
external to the society to which it refers, then (since the question of
self-reflexivity does not arise) no barrier faces bin that would not face
him if he were intent on producing an ex post facto explanation of the
phenomenon under consideration. But if a social scientist makes a
prediction not ah extra, but publicly within the society to which the
prediction refers and if its dissemination subsequently becomes an
1. A. Grimbaum, 'Historical Determinism, Social Activism, and Predictions
in the Social Sciences', op. cit., p. 240 (italics added)
2. M. Polanyi, 'On the Modern Mind', in Encounter, Vol. XXTV, Ko, 5,
Kay 1965, pp. 12-15
11. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, (lloutledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1967), pp.*34-42
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integral part of the social situation and changes the circumstances
under which the prediction originally held true, is there anything
(apart from empirical impediments due to the complexity of the subject-
matter) to prevent him making an allowance for the effect of the
publication and. then adjusting the prediction accordingly?
The answer to this is easily given. If the prediction in
question and its adjustments are (as can sensibly be conceived) all of
an enduring self-reflexive nature and if they are publicly disseminated,
then it is the case that the phenomenon-to-be-predicted is indeterainistic.
Under the conditions just described, it is logically impossible to make a
successful prediction. For it is conceptually incoherent to demand that
a publicised social prediction take into account the effect of its own
dissemination; once the original prediction has been adjusted, the
revised prediction has then to be adjusted to allow for the effect of
its publication, and so on ad infinitum.
This last point can be shown in a schematic fashion.
Suppose that one produces a (first-order) prediction , thus ;
Px = (If p in S, then q)
This states that if the set of actions p is initiated in social
conditions S , then the consequence will he q . Fat (it is here
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supposed) two assertions are true of P^ , namely j
(a) If p takes place and P^ is not publicised, then q ,
(b) If p takes place and P^ is publicised, then r .
However, by producing (a) and (b) one has, in effect, produced two
(second-order) social predictions. If one reads * u ' as 'is not
uttered in public' and ' u ' as 'is uttered in public* , then these
two predictions run s
P^(a) = (if p +u^) in s, then q)
- (If P 4- u(lf p in S, then q) in S, then q)
P (b) = (If p +u^) in S, then r)
= (if p+u(lf p in S, then q) in S, then r)
But the matter does not stop here. For now it is open to one to express
the two statements that on the supposition of persistent self-reflexivity,
are true of each of Pp(a) and Pg(b) . These are :
(a) If p takes place and P^(a) is not publicised, then q .
(b) If p takes place and P_(a) is publicised, then s .?
(c) If p takes place and P^(h) is not publicised, then r .
(d) If p takes place and Pg(b) is publicised, then t .
And if fully expanded, these four (third-order) predictions appear as
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follows :
E (a) = (if p + u(P2(a)) in S, then q)
= (if p + u(lf p + u(PL) in »S, then q) in S, then q)
— (if p + u(lf p-i-u(lf p in S, then q) in. S> then q) in S» then q)
P„(b) = (if p + u(P2(a)) in S, then s)
= (if p + u(lf p-fu(p^) in Sg then q) In S, then s)
= (if p-s-u(lf p-*-u(lf p in S, then q) in S, then q) in S» then s)
Ev(c) = (if p + ^(P^b)) in S, then r)
= (if p*u(lf p+xi(?1) in St then r) in S» then r)
= (if p+u(l£ y<~ u(lf p in S» then q) in S, then r) in S, then r)
P^(n) = (if P + u(?2(b)) in S» then t)
— (if p+.u(lf p + u(p ) in S» then r) in S, then t)
= (if p-t-u(lf p+u(lf p in S, then q) in S, then r) in S, then t)
One does not need to continue this regress of adjusted self-reflexive
predictions any further. It should be clear fron an inspection of what
has been set out, that provided the predictions are actually disseminated
(and of course remain self-reflexive), it is indeed logically impossible
to make a successful prediction. No ultimate public allowance for the
effect of the dissemination of the original prediction can be made,
because to achieve this involves the conceptually impossible task of
constructing an infinite-order social prediction.
One must now consider the question of how far it is possible
(i.e. logically possible) to undertake what was called earlier in this
section the 'categorical prediction' of specific social phenomena.
A prediction of this type, it will be recalled, is an assertion to the
effect that since a particular state of affairs prevails at the present
time, therefore it will be followed at a specific time in the future by a
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certain consequent state of affairs. In the short-term, the categorical
prediction of a particular phenomenon presents no problems in addition
to those encountered in attempting to establish a hypothetical prediction
of instances of its kind. Once one has established that ' If p in S,
then q * is true and that p has come about, one is then in a position
to predict categorically the emergence of q . But is long-term
categorical prediction of societal phenomena, a suitable aim to
recommend for the social sciences?
It has been maintained that unless the social sciences can
produce long-term categorical predictions, they do not deserve the title
•sciences' . A statement of this position (to which of course Popper
attaches his label 'historicis^l,''" ) is well articulated by Charles A.
Beard (l874~*1948) . 'If a science of society*, he writes,
"were a true science, like that of astronomy, it would
enable us to predict the essential movements of human affairs
for the immediate and the indefinite future, to give pictures
of society in the year 2000 or the year 25C0 just as
astronomers can map the appearance of the heavens at fixed
points of time in the future. Such a social science would
tell us exactly what is going to happen in the years to come
and we should be powerless to change it by any effort of
will." 2
An extremely puzzling feature of this passage is that it regards a
categorical prediction as an entirely unconditional prognostication.
But this is surely not a correct characterisation. In astronomy (to
1. K.B.. Popper, The Poverty of Historicisia, op. cit., p. 2, p. 41ff et
- passim
2. C.A. Beard, The Nature of the Social Sciences in relation to
Objectives of Instruction, (c. Scribner's Sons, Hew York, 1934),
p. 29 . The passage is also cited in E. Hagel, op. cit», p. 460
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take Beard's example of a 'true science' ) it is assumed that the
orbital arrangements of the various celestial bodies will continue to
bold in the future as they have done in the past, and that no new element
(such as a stray comet) will enter the particular system under scrutiny
and disrupt the prevailing pattern of movements. A categoxucal
prediction of a specific event is not a forecast made without knowledge
of initial conditions, but is a forecast that is conditional upon one's
having good grounds for believing either that the initial conditions
pertinent to the production of the event in question will remain
undisturbed, or that the initial conditions change in ways which can he
categorically predicted because they themselves rest upon a set of
circumstances which remains unchanged over time. Thus, if one is
interested in, say, the relative positions of the planets Mars ,
Jupiter and Saturn at the beginning of the first second of the first
day of the year 2000 , this could be categorically predicted because
astronomers have 'good assurance' that the established cyclical pattern
of notion within the solar system is likely to remain permanently
extant.
However, when it comes to social phenomena, one is unable to
have this assurance regarding the initial conditions upon which specific
aspects of society in the distant future depend; and one is unable to
have this, for reasons that are additional to those stemming from the
empirical fact of the inherent complexity of the social world. For once
the full implications of the distinction between the social and the
natural sciences are appreciated, the demand that long-term categorical
prediction be made the aim of the social sciences reveals itself as a
demand that the sciences of society pursue a goal that cannot even he
spelled out without conceptual incoherence.
In order to obtain a successful categorical prediction
of a feature of society in the distant future (when the set of social
conditions presently extant will have altered radically), it would,
beforehand, be necessary to produce categorical predictions of what
relevant conditions will prevail at the specified time. But because
a large and important part of the determining circumstances of future
social events will be the results of numerous intellectual inquiries,"*"
in order to predict all the requisite initial conditions it is very
likely that one would therefore be faced with the task of having to
predict both of the following?
(a) the time in the future that particular scientific
discoveries vri.ll be made and novel philosophical
ideas created, and,
00 the exact details of the substantive contents of
these discoveries and ideas .
It goes without saying that at the very least such an endeavour is (and
will remain forever) well beyond the bounds of empirical possibility.
But is there any contradiction in the notion that a predictor (by
predicting the brain processes of scientists and others) could learn
that a piece of knowledge would be discovered at a certain date, and
that its details vrould be such and such?
1. K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Hlstoricism, op. cit., pp. v-vii
G.L.S. Shackle, hpisteraics & Economics, (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1972), pp. 25-27, p. 272f et al.
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Just for a brief moment, it will be assumed that (i) there
is nothing incoherent in the concept 'the prediction of a discovery by
the prediction of a brain state* , and that (ii) one is discussing a
situation, in which the predictor publicises his prediction within the
social environment to which it refers."'* If a predictor could predict
both (a) and (b) , this would make hira, at the time of the achievement
of the predictions, the actual discoverer of the piece of knowledge in
1. K.R. Popper, 1 Indeteminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical
Physics*, in The British Journal for the philosophy of Science,
Vol. I, No. 2, August 1950, pp. 117-135 , and
Vol. I, No. '5, November 1950, pp. 173-195 -
In this double article, Popper argues that in a society of mutually
interacting predictors (either human agents or predicting machines
constructed by human agents) it is a logical point that "even if any
prediction task is capable of being carried out by some predictor, there
will be no predictor capable of carrying out every task" . (p. 193) For
in such circumstances, "the future states of one at least of the existing
predictors cannot be predicted by any of the existing predictors" .
(p. 119) A predictor is necessarily unable to predict every future event
within the society of which he is a part (no matter how much he may know
of the initial conditions, and no matter how fast he may be able to
calculate), because he is logically precluded from predicting (i) his
own future predictions, and (ii) the future states of those predictors
trying to predict his own future predictions. It is logically impossible
for a predictor to predict his own future predictions, since they
can only be made by him at the specified time ; they cannot be predicted
now (and hence made by him now), and yet remain for him predictions to be
made at the allotted time.
While one readily agrees with Popper's argument and conclusion,
the situation he analyses is not precisely similar to that under present
examination. At the moment one is attempting to discover whether it is
logically possible for a predictor (who is not outside the society to
which his predictions relate, but interacts with it to the extent that
the publication of what he predicts now, affects subsequent developments)
to predict not his own. future states, but those of others. In these
circumstances, the predictor plays no part in shaping the course of
events beyond the mailing and publicising of his single prediction.
question (because he would know all its details before it otherwise would
have been discovered). However, provided that the predictor kept this
knowledge strictly to himself, no problem of conceptual coherency arises
on the understanding that assumption (i) is conceded. But one wants
here to assert assumption (ii) as well. And it is obvious that if made
public, an initially correct prediction of a discovery (to be made by a
member of the society under consideration) would, as a matter of fact, be
self-reflexive; the individual whose brain-state had been predicted
would learn of the prediction, and thus would himself be unable to
produce the piece of knowledge an a_ discovery at the time the predictor
predicted he would (or indeed at any other time). The assertion advanced
by the predictor would then cease to say anything at all about the future
of the society to which it referred; hence if the predictor should ever
gain the opportunity to succeed, this, ipso facto, dooms his effort to
ultimate failure. Notwithstanding this, under assumptions (i) and (ii)
no conceptual absurdity appears to be involved in holding that the results
of intellectual inquiries could be predicted and publicly disseminated,
for it is a purely empirical matter that such predictions would become
self-reflexive.
But suppose that assumption (ii) is not advanced, and that
one is concerned with a situation in which the predictor stands absolutely
aloof from the society whose future properties he is anxious to predict.
What then is to be made of assumption (i) ? Is it indeed even logically
possible to obtain foreknowledge of future discoveries by predicting the
brain-states of those involved in scientific research and other forms of
intellectual investigation? Within a context of discussion different
from that of the moment, this last question is examined in a recent
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article by Paul Keehl . In this paper, it is envisaged that a "Utopian
neurophysiologist studies the brain of a mathematician who is currently
working on. Fermat's Last Theorem . (Ey 'Utopian neurophysiologist'
is meant "a man from Mars .... mysteriously possessed of such a
Utopian knowledge of JBarthling neurophysiology that he is able, by a
combination of behavioral and microtechniques — such as single-unit
stimulation and the like - to give a complete causal account, in
neurophysiological terms, of all the activities ana dispositions of any
2 v
given member of Homo sapiens" .j With reference to this imagined set of
circumstances, Keehl writes as follows;
"
.... the neurophysiologist in some sense
could 'discover' a valid proof of Format's Last Theorem
without understanding mathematics, by studying the brain
of .... (the) mathematician .... I readily agree that
this sounds counterintuitive. But I do not see anything
contradictory about it." 5
The exact details of Keehl's problem and argument are not of concern;
what is of interest, is his contention that there is no contradiction in
the notion that a discovery could be predicted, if it were empirically
possible to achieve a prediction of "the mere graphical residues of a
molar class of finger movements"^ by means of a further prediction of
5
the antecedent cerebral sequences in the mathematician's brain .
1. P.A. Keehl, 'Psychological Determinism and Human Rationality1, in
H. Radnor and S. Winokur (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Vol. IV
p. 351
2. Ibid., p. 349
3. Ibid., p. 354
4. Ibid., p. 353
5. Ibxd., p. 351f
(Keehl's italics)
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Against Meehl , one can say that his claim only possesses
a semblance of conceptual coherence because his approach rests upon
scientistic preconceptions. But once scientisa has been abandoned, it
is easily perceived that any argument which has as its conclusion a
statement referring to the occurrence of what requires to he identified
by intentional criteria, and which has as its premises statements
referring only to the occurrence of what requires to be identified by
physical criteria, must be fallacious. Therefore, one cannot derive a
statement (or set of statements) describing a discovery from a statement
(or set of them) describing the purely physical, results (eg. ink
scratches on paper) of the effector movements of the muscles of a man's
hand. In other words, when thoroughly explicated, the concept 'the
prediction of a discovery by the prediction of a brain state' proves in
its own fashion to be no more internally coherent than the famous
concept 'the class of all classes that are not members of themselves' .
If it is logically impossible (as it appears to be) to
predict the emergence and the substantive details of future intellectual
inquiries, then it is logically impossible to predict the totality of
environmental circumstances which might have an influence on social
phenomena in the future. From this conclusion, it is an obvious inference
that long-term societal prediction (of the sort advocated by Beard in
the passage quoted earlier) is not a possible aim for the social sciences,
because what is recommended cannot even be stated coherently. To accept,
however, that it is methodologically misconceived to seek to produce
categorical predictions of events that are to occur within societal
conditions that are likely to embody features which necessarily cannot
be predicted, in no way detracts from the propriety of formulating
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hypothetical social predictions. Indeed, apart from cases where these
prove to be persistently self-reflexive, there seems to be no reason to
suppose that improvements in the precision of social 'explanations of
the principle* , should not receive correlative reflection in improvements
in the accuracy of just such predictions.
157.
IV PROBLEMS OF THEORETICAL AND IDIOGRAPHIC EXPLANATION
(i) The Structure of Formal Theories
Social scientists (like natural scientists) are not
interested in accumulating unconnected single facts ; it is part of
the essence of scientific investigation that inquirers be concerned
with systematic research into the causes of specific explananda-
phenomena. One of the goals of social scientific activity, therefore,
is to ensure that what are offered as explanations of particulai*
events are related, even if only to the minimum extent of giving
mutually consistent accounts of the individual phenomena within a
given domain of inquiry. It has already been noted that economics is
the only social science whose component statements are 'rigorously'
related in that they form systems of deductive connections. This
chapter, accordingly, will be devoted first to examining a number of
central methodological problems which are pertinent to the theoretical
explanations provided by economics, and, secondly, to discussing some
further questions of philosophical importance which concern the
idiographic explanations provided by the other social sciences.
At the present time, the most widely accepted position
regarding the nature of scientific theories is the one Herbert Feigl
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has recently dubbed "the standard account of the structure of
scientific theories""*" . This influential view (which seeks to model
empirical science on formal logic) is maintained by many philosophers,
2 3 4
including Hempel , Nagel , and Rudner .In brief outline, the
logical analysis of the structure of formal theories (whether natural
or social scientific) promulgated by this account, is as follows.
It is claimed that every scientific theory is properly regarded, in
the first instance, as a purely syntactic calculus consisting of
a deductively organised network of uninterpreted symbols. Each
constituent symbol is either a 'primitive term' of the system,
or is the subject of an implicit definition (i.e. is defined by
reference to a number of the primitive terms) e Although these
symbols are totally devoid of any meaningful content, they are
arranged into various permissible permutations called 'well formed
formulas' (or 'wffs' for short) by preassigned 'formation rules' .
A small number of wffs are designated as 'axioms' ; and to these
axioms 'transformation rules' specifying the accepted rules of
deductive inference are applied in order to derive some (but not all)
1. H. Feigl, 'The 'Orthodox' View of Theories', in M. Radner and
S. VJinokur (eds), op. cit., p. 3
2. C.G. Hempel, 'The Theoretician's Dilemma', in H. Peigl, M. Scriven
and G. Maxwell (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Vol. II, (University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis,
1958, edit., 1967), pp. 37-98
C.G. Hempel, 'On the 'Standard Conception' of Scientific Theories',
in M. Radner and S. Winokur (eds), op. cit., pp. 142-163
3. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit., pp. 90-105
4. R.S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science. (Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp. 10-53
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of the possible wffs as 'theorems' . Finally, the syntactic
calculus of uninterpreted formulas becomes an empirical theory when
'rules of correspondence' are found which link the primitive terms
in the axioms (and in the formulas derived from them) with classes
of directly observable phenomena.
The proponents of the 'standard' conception take care
to stress that the account they give is intended as an analysis of
the structural characteristics of existing theories, and should be
construed neither as a description of the historical process of the
formation of theories nor as a recipe for the construction of new
theories."'' This point is understood and accepted, but even as a
hindsight reconstruction of the logical features of existing formal
theories the analysis is highly unsatisfactory.
The 'standard' account, as is openly admitted by those
who advance it, rests upon a "sharp distinction between the language
of observation (observational language; O.L.) and the language of
2
theories (theoretical language; T.L.) " ; in other words, on this
distinction depends the contention that an uninterpreted syntactic
structure is conceptually prior to an 'empirical interpretation' ,
and that hence every explanandum-phenomenon of every theory can be
identified by criteria which are completely 'uncontaminated' by
conceptual notions stemming from the empirical theory which is to be
used to explain the events in question. However, since there are
and can be no such things as uninterpreted observations (one cannot
simply observe, one must observe something; and in order to be able
1. H. Feigl, 'The 'Orthodox' View of Theories', op. cit., p. 13
E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, op, cit., p. 90
R.S. Rudner, op. cit., p. 18
2. H. Feigl, 'The 'Orthodox' View of Theories', op. cit., p. 7
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to observe something, one requires some idea of what is significant
and what is not), a rigid distinction between an O.L. and a T.L.
cannot be substantiated. And granted this, it is evident that the
'standard' conception cannot be a correct account of the formal
structure common to all empirical theories. For it is the case that
numerous explananda-phenomena of many theories can only be identified
after (a tentative version of) the theory in question has been
formulated. Thus, although in the realm of formal logic it may
always be possible to identify the 'elements' to be connected (eg,
propositions, classes) by criteria extant in 'ordinary language',
in the field of empirical science an account which allows for the
employment of only those criteria of identification which can be
found wholly apart from the theory to be established, cannot be
accepted as an adequate analysis of the structural properties of
scientific theories in general.
The rejection of the view that scientific theories are
uninterpreted calculi which have had an empirical interpretation
bestowed upon them, does not of course entail the rejection of the
position that many theories are correctly viewed as systems of
deductively related statements (and by 'statements' is meant
'meaningful assertions' or 'hypotheses' ) , It should be
recognised however, that this characterisation is not true of all
formal theories, for there are varying degrees of formalisation.
In the terminology introduced in the first chapter, a 'rigorous'
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formal theory (eg. Newtonian mechanics and micro-economic price
theory) possesses a well articulated deductive structure, while a
'less rigorous' formal theory (eg. Darwinian evolutionary theory
or Freudian psycho-analytic theory) has to depend for structural
coherence more on informal connections between its constituent
statements than on established deductive relations.
An analysis of the main components of a formal theory
should commence by remarking that every scientific theory has to
rest upon some ultimate metaphysical presupposition as to the
inherent nature of the phenomena comprising the subject-matter in
question, and hence as to the appropriate mode of explanation to
be employed. There is no need to rehearse here the arguments
amplifying this point, because they were brought forward in depth
in an earlier chapter of this discussion. At the moment it is
sufficient to repeat that if one is interested in constructing, say,
an economic theory, then one's efforts must be based on the
understanding that the explananda-phenomena under investigation
require to be identified by criteria employing intentional concepts,
and thus require to be explained in a manner appropriate to their
nature as social phenomena. It may well be suggested that ultimate
presuppositions are better regarded not as concrete components of
scientific theories, but as necessary pre-conditions for the
formation of theories. Whether this is so or not, is a matter of
no great consequence; what is of importance is the fact that the
business of theory-construction can only begin once an inquirer has
adopted some initial theoretic conception (which may of course have
to be abandoned in time in favour of some other) as to the kind of
phenomena to be encountered within the given field of events.
162.
If questions relating to the logical status of ultimate-
presuppositions are placed aside, the following types of statements
(frequently confounded) can he discerned to constitute the axiomatic
principles of a formal scientific theory: (a) fundamental
nomological laws (if the theory pertains to natural phenomena), or
basic social generalisations (if the theory pertains to human or
societal phenomena), (b) analytic statements (true as a matter of
logical necessity), and (c) foundational statements of 'mixed
quantifier' form . From these three sorts of statements, there
are deduced (if the theory in question is 'rigorous') or informally
inferred (if the theory in question is 'less rigorous') the laws or
social generalisations which are the main elements in theoretical
explanations of specific phenomena.
With economic theories, the empirical postulates
(statements of sort (a) ) refer to human goals, to the means agents
regularly choose to achieve their desired ends, and to features of
the types of environmental circumstances within which the identified
agents habitually operate. Examples of such statements are:
'consumers aim to maximise their satisfaction' , 'suppliers aim to
maximise their profits' , 'human agents are rational and will
pursue their desired objectives in the most technically efficient
manner available to them' , 'labour and capital factors of
production are completely mobile' and 'markets are perfectly
competitive' . (inter alia, the following three sections of this
chapter will examine a number of the central questions which arise
in connection with the status and role of such statements.) An
example of an analytic constituent (a statement of sort (b) ) of
an economic theory is the statement ' Y, = S, , + C, , ' : itX "t+JL "t+1
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will be recalled from the second chapter that this particular
statement is to be found in the explanation of the 'paradox of
thrift' phenomenon. Since, as far as the pertinent macro-economic
theory is concerned, the assertion (implicitly) defines what is to
be called 'national income' , the statement 'the. national income
of one period is equivalent to the sum of the saving and the
consumption expenditure of the following period' is a logically-
necessary truth. Provided that analytic statements such as this
are not confused with statements of either- of the two other sorts,
their use within scientific theories presents no special problems.
All that has to be understood is that statements of sort (b) do
not convey anything factual, but function within a_ theoretical
structure as (implicit) criteria of identification of what are to
count as the referents of the terms they contain.
Somewhat more difficult to characterise than empirical
and analytic statements, are statements of sort (c) . If by the
word 'empirical' one means 'testable' , 'falsifiable' or
'incompatible with some conceivable observational report' , then
it is just not the case that the categories 'empirical' and
'analytic' are able to classify exhaustively every statement which
may be found among the axiomatic principles of a scientific theory.
For between statements which are empirical and those which are
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analytic, there are a number which fall into a twilight zone which
lies in the middle.''' These are statements which are factual (for
they are not consistent with the descriptions of all logically
possible states of affairs) but which are nevertheless non-empirical
(for they are consistent with all imaginable observational reports) .
To this group belong 'mixed quantifier' or 'all-and-some'
statements, examples of which are: 'every event has some cause'
(the thesis of 'ontological determinism'), 'every social phenomenon
is the intended result of some consciously designed plan' (the
'conspiracy theory of society'), 'every social institution serves
some functional consequence' (the 'postulate of universal
functionalism' ) and 'the quantity demanded and the quantity
supplied of every good are some respective functions of the ruling
price' (the skeletal structure of micro-economic price theory) .
On account of their untestable nature, J.W.N. Watkins labels
3
statements of this kind 'metaphysical' ; however, since this
expression has been used previously to describe the ultimate
1. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Between Analytic and Empirical', in Philosophy.
Vol. XXXII, No. 121, April 1957, pp. 112-131
J.W.N. Watkins, 'Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics', in
Mind. Vol. LXVII, No. 267, July 1958, pp. 344-365
J.W.N. Watkins, 'When are Statements Empirical?', in The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. X, No. 40, February
I960, pp. 287-308
2. The thesis of universal functionalism will be discussed in
chapter V, section (iv) .
3. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics', op.
cit., p. 344 et al.
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presuppositions of scientific inquiries, statements of 'mixed
quantifier' form will be called (for the purposes of this discussion
'foundational statements' .
It is a characteristic of -foundational statements that
they can be neither conclusively verified nor conclusively falsified
Take the assertion 'every social phenomenon is the result of some
design' . In the symbolism of the first-order predicate calculus,
this is written as '(x)(Ey)(Sx =» (Py & C(x,y)))' - that is, 'for
all x there is a y such that if x is a social phenomenon, then
y is a set of purposive actions and x' stands in the relationship
'is the directly intended consequence of' to y ' . It can be
seen by inspection that the symbolic translation contains both a
universal and an existential quantifier; since whatever falls
within the scope of the former is unverifiable and whatever falls
within the scope of the latter is unfalsifiable, it follows that a
union of what falls within the scope of each of these operators is
both unverifiable and unfalsifiable. Nevertheless, despite the fact
that _if considered on its own as a single isolated assertion the
statement under scrutiny (along with all other 'mixed quantifier'
statements) cannot be formally demonstrated to be either true or
false, it is open to an informal 'test of acceptability' when
considered as an integral part of a formal theory which is itself
open to empirical refutation. Although the statement 'every social
phenomenon is the result of some design' cannot be formally
disproved, if numerous empirical hypotheses, of the form 'this
social phenomenon is the intended result of the actions initiated
at time _t by agents a ' (constructed by circumscribing the
existential component of the original assertion) are convincingly
falsified when tested, the fact of their refutation could not but
cast grave discredit on the foundational statement itself. And
indeed, it is because empirical conjectures of precisely this form
cannot survive rigorous testing, that the conspiracy theory of
society is held in wide disrepute. Since social theories employing
the concept 'unintended consequence' have been shown to possess
explanatory abilities vastly superior to those theories built around
testable conspiracy hypotheses, one is quite unable to accept that
the foundational statement, lying behind such hypotheses is true
(even though it itself cannot be definitely refuted) »
Similarly, it is the case that on their own both 'the
quantity demanded of any good is some function of the ruling price'
and 'the quantity supplied of any good is some function of the
ruling price' are non-empirical and hence cannot be formally proved
or disproved. However, these foundational assertions are subjected
to a 'test of acceptability* whenever falsifiable hypotheses
specifying in what, way the quantities demanded and supplied of a
particular sort of commodity are functions of its price are created
and submitted to empirical tests. In this instance, because very
many hypotheses of the form 'the quantity demanded of commodity c
is a function f of the ruling price and the coefficient of price
elasticity of demand is of value u ' and 'the quantity supplied
of commodity c is a function f^ of the ruling price and the
coefficient of price elasticity of supply is of value v ' are
well corroborated, their respective foundational statements are
accepted as true.
Before this section is concluded, a final comment is
required; namely, that statements of types (b) and (c) are only
167.
of scientific value in so far as they are combined in a coherent
fashion with statements of type (a) to form a comprehensive theory.
A formal structure composed entirely of analytic and 'mixed
quantifier' statements cannot possess any explanatory power becauise
all observable states of affairs are compatible with it; since it
'forbids' nothing, it can explain nothing. To be effective as an
explanatory account, it is necessary for a theory to contain at
least one statement which is unambiguously of type (a) . The point
may be trivial, but its triviality does not prevent it being of
crucial importance.
(ii) Testability and Economic Assumptions
Because its subject-matter is comprised of complex
phenomena, an economic theory is able to indicate only the main
instances of the predominant kinds of causal factors which regularly
bring about (intended or unintended) consequences of certain sorts.
Since this is so, in the event of a controversion of a (hypothetical,
non self-reflexive) prediction as to the result of the initiation
of a particular set of actions, how does one decide whether to
attribute responsibility for the divergence to temporary causes
allowed for by the 'ceteris paribus' clause, or to consider that
the discrepancy falsifies one or more of the empirical postulates
of the theory? This question was raised in the final section of
the previous chapter, and there (as will be remembered) it was found
that on account of the ineliminable unspecificity of the 'ceteris
paribus1 clause qualifying every 'prediction of the principle1, the
matter admitted of no definitive solution. In practice, can this
problem ever be obviated or side-stepped? More precisely, is there
any impediment to prevent one testing 'an economic theory by testing
the truthfulness of its empirical postulates instead of, or in
addition to, testing the veracity of its logical consequences?
Before one can decide if there is any practical
barrier, one must examine a more fundamental issue; namely, whether
or not it is methodologically illegitimate to attempt to test a
theory 'directly' (by testing its empirical postulates) rather than,
or as. well as, 'indirectly' (by testing its derived implications)
because it is impossible in principle to test a theory by means of
the former method. Prima facie, the claim that in principle a
theory cannot be tested by testing its postulates seems to be
patently incorrect. In the first place, it is a matter of simple
logic that if a theorem (a law or a social generalisation) is
validly deduced from a set of empirical postulates (in conjunction
with a number of analytic and foundational statements) and if the
postulates are tested and found to be true, then the whole theory
has been tested and the theorem shown to be true even though the
latter element has itself not been subjected to an empirical test.
A second pertinent consideration is that no statement is a postulate
or a theorem absolutely, but is such only with reference to the
position it occupies within the framework of a given theory. Since
a statement which is a postulate from the point of view of one
theory may be a theorem from another and vice versa, the contention
that a theory cannot in principle be tested directly entails an
immediate and obvious paradox. Finally, since every statement
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implies, and is implied by, itself, the claim that only a theory's
logical implications but never its empirical postulates can be
tested, appears to border on the incoherent.
In a very well known and frequently quoted essay
entitled 'The Methodology of Positive Economics' , the eminent
economist Milton Friedman seeks to establish the proposition that
"the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison
of its predictions with experience"*" .... (and hence) a theory cannot
2
be tested by the 'realism' of its 'assumptions' " . This claim
is amplified in the following passage:
"The difficulty in the social sciences of getting
.... evidence .... and of judging its conformity with
the implications of the hypothesis makes it tempting to
suppose that other, more readily available, evidence is
equally relevant to the validity of the hypothesis - to
suppose that hypotheses have not only 'implications'
but also 'assumptions' and that the conformity of these
'assumptions' to 'reality' is a test of the validity of
the hypothesis different from or additional to the test
by implications. This widely held view is fundamentally
wrong and productive of much mischief." 3
Since Friedman here contrasts the 'implications' of a theory with
its 'assumptions', it is natural to take him to be using the latter
expression to denote the empirical postulates from which a_ theory's
numerous implications can be deduced. If the term 'assumption' is
understood in this sense, then Friedman's contention is that a
theory cannot be tested by ascertaining to what extent its (empirical)
1. M. Friedman, 'The Methodology of Positive Economics' (1955), in
M. Brodbeck (ed), Readings in the Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. (Macmillan, Few York, 1968, edit., 1969), p. 512
(Friedman's italics )
2. Ibid., p. 525
5. Ibid., p. 516 (Friedman's italics)
170
postulates are 'realistic' (i.e<> true) .
Having expounded the kernel of his thesis, Friedman
proceeds immediately to outline exactly what 'mischief' he thinks
has in fact resulted from the disregard of his own methodological
precept. He continues:
"The theory of monopolistic and imperfect competition
is one example of the neglect in economic theory of
these propositions. The development of this analysis was
explicitly motivated, and its x*ide acceptance and approval
largely explained, by the belief that the assumptions
of 'perfect competition' or 'perfect monopoly' said to
underlie neoclassical economic theory are a false image of
reality. And this belief was itself based almost entirely
on the directly perceived descriptive inaccuracy of the
assumptions rather than on any recognised contradiction of
predictions derived, from neoclassical economic theory." ^
Friedman believes that his methodological maxim is applicable not
only to social scientific theories, but to scientific theories
generally. However, since the theory of imperfect competition is
the only example he actually provides of a theory which'was created
in order to satisfy principles he considers methodologically
inadmissible, it is worth exploring in depth what Friedman has to
say on this point. In the aforementioned passages (taken together)
there are two separate claims: (a) the theory of imperfect
competition xras constructed because the central postulate of the
theory of perfect competition was 'directly perceived to be
descriptively inaccurate' , and (b) it is methodologically illicit
to question the standing of a theory on the grounds that its
premises present a 'false image of reality', because .in principle
a theory cannot be tested by testing the truthfulness of its
1. M. Friedman, op. cit., p» 517
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assumptions. These two propositions will now be examined in turn.
The theory of imperfect (or monopolistic) competition
is the branch of micro-economic price theory which traces the
consequences of the actions initiated by producers to achieve profit
maximisation in conditions where each producer faces a level of
demand (for his output) which has a coefficient of price elasticity
6f less than infinity. The theory first appeared in 1933"'" with
2
the publication of the book The Economics of Imperfect Competition
by Mrs. Joan Robinson (1903- ) . Mrs. Robinson at Cambridge
(where she had been a student under Arthur C. Pigou (1877-1959) ,
who had himself been a student of the economist Alfred Marshall
(1842-1924) ) was one of the two originators of the theory which
is the direct object of Friedman's criticism. (The other
originator, who developed a similar theory independently on the
other side of the Atlantic, was the Harvard economist Edward H.
Chamberlin (1899- ) . His views appeared, also in 1933 , in
3
a work entitled The Theory of Monopolistic Competition . which
was based on a dissertation presented to Harvard in 1927 .)
1. P.C. Newman, The Development of Economic Thought. (Prentice-
Hall, New York" 19521, pp. 304-313 "
J. Oser, The Evolution of Economic Thought. (Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc.. New "York, 1963 J, pp. 297-308
2. Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, (Macmillan,
London, 1933, second edit., 1969) .
3. E.H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, eighth edit.,
1966) .
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In her book, Mrs. Robinson gives her considered view
of the theory of perfect competition. She writes:
"The traditional assumption of perfect competition
is an exceedingly convenient one for simplifying the analysis
of price, but there is no reason to expect it to be fulfilled
in the real world. It depends, in the first place, upon the
existence of such a large number of producers that a change
in the output of any one of them has a negligible effect upon
the output of the commodity as a whole, and it depends, in
the second place, upon the existence of a perfect market. The
first condition may often be approximately fulfilled, but the
existence of a perfect market is likely to be extremely rare
in the real world." 1
Thus, for the assumption of perfect competition to be a true
characterisation of a given economy at a particular time, there have
to be (i) a large number of producers involved in supplying the
aggregate quantity of each type of good, and (ii) a perfect market
for each different type of good. (The phrase 'perfect market'
is a technical expression used by economists to describe the market
for a particular commodity if it is the case that "the customers
who make up the market all react in the same way to differences in
✓y
the prices charged by different sellers" .) At the time of Mrs,
Robinson's investigation, although the first condition was fairly
well satisfied, the composite assumption of perfect competition was
held to be false because the second condition was not even
1. Joan Robinson, op. cit., pp. 88-89
2. It is to be observed that und.er perfect competition (i.e. when
conditions (i) and (ii) above are fulfilled), no individual producer
is able by his own efforts to influence the selling price of the
commodity he manufactures. That is to say, when perfect competition
prevails any one producer is able to sell,as much as he pleases at
the current market price; if he lowers his price (by however little)
he will be able to capture the whole market for himself, while if
he raises his price (by however little) he will forfeit the whole
of his saleso
3. Joan Robinson, op. cit., p. 89
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approximately fulfilled. The fact that Mrs. Robinson argues along
these lines, appears at first sight to confirm Friedman's claim
as to what originally prompted the creation of the theory of
imperfect competition. However, Mrs. Robinson not only attacks
the main premise of the theory of perfect competition on the ground
that it is (to use Friedman's expression) 'descriptively
inaccurate', but she also gives an additional reason why the premise
in question should be abandoned. This second reason is to be found
in the preface to her second edition (i.e. the edition of 1969)>
and will be examined shortly.
In both the theory of perfect and of imperfect
competition, it is a theorem (derivable from the postulates
'suppliers aim to maximise their profits* and 'human agents are
rational and will pursue their objectives in the most effective
manner available to them' ) that every supplier will produce that
level of output at which his marginal revenue is equal to his
marginal cost. For a producer, this level is always the 'optimal'
or 'equilibrium'"*" level of output. A producer's equilibrium level
of output however, does not always coincide with the level of output
at which the average cost per unit of output is at a minimum. An
entrepreneur will only supply this latter level of output as his
equilibrium level if he faces a perfectly competitive market, i.e.
if he faces an infinitely price elastic level of demand for the units
1, In the theory of the firm, a single firm is said to be in
'equilibrium' when there is no tendency for it to alter its level
of output; an industry (i.e. a group consisting of all the firms
producing goods of the same sort J is said to be in 'equilibrium'
when there is no tendency for the number of its constituent firms
to change.
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he produces of the type of commodity in question. This is the '
situation depicted by figure 8.^ where quantity Oq is supplied
at price Op per unit; here, the set of circumstances resulting
from the actions of consumers and producers is such that for any
single producer the level of output at which MR is equal to MC ,
is also the level at which AC is at a minimum. In addition, if
a supplier faces a perfectly competitive market, then: (a) he would
bankrupt himself if he adopted any other level of output because,
as can be seen by inspection, at any other level of output total
revenue (ruling price x the quantity produced.) is less than total
cost (average cost x the quantity produced) ; and (b) his overall
1. In figures 8. and 9. : 'AC' stands for 'average cost', 'MC' for
'marginal cost', !AR' for 'average revenue', 'MR' for 'marginal
revenue' and 'D' for 'level of demand facing individual firm' ;
price/cost is measured up the ordinate, while quantity demanded/
supplied is measured along the abscissa.
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profit would be no greater than what is required to service his
capital (for if his profit were any larger, other individuals would
be attracted into his line of business; and the consequent increase
in the aggregate supply of the good in question, would depress
the market price until his profit margin ceased to attract further
entrants into the industry) ,
In the preface to her second edition, Mrs. Robinson
points out that it is a deductive consequence of the theory of
perfect competition that "any plant that .... (is) working at all
must be working up to capacity"'*" . (By the expression 'up to
capacity' , Mrs. Robinson means 'up to that level of output at
O
which the AC per unit produced is at the lowest level'"1" „) But
in the inter-war years (by October 1932 the script of the first
edition had been completed) Mrs. Robinson felt compelled to
construct an alternative theory of the firm, "to explain the fact,
in the world around us, that more or less all plants were working
part time" . To account for this phenomenon, Mrs. Robinson had
to reject the postulate of perfect competition (which requires, as
is illustrated, diagrammatically in figure 8. by the horizontal
position of the demand curve, that every firm faces a situation in
which the demand for its particular units of output is infinitely
price elastic) . Tims, it is evident that Mrs. Robinson rejected
the theory of perfect competition not only because she found that
its central assumption was false, but also because she discovered
1. Joan Robinson, op. cit., p. vi
2. Ibid., pp. 96-97
3. Ibid., ps vi
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that a_ number of its logical implications were empirically refuted.
In place of the assumption of perfect competition,
Mrs. Robinson embraced the postulate 'all markets are imperfectly
competitive' . Accordingly, she proceeded to revise the theory of
the firm in order to accommodate what this new premise entailed,
namely "the notion that every firm is facing a falling demand curve
for its own product""^ . The theory of imperfect competition states
that if the actions of consumers are such that each individual
producer faces a level of demand which is less than infinitely price
elastic, and if suppliers operating within such circumstances seek
to maximise their profits (and rationally pursue this end by
producing the level of output which equates MR with MC ), then
two consequences of importance follow. First, each producer's
equilibrium level of output will be below that at which the AC per
unit of ouput is at a minimum, and, secondly, the ruling price of
each unit of the sort of commodity in question will be higher than
it otherwise would be. Both these consequences are illustrated by
2
figure 9. ; here, the producer''s equilibrium position is such
that the quantity supplied (i0eo Oq^ ) is less, and the ruling
price (i.e. Op^ ) higher, than would be the case if the same
producer were facing a level of demand which was infinitely price
1. Joan Robinson, op. cit., p. vi
2. Also in figure 9», the area p^abc represents the 'extra' profits(i.e. those additional to the 'normal' profits required to service
the capital employed in the process of production) which accrue to
a firm if it has a semi-monopolistic position in the market for the
kind of good it produces0
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elastic (as can be checked by comparing the situation depicted by
figure 9. with that depicted by figure 8. ) .
To recapitulate: the assumption of imperfect
competition was adopted not only because the assumption of perfect
competition was found to be false, but also because the former
premise permitted the construction of a theory which was able to
provide, in Mrs. Robinson's words, "an explanation for a
situation in which all firms could work their plants at less than
full capacity (i.e. at less than the level of output at which AC
was at a minimum) and still earn a profit""*" . Friedman is
therefore only partly right in the first of his two contentions
distilled from the passages quoted earlier in this section. He is
correct in that the theory of imperfect competition was developed
on account of the fact that when the theory of perfect competition
was tested directly, its central assumption was discovered to be
unacceptable; he is incorrect in that (in contradiction to what he
asserts) theorems can be derived from the theory of perfect
competition which are not in conformity with the phenomena the
theory is meant to explain, and in that the originators of the
theory of imperfect competition were fully aware that false
implications could be so derived. Thus, despite the fact that
Friedman expressly and emphatically directs his criticism against
the theory of imperfect competition, careful analysis shows his
historical claim to be unfounded. For even if Mrs. Robinson had
not tested the theory of perfect competition directly by examining
1. Joan Robinson, op. cit., p. vi
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the truthfulness of its main postulate, she would certainly have,
abandoned the theory once she had discovered that a number of
its logical implications were not in concordance with real-world
phenomena.
One must now investigate the second of the two claims
Friedman advances in the passages to which reference was made a
moment ago. The second contention is that to attempt to test a
theory by examining the veracity of its assumptions is an illicit
move, because in principle no such test can be achieved. What
argument does Friedman bring forward in support of this claim,
which seems at first sight to be almost as erroneous as any claim
can be (as mentioned previously) ?
Although Friedman is anxious to demonstrate the
importance of his methodological precept to economic theories,
he stresses that the relevance of his view is not restricted to
theories of human and social phenomena but has application to all
scientific theories. In order to emphasise the universal nature
of bis thesis, Friedman attempts to prove the proposition that a
theory cannot be tested by ascertaining to what extent its premises
are realistic, by arguing the case with reference to Galileo's
law of falling bodies (i.e. 'for all x , if x is a body falling
freely in a vacuum, the distance x travels in any specified
1 x \
interval of time is given by the formula 's - -g-gt ' ' ) . At
once, however, the mention of Galileo's law arouses suspicions as
to whether Friedman is still debating his professed thesis; for
while he was formerly concerned to analyse the relationship between
the empirical postulates and the derived theorems of a formal
theory, this example from classical physics involves a single lawc
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And indeed if awakened, any such suspicions prove to be fully
justified. Without so much as batting an eyelid, Friedman asserts
that "testing this hypothesis by its assumptions presumably means
measuring the actual air pressure and deciding whether it is close
enough to zero""1' . But at this juncture, as critics have not been
2
slow to notice, Friedman changes his tune. When he examines the
theory of imperfect competition, Friedman employs the expression
•assumption" to denote the empirical postulates from which theorems
can be derived; now, however, he is using the same term to denote
the antecedent component (or components) of a statement in
conditional form. Galileo's law is an assertion to the effect
that if the statement 'this body is falling freely in a vacuum'
is true, then the statement 'the distance this body falls is given
by the formula 's = ' ' is invariably true (when asserted of
any body) . The veracity of this conditional statement cannot of
course be tested simply by ascertaining whether in actuality falling
1. M. Friedman, op. cit., p. 518
2e E. Nagel, 'Assumptions in Economic Theory", in The American
Economic Review. Vol, LIII, No. 2, May 1963* p<> 212
A. Rosenberg, 'Friedman's 'Methodology' for Economics: A Critical
Examination', in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Vol. 2,
No, 1, March 1972, p. 21 ~ "
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bodies do or do not pass through a resisting medium. No statement
in conditional form can be tested by seeing if its antecedent is
true or false, but only by discovering if its antecedent is ever
true while its consequent is false. If (as appears to be the
case) this elementary logical point is what Friedman understands
by his claim that Galileo's law"^ cannot be tested by assessing
the realism of its assumptions, then this is something to which
one very happily assents. But who has ever seriously sought to
challenge the point?
1. The premises from which Galileo's law can be deduced, (the first of
which is an empirical assertion and which can certainly be tested as
a statement in its own right) are:
(a) All bodies in free vertical fall, travel with uniform
acceleration (of value f )
(b) v = u + (e - u)/2 (analytic statement)
(c) s = vt (analytic statement)
(in (b) and (c) above, 'v' stands for the average velocity of fall
over a given period of time, 'u' for the initial velocity of fall,
'e' for the terminal velocity of fall, and 't' for the number of
time periods.) Thus:
(1)e=u+ft From (a)
(2) s = t(u + (e - u)/2.) Substitution of (b) in (c)
(3) s = ut + t(e - u)/2 From (2)
(4) s = ut + t(u + ft - u)/2 Substitution of (l) in (3)
(5) s = ut + t(ft)/2 From (4)
(6) s. = ut + -g-ft1 From (5)
If the initial velocity is zero, and if f is given the value of
g (i.e. 981 cms/sec2" ), then (6) becomes:
(7) s = -^gtx
Q.E.I).
Since Friedman uses the word 'assumption' in a
grossly equivocal fashion, his argument for the highly contentious
methodological thesis"^" advanced at the beginning of his essay
simply collapses. Nevertheless, even though Friedman's
methodological injunction cannot be cogently supported, a problem
1. The reference at this point in the main text is of course to
the thesis regarding the testability of economic assumptions. It
is to be noted however that in the same essay Friedman propounds
a second major thesis, not altogether unconnected with the first.
He writes:
"Consider the problem of predicting the shots made by an
expert billiard player. It seems not at all unreasonable that
excellent predictions would be yielded by the hypothesis that
the billiard player made his shots as if_he knew the complicated
mathematical formulas that would give the optimum directions of
travel, could estimate accurately by eye the angles, . etc.,
describing the location of the balls, could make lightning
calculations from the formulas, and could then make the
balls travel in the direction indicated, by the formulas. Our
confidence in this hj'pothesis is not based upon the belief that
billiard players, even expert ones, can or do go through the
process described; it derives rather from the belief that,
unless in some way or other they were capable of reaching
essentially the same result, they would not in fact be expert
billiard players." (M. Friedman, op. c.it., p. 521; Friedman's
italics)
In the above passage, Friedman readily admits that the assertion
following the words 'as if' is a palpable falsehood. Despite his
recognition of this fact, Friedman thinks that it is 'not at all
unreasonable' to predict the actions of an expert billiard player
by means of a theory which employs the said falsehood as one of
its premises.
However, it is surely accepted that social scientists, no less
than natural scientists, are not just concerned to obtain theories
which are good instruments of prediction, but are also concerned
to obtain theories which are bodies of true statements. If a
postulate such as 'billiard players know and apply numerous
mathematical formulas' were to be adopted as an integral part of a
theory designed to explain the behaviour of an expert billiard
player, then that theory would be incompatible with, say,
psychological theories relating to the acquisition of human skills
(which is what the ability of a billiard player is). And if one
scientific theory is in logical conflict with another, then at
least one of them must be rejected; to abandon this view (in
effect, the view that truth is indivisible) is to retire from
scientific activity.
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associated with it remains. For even if there is no barrier in
principle to testing a theory by testing the truthfulness of its
empirical postulates, is there ever a practical barrier? The answer
is clearly in the affirmative if one is talking about scientific
theories in general. Suppose one takes, for example, the atomic
theory of chemistry. Since the postulates of this theory refer to
connections between 'microscopic' processes and entities which are
far removed from what can be perceived by observational experience,
it is only possible (that is, empirically possible) to test the
postulates indirectly by seeing if their logical consequences are
corroborated by the occurrence of the anticipated 'macroscopic'
phenomena. But although there are certainly unsurmountable empirical
impediments to the direct testing of many theories within the exact
physical sciences, this does not seem to be true of theories within
the human and social sciences (with the exception of psycho-analytic
theories). The empirical postulates of, for instance, an economic
theory appear to be no more difficult to test than their logical
implications. But is this appearance in fact correct?
It must be borne constantly in mind that because an
economic theory deals only with the main kinds of causal factors at
work in a complex social situation, whatever form of test is
administered it will hardly ever be able to provide a clear-cut
indication, of whether the theory does or does not capture the major
causal inter-connections operating in the realm of events under
investigation. The great difficulty of devising a significant test
for a social theory when each of its 'predictions of the principle'
is qualified by a 'ceteris paribus' clause which cannot be unpacked
in detail, has been discussed previously; it is also the case,
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however, that a precisely analogous difficulty is associated with
any attempt to test an economic theory directly by testing the
veracity of its empirical premises.
Suppose one takes as examples of empirical postulates
the following statements: 'every producer aims to maximise his
profits' , 'every consumer aims to maximise his satisfaction' and
"each individual acts in a sensible manner, in the circumstances
in which he finds himself, from the point of view of his own economic
interests""'" ; and then one asks whether these assumptions are true
or false. The answer (briefly, so as not to trespass too far into
the province of the next section) is that these, and many other
empirical postulates of economic theories, are completely true only
of idealised individuals but are nevertheless approximately true
of actua1 individuals. That is to say, when applied to actual
agents such assumptions should in strict accuracy be preceded by
phrases like 'for the most part' or 'on the whole' which are
every bit as unspecific as the 'ceteris paribus' clauses qualifying
derived ' predictions of the principle' . Certainly, if_ an empirical
postulate is investigated and found to be manifestly neither true
nor approximately true (eg. the assumption of perfect competition
in the inter-war years), then any theory which employs it is false.
However, on account of the ineradicable unspecificity of a phrase
such as 'for the most part' , the line of demarcation between a
postulate being approximately true and being false is usually not
easy to draw. Hence the occasions on which an economic theory can
be falsified directly because one of its a.ssumptions is found to be
1. Joan Robinson, op. cit., p. 15
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indubitably false, are likely to be few and far between.
If an economic theory is tested directly and ail its
empirical premises seem to belong to the category 'approximately
true', the theory should then be tested further in order to
determine whether any of its infinitely many logical consequences
can be falsified by the occurrence of phenomena falling outside
the expected range of events; for only if the theory is subjected
to an indirect test can it be discovered whether any postulate is
in fact false. even though its falsity is not obviously apparent.
In the social sciences, therefore, the method' of direct test (which
requires a penetrating inspection of a theory's small number of
empirical assumptions) should be conceived as a helpful supplement,
rather than as an alternative, to the method of indirect test
(which requires a critical and systematic examination of as many
as possible of a theory's derived implications) .
(iii) The Status and Function of Ideal Types
The component statements of a well developed scientific
discipline cannot be expressed entirely in the language of everyday
speech. Although investigation into a given field of events has
necessarily to begin with ideas formulated in the terminology of
ordinary language, in order to make headway a scientific inquiry
must develop a technical vocabulary of terms whose meanings are
clear, precise and free of the ambiguities and obscurities which
habitually infect words in common usage. The technical vocabularies
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of most sciences (both natural and social) include terms known
as 'ideal types' , which refer to idealisations (or 'pure cases')
of the phenomena under investigation. Although the strict referents
of such terms are hardly ever realised and encountered in experience,
if idealisations should be approximated empirically by concrete
phenomena, explanations employing ideal types can often be used to
account (with an acceptable degree of accuracy) for what takes place
within the sphere of actual events.
The question of the employment of ideal types in social
scientific explanations was first explored in depth by the political
economist and sociologist Max Weber (l864~1920) . In his essay
of 1904 i> !'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy'"*" ,
he states that an ideal type of an historical situation is a
"construct .... which .... (is) arrived at by the analytical
2
accentuation of certain elements of reality" . In amplification,
1. M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and
edited by E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch, (The Free Press of Glencoe,
Illinois, 1949) . The 1904 essay forms Chapter II (i.e. pp. 49-
112) of this work.
2. Ibid., p. 90
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and in description of the way the ideal type 'medieval city economy'
is formed, Weber writes:
"
.... we construct the concept 'city economy' not as an
average of the economic structures actually existing in all
the cities•observed but as an ideal-type. An ideal type is
formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete,
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete
individual phenomena, which, are arranged according to those
one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical
construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a
utopia." 1
(One notes, by way of parenthesis, that this quotation contains a
confusion between the proposed ideal type and its possible referent.
Weber does not mean, surely, that the mental construct cannot be
found anywhere, but that its strict referent cannot be.) As
originally envisaged by Weber , an ideal type is a concept (of a
particular kind of historical or social situation) formed "by
arranging certain traits .... into a consistent ideal-construct by
2
an accentuation of their essential tendencies" . The concept
itself designates nothing actual, but to its imagined referent a
real set of circumstances can be compared in order that its socially
significant features can be thrown into sharp relief for the purpose
of historical analysis. Thus, speaking of the ideal type 'city
economy', Weber writes that "historical research faces the task
of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this
ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality, to what
1. M. Weber, Methodology, op. cit., p. 90
2. Ibid., pp. 90-91 ' (italics added)
(Weber's italics)
extent for example, the economic structure of a certain city is to
be classified as a 'city economy' ,
The methodological utility of creating ideal types of
the sort just described has often been queried. In recent times
the most damaging objection is that advanced by J.W.N. Watkins .
In criticism of Weber , Watkins castigates the 1904 essay on
account of the fact that the ideal type it proposes is 'holistic'
2
in character. Watkins' critique of the theory of holistic types
rests on the contention that although it is, on the one hand, indeed
possible to ascertain the macroscopic properties of a volume of gas
while knowing nothing about the constituent molecules, it is, on
the other hand, conceptually impossible to discern the essential
traits of an historical or social situation considered as a_ whole
3
while knowing nothing about the participating individuals. The.
question of methodological individualism versus methodological
holism will be examined in detail in the following chapter of this
discussion; in the meantime (anticipating a little the conclusions
to be reached in the next chapter), it is sufficient to remark that
Watkins' claim is correct. It is indeed the case that a social
scientist is only in a position to comment upon the overall features
of a given situation after he has elucidated (i.) how the agents in
the society under examination view their own societal environment,
(ii) what institutional relationships hold between the individuals
1. M. Weber, Methodology, op. cit., p. 90
2. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Ideal Types and Historical Explanation' (1952),
in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds), op. cit., p. 724f
3. Ibid., p. 727
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within the society in question, and (iii) what social repercussions
emerge as the (intended or unintended) consequences of the
behavioural interactions of the said agents."'" Granted the propriety
of the 'individualistic' approach, it follows that one can only
set about constructing a holistic ideal type after one has analysed
the pertinent social circumstances by investigating the three points
just mentioned. Hence, the ideal type can be of no assistance in
the process of inquiry itself; or, as Watkins himself puts the
matter (in a rhetorical question), "if the characteristics of a
historical situation have already been charted before the ideal type
2
is brought into play, why bother with ideal types?" . Holistic
ideal types, therefore, seem to amount to nothing more than arbitrary
verbal definitions and consequently are devoid of relevance for
explanatory purposes.
3
Yteber himself, as is shown by Watkins , came to
recognise the grave weakness of his original version of the ideal
type. The later Y/eber (to be found in his 1917 essay, 'The
Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics'^ , and
in his posthumous book entitled The Theory of Social and Economic
Organisetion"> ) abandoned his earlier conception of what ideal
types should be and the way they should be constructed, and advocated
instead the employment of individualistic ideal types. These types
1. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Ideal Types', op. cit., p. 725
2. Ibid., p. 726 (Watkins' italics)
5. Ibid.) p. 727
4. The 1917 essay forms Chapter I (i.e. pp. 1-47) of M. Weber,
Methodology, op. cit. .
5. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, trans¬
lated by A.M. Henderson and T, Parsons, edited by T. Parsons,
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1947) .
189.
are constructed by determining what would be the rational courses
of action for individuals to take to achieve their ends within a
system of institutional relationships of the given sort, and then
by working out which (intended or unintended) consequences of the
interplay of these actions constitute the overall features of the
societal circumstances being investigated.
There is little to criticise in Weber's own
elaboration of the use of his second (and largely acceptable)
version of the ideal type within the social sciences. As far as
theoretical social science of economics is concerned, Weber
writes that "economic theory makes, certain assumptions which
scarcely ever correspond completely with reality but which
approximate it in various degrees and asks: how would men act
under these assumed conditions, if their actions were entirely
rational?""'" . By employing a theory which makes use of the ideal
type 'rational agent' , an economist is able to discern "what
course a given type of human action would take if it were strictly
rational, unaffected by errors or emotional factors and if,
furthermore, it were completely and unequivocally directed to a
2
single end, the maximisation of economic advantage"" » Since
explanations which treat actual agents as idealisations of rational
men are normally adequate to account for men's actions, an economic
theory which assumes that men act in a rational fashion will
therefore usually provide tolerably accurate analyses of how concrete
phenomena are brought about by the interaction of actual goal-seeking
1. M. Weber, Methodology, op. cit., p. 44
2. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, op. cit.,
p. 96
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activities. Ideal types can also play a useful role in the
investigations of-the idiographic social sciences such as history.
On the subject of historical inquiry, Weber argues that an
historian who is examining a political or military campaign will
often find it of assistance to determine the rational course of
action given the ends of the participants and good knowledge on
their part of all the pertinent circumstances. For once an historian
has worked out what constitutes the ideally rational course of action,
it is possible by comparison with this "to understand the ways in
which actual action is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts,
such as affects and errors, in that they account for the deviation
from the line of conduct which would be expected on the hypothesis
that the action were purely rational"^ . (The following section
of this chapter will deal further with the problems connected with
the explanation of actions, and will examine the question of how
deviations from the rational line of conduct are to be properly
accounted for.)
An ideal type should not be confounded with an 'extreme
type' . The former .is a concept which denotes an idealised or pure
case of a certain sort of phenomenon (an idealisation is an instance
which either lacks entirely a number of the properties which are
always or usually attendant upon phenomena of its kind, or possesses
a particular property (viz., that of special concern) to the maximum
degree conceivable). In the natural sciences, many ideal types are
concepts which are not merely without a referent, but are concepts
without a physically possible referent (an example of such a type
1. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, op. cit.,
p. 92
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will be given shortly); in the social sciences, ideal types are
concepts whose referents are in principle capable of exemplification
but are, as a matter of fact, only occasionally found in actuality.
An extreme type, on the other hand, is a concept which denotes an
'extreme instance' of a certain kind of phenomenon (an extreme
instance is an empirically encountered end-point of a graded series
of entities or processes each of which exhibits a particular trait
to some degree) . Regardless of whe-ther a discipline is natural
or social, the referents of extreme types are, by convention, always
to be found instantiated in reality (illustrations will be given in
just a moment) .
■ In his analysis of typological methods, Ilempel
differentiates ideal types, from extreme types in a second, but
clearly related way^"; namely, by reference to the fact that only
the former are used for explanatory purposes (often as components
of laws and social generalisations) . Extreme types, however,
are ordering concepts employed for the purpose of categorisation
in conditions where any precise boundary line between two sorts of
'objects' would seem unnatural, because each 'object' possesses the
property of concern to some extent, Hempel gives two examples of
pairs of extreme types: that used by the 'scratch test' employed
by geologists to distinguish between 'hard' and 'soft' minerals,
and that used by the classificatory scale employed by psychologists
to distinguish between 'extravert' and 'introvert' personalities.
The two members of each pair "serve as conceptual points of
reference or 'poles', between which all actual occurrences can be
I. C.G. Hempel, 'Typological Methods in the. Natural and the Social
Sciences' (1952), in Aspects, op. cit., pp. 157-158
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ordered in a serial array""'" . Thus, if the term ' D 1 stands
for the trait possessed to the greatest encountered extent by the
referent of the extreme type 'hard mineral' (or, 'extravert
personality'), any given 'specimen' (even if a concrete example of
the extreme instance) would not be described as ' D or not-D '
but as ' more or less D ' . A second rock (or, individual) is
to be correctly compared to the first, by applying the same
classificatory criterion in order to determine whether it (or, he)
should be characterised as ' more I) than ' , 'less D than ' or
as ' as much D as ' the first 'specimen' .
Ideal types, therefore, differ from extreme types in
two ways: (a) the referents of ideal types are only rarely (never,
in many cases in the natural sciences) fully exemplified in reality
but mas'" nevertheless be well approximated by actual phenomena, while
the referents of extreme types are to be found in concrete form as
a matter of convention; and (b) ideal types are employed for
explanatory purposes, while extreme types function as merely ordering
concepts.
The employment of ideal types for explanatory purposes
within the social sciences has considerable affinity with their use
to the same end within the natural sciences. While economic theories
make use of postulates and generalisations containing terms such as
'perfect competition' , 'perfectly rational agent' and 'perfect
mobility of labour and capital' , many physical laws (pertaining
to macroscopic phenomena) are formulated with reference to
idealisations and thus contain concepts such as 'ideal gas' ,
1. C.G. Hempel, 'Typological Methods', op. cit., p. 157
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'perfectly rigid body' , 'perfectly elastic impact', 'frictionless
pulley' and 'mathematical pendulum' . An example of a physical
law stated with reference to an idealisation is the Boyle-Charles
law for gases ( 'pv = kT' ) or, as it is more accurately called,
the Boyle-Charles law for ideal gases. This law can be derived
from the more comprehensive kinetic theory of gases in conjunction
with the additional premise that the molecules constituting any
mass of gas are volumeless"'' (and that therefore there are no forces
of attraction between its component molecules) . The concept
'ideal gas' has of course no possible referent because there is
not and never can be a mass of gas composed of molecules which
answer to the description 'volumeless' . However, in so far as
the strict referent of the term 'ideal gas' is approximated (in
the relevant aspect) by any constant mass of real gas, the Boyle-
Charles law designates with tolerable accuracy the actual relations
of dependence between the temperature, the pressure and the volume
of the quantity of gas being investigated. (Experimental results
in fact show that the ideal gas law expresses satisfactorily the
behaviour of a constant mass of a real gas only for a certain range
of low densities; for only when the mass per unit volume is small,
can the forces of attraction between the constituent molecules of
a given quantity of gas be deemed empirically insignificant. )
1. F.W. Sears and M.W. Zemansky, University Physics. (Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, Reading, Massachusetts, 1963, edit., 1967),
pp. 446-447
2. Ibid., pp. 466-474
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Because human and societal phenomena are intrinsically-
complex, social scientists are only in a position to provide
'explanations of the principle' of the specific events which fall
within their domains of inquiry. Physical scientists, by way of
contrast, deal with phenomena which are inherently simple, and
hence they are able to give 'explanations of detail' of the events
which concern them. The fact that laws relating to simple phenomena
are often formulated with reference to idealisations, weakens
neither the distinction between simple and complex phenomena nor
the distinction between 'explanations of the principle' and
'explanations of detail' .
A subject-matter is correctly characterised as
'simple' , if inter alia it is the case that (i) the kinds of
variables pertinent to the determination of each specific occurrence
of the sort of phenomena in question are small ('conceptually
manageable') in number, and that (ii) all the particular instances
of these variables can be taken into account for explanatory
purposes should this be desired. Because their domains of inquiry
contain simple phenomena, physicists and chemists are not in any
way obliged to use laws containing ideal types; they freely choose
to employ laws formulated with reference to idealised cases of the
phenomena being investigated whenever it is 'safe' to dc so (i.e.
whenever the deviations in reality from what is predicted by means
of such laws, are negligible), because the manoeuvre permits them
to streamline their numerical calculations. In the exact physical
sciences actual divergences from what is asserted to happen in the
realm of idealisations, are always -precisely calculable and can
a1way3 be accounted for in detail; for example, the discrepancies
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between the behaviour of a real gas and that of an ideal gas which
take place as the temperature of a fixed quantity (at constant
pressure) of the former is lowered, can be com-puted exactly. It is
thus not a matter of dispute that when ideal laws are not employed,
physicists are able to provide 'explanations of detail' . But it
is also true that on the frequent occasions when laws containing
ideal types are employed within the exact physical sciences,
inquirers in these fields do not cease to provide 'explanations of
detail' ; for, as Michael Scriven aptly observes, "the essence
of the success of the (exact) natural sciences is the possibility
of finding simple laws referring to ideal cases that are or can be
realised in empirical cases to an indefinitely high degree of
approximation" .
Social scientists are concerned with complex subject-
matters, and hence (as was argued at length in the previous chapter)
they cannot provide 'explanations of detail' which give, information
on the occurrence of all the separate instances of the complete
number of kinds of variables that are relevant to the determination
of specific events. As a matter of empirical necessity, social
scientists have to work with 'explanations of the principle' which
can give information only on the occurrence of the major instances
of the most important kinds of variables that bring about their
explananda-phenomena. Not only are social scientists unable to
1, M. Scriven, 'A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientifi
Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior', in H. Feigl and
M. Scriven (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Vol. I, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1956, edit.
1964-), p. 538
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ascertain all the individual elements which cause specific events
within the social- sphere; but in order to give their theories a_
degree of general applicability they are obliged (on account of
the great heterogeneity of all human and societal phenomena) to
treat the particular factors referred to by their 'explanations
of the principle' as if these elements were more homogeneous'than
in fact they are. Thus, theoretical social scientists (unlike
physicists) have no option but to use generalisations containing
ideal types; in order to construct a formal social theory (such
as micro-economic price theory) a social scientist has to concern
himself with the actions of idealised agents operating within an
idealised institutional setting. Also, the actual divergences from
what is asserted by a social theory to occur within a realm of
idealised phenomena are neither negligible (in comparison with the
'acceptable' discrepancies between the actual and the idealised in
physics), nor amenable to precise calculation or detailed
explanation. But this, however, is the price that has to be paid
^or theoretical advance in the fields of complex social phenomena.
(iv) Degrees of Rationality
It was claimed in the first chapter that whenever the
object of reference is a freely initiated action, the question
'Why did this occur?' should be regarded as a request for a
teleological explanation (that is, an explanation which mentions
an end or a goal which is aimed at) 0 On that earlier occasion
in this discussion, it was also pointed out that two forms of this
kind of explanation can be identified. A teleological explanation
of the first sort is called a 'rational explanation' , and is given
in a situation where an inquirer seeks the aim or goal a particular
agent is attempting to achieve by means of his action. The action
is then successfully explained when the inquirer learns what reason
or intention lies in the mind of the initiating agent, and hence
comes to understand to what goal the action itself is directed.
A teleological explanation of the second sort is given not when an
inquirer requests the end of an action, but when he seeks the
grounds for which an agent with a given objective (or with a given
hierarchy of different objectives) adopts the course of action he
does, rather than some other, as a means of bringing about his
desired goal. This type of explanation is called a 'rationality
explanation' on account of the fact that it employs an important
component known as the 'principle of rationality' . This principle
is an assumption to the effect that human agents act rationally
(i.e. adopt appropriate or fitting means) to achieve their chosen
ends."'' An explanation which employs this principle operates,
therefore, by showing that the action in question is performed
because it is the rational thing (or, perhaps, one of a number of
1. The rationality principle is not, of course, applicable only to
deliberate actions. An habitual aetion can be called 'rational',
provided that it is an appropriate means to the given end, and
provided that it would have been adopted if the agent's choice of
means had been consciously made.
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equally rational things"^) for the initiating agent to do in the'
circumstances in which he finds himself. The general schema for
a rationality explanation was laid out in section (ii) of
chapter I ; this present section is concerned to elucidate what
is properly meant when reference is made to human rationality, and
the precise role the principle of rationality plays in the
explanation of a given action.,
In order to be able to speak unambiguously on the topic
of rationality, it is necessary to establish a three-way distinction
between (i) subjective rationality, (ii) ideal rationality, and
(iii) objective rationality . (it is to be noted that this
terminology is peculiar to the present discussion, and does not
therefore coincide with that used elsewhere in analysis of the same
issue. As regards the particular topic in hand, there seems to be
no generally accepted technical vocabulary.) If it is planfully
directed in some way or other (no matter how ineffectively) to the
achievement of a desired goal, any piece of behaviour constitutes
a subjectively rational action. In this minimal sense of
rationality, to be rational an action only has t_o be_ an_ action;
thus, bodily movements which are not rational in this sense are
1, In his analysis of rational behaviour, Quentin Gibson writes: "(it
is) an elementary logical point .. that, given certain evidence,
there can only be one correct solution to the problem as to the best
wray of achieving a given end" « But this claim is coEipletely false;
there is no such logical point. If there happen to be a number of
competing means to a given end, then it is a purely empirical matter
whether one of them is more appropriate than any of the others, or
whether several of them are equally appropriate.
- Q. Gibson, The Logic of Social Inquiry, (Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, I960, edit., 1968), p. 162
involuntary reflexes produced by, say, extreme alcoholic or drug
intoxication, or by physiological degeneration of the nervous
system. In sharp contrast, objective rationality is possessed by
an action if, within the environmental conditions of its initiation,
it is the most appropriate choice (or, one of a number of equally
appropriate choices) of means to achieve a given goal according to
the criteria of an observing social scientist who bases his judgment
upon the most recent scientific knowledge. In this optimal sense
of rationality, to be rational an action must be the most technically
effective means relative to the highest standards available at
the present time. Finally, an action is ideally rational if it
constitutes a means which is objectively rational according to the
standards of technical appropriateness prevailing within the agent's
own society. In this sense of rationality, to be rational an action
must satisfy the criteria of what counts as objectively rational
within the cultural environment of which the initiating agent is
a social!sed member. Thus, criteria of rationality form a continuous
scale of degrees which stretches from the subjective at the bottom
to the objective at the top; the criteria of ideal rationality
occupy a position on the scale which either coincides with that of
objective rationality, _or is removed from the position of objective
rationality by a distance whose length is inversely related to the
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level of scientific advance attained by whatever society is under
investigation.^
The distinction between objective and ideal rationality
is required because it is the business of many social scientists
to explain actions (and phenomena which result from the interaction
of many men's actions) which occur outside contemporary society.
Although the rationality imputed to the individuals whose actions
are studied by economics is virtually coextensive with what economic
theorists hold to be objectively rational, it is not the case that
the rationality attributed to the individuals whose actions are
explained by social anthropologists and historians can be identified
1. P. Winch, 'Understanding a Primitive Society', in American
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol, I, No. 4, October 1964 .
In the abovementioned essay, Winch advances the contention that
it is illegitimate to speak of the intrinsic superiority of the
standards of rationality found in a society which is profoundly
influenced by the achievements and methods of modern science, over
those found in a primitive society (such as the African Azande)
which is deeply affected by a system of magical beliefs and
practices. Winch states that he does not seek to challenge the view
that ideas and beliefs are checkable by reference to an independent
reality (p, 308), but that rather he seeks to deny that the concept
'independent reality' has meaning outside a particular universe of
discourse (p. 309); in other words, he maintains he does not
uphold, as he puts it, "an extreme Protagorean relativism" (p. 308),
but nevertheless he strongly disputes the claim that the European
notion of reality is correct and that of the Azande mistaken, In
support of his position, Winch argues that "the conception of
reality ...» is not a conception which can be explicated .... in
terms of what science reveals to be the case; for a form of the
conception of reality must already be presupposed before one can
make any sense of the expression 'what science reveals to be the
case' " « (p. 315)
Since there can be no such thing as a 'protocol observation' ,
all scientific inquiry has certainly to rest upon some ultimate-
presupposition as to the nature of reality. But this does not
mean that any metaphysics is as good as any other. An initial
theoretical/
Continued at foot of following page . . . . .
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with objective rationality. Both anthropologists (\hio are concerned,
with the behaviour of men within primitive cultures) and historians
(who are concerned with the actions of agents in bygone eras) need
a clear separation between what is objectively, and what is ideally,
rational. If this distinction is not made, absurdity results. For
it is palpable nonsense to hold that an agent is irrational if he
adopts a means which is optimally efficient by the technological
standards of his own society, but is downright inefficient by the
technological standards in use within the social scientist's society.
To avoid the crude error of calling the actions of people living
within primitive societies 'irrational' , social scientists, as the.
theoretical idea is not something fixed and immune from, criticism,
but is something which may be abandoned if it does not lead to an
appropriate conceptual framework within which true statements
concerning the domain of inquiry in question can be formulated.
And by 'appropriate' here, is not meant 'thought within a certain
culture to be appropriate' but 'appropriate uberhaupt' . A
conception of reality therefore, is not just presupposed by, but
is in addition supported by, what science reveals to be the case;
for if under critical testing the empirical statements of a theory
are invariably falsified, then this damages the basic theoretical
presupposition.
As noted, Winch declares there is an 'independent reality'
against which statements can be tested for truth or falsity. But
since he holds this, is he not committed to saying that Azande
beliefs containing the concepts 'magic' and 'witch' are amenable to
test, and can therefore be pronounced true or false? And granted
that such beliefs are false and that a choice of means to a given
end is more rational when based on true beliefs than on false, it
follows that the rationality of the Azande is objectively inferior
to that of modem western civilisation. If a statement is true, it
is true regardless of cultural conditions; and if a statement is
false, it is false regardless of cultural conditions. To deny these
sentiments is_ to espouse relativism. Thus, it appears that not only
is Winch's central position erroneous, but that his overall
position is internally inconsistent: if his thesis is true, he has
to be a relativist; if (as he proclaims) he is not a relativist,
his thesis has to be false.
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anthropologist Siegfried F. Nadel (1903-1956) emphasises, "ascribe
rationality to sequences of behaviour if they are analysable in terms
of ...o an intrinsic appropriateness of means to ends of which the
actors are aware and which the observer, drawing on his empirical
knowledge, can discern and verify"''" . In general, then, a cleavage
between objective and ideal rationality is called for whenever an
individual belongs to a cultural tradition in which what counts as
a good reason for a particular choice of means, is not what the social
scientist (who possesses more advanced knowledge then the agent being
studied) would himself be prepared to endorse as a good reason.
The rationality principle states that men act
appropriately to achieve their chosen goals in the conditions in
which they find themselves. From what has been asserted so far in
this section, it is surely evident that this principle has to be
understood as an assumption that actual agents are ideally rational.
Granted this point, two relevant questions arise: (i) What is the
status of the principle within an explanation? , and (ii) Is it
a reasonable supposition to hold on all occasions? . Both these
questions can be answered in the context of an analysis of the main
claims advanced by a recent article on the theme of rationality. In
1, S.F. Nadel, The Foundations of Social Anthropology, (Cohen & West,
London, 1951. edit., 1953)> pp. 266-26?
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his paper 'la rationality et le statut du principe de rationalite' ,
Popper puts forward three inter-dependent theses concerning the
logical status and methodological function of the principle in
question. These are: (a) "le principe de rationalite ne joue pas
le role d'une proposition empirique ou psychologique, et .... s'il
n'est pas traife dans les sciences sociales comme le sujet d'une
ca'tegorie quelconque de tests"\ (b) "le principe de rationalite
2
est faux" but nevertheless if the theory of which it is an integral
part collapses, "une bonne pratique methodologique consiste a ne
pas declarer responsable le principe de rationalite, mais le reste
rz
de la theorie" , and (c) "bien qu'"etant faux, il est en general
suffisamiaent proche de la realite"^ and hence "nous employons le
principe de rationalite simplement conune une bonne approximation de
la realite, tout en reconnaissant qu'il n'est pas vrai" .
Popper construes the principle of rationality as the
\ /
assertion "les individus agissent toujours d'une maniere adaptee
a la situation ou .iJ.s se trouvent"^ . (Rather idiosyncratically,
1. K.R. Popper, 'La rationalite et le statut du principe de
rationalite', in E.M. Claassen (ed), Les Fondements
Phllcsochiques dcs Systomes hcononidues, (Payot, Paris, 196?"),
p. 145 ~
2. Ibid., p. 145
3. Ibid., p. 146
4. Ibid., p. 147
5. Ibid., p. 148
6. Ibid., p. 145
Popper incorporates the goals agents pursue into their situation;
he writes: "la situation, dans le sens ou j'utilise ce terme,
contient deja toutes les fins et toutes les connaissances realisables
qui peuvent etre iinportantes, en particulier la connaissance des
moyens possibles de realiser ces fins11"'' . The fact that Popper
treats aims in this fashion appears, however, to possess no
significance beyond itself; consequently, there is no need to
refer to the matter again.) If taken exactly as it stands,
Popper's formulation of the rationality principle is certainly
(to use the language familiar to section (ii) of the present
chapter) an 'unrealistic assumption' ; that is, the principle
views actual agents as if_ they were idealisations of rational men.
Strictly considered, therefore, the principle is indeed false, as
the first part of Popper's thesis (b) proclaims. However, even
though the principle in the precise form .just enunciated is not
completely true, it is the case (as Popper clearly acknowledges
in thesis (c) ) that in reality men tend to be rational and, in
the main, they strive for optimal appropriateness in the choice
of means for the achievement of their goals. Hence, the qualified
statement 'for the most part, agents act rationally in pursuit of
their goals' can be confidently accepted as true. Human agents
are sufficiently rational to enable explanations (and theories)
employing the assumption that men are fully (i.e. ideally) rational,
to account with satisfactory accuracy' both for men's actions and
for the many social phenomena brought about as the (intended or
1. K.R. Popper, 'la rationality', op. cit., p. 144
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unintended) consequences of the interaction of their various goal-
seeking activities. (The question of just how well the rationality
principle approximates the truth, will he discussed further in a
moment.)
If Popper's thesis (c) is true (and there seems no
reason to doubt that it is), then surely the rationality principle
is an empirical proposition and therefore open, in principle at
any rate, to overthrow by falsification. But these two
consequential points are precisely those which thesis (a) disputes.
As regards the first claim of thesis (a), Popper's position
cannot be accepted as tenable; since the rationality principle is a
meaningful, well-formed, non-analytic universal statement, it cannot
be granted immunity on logical grounds from empirical test (in the
way that, for example, a bald 'all-and-some' statement is Immune
from empirical refutation) . Moreover, in a substantial number*
of cases the behaviour of human beings is such that the.principle
is reasonably well satisfied; but that this is so, is nothing more
than a brute empirical fact (for conceivably matters could have boen
different) . A solution to the problem of the status of the
rationality principle is available along these lines: thesis (a)
ought to be re-structured and combined with the second part of thesis
(b) to create a more comprehensive thesis. This new contention
would assert that although the rationality principle is an empirical
assumption, social scientists should on methodological grounds look
upon it for the most part as if it were non-refutable. In other
words, the principle of rationality should always be the very last
component blamed in the event of a social theory's failure; hence,
the principle should be regarded as falsifiable, but should be held
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accountable only in the final resort. The argument in favour of
this revised, thesis proceeds by reductio ad absurdum; unless the
proposed methodological rule is adhered to, then any social inquiry
is liable to end in a highly unpalatable way. Since a social
explanation can only be overthrown in favour of another and since
all social explanations contain the principle of rationality, to
abandon this common principle is tantamount to making the
disagreeable claim that the action under consideration is irrational
(i.e. is merely subjectively rational) . Thus, to repeat the chief
points, one needs to recognise two things about the principle of
rationality: (l) the principle is an empirical a.ssumption, and is
a good approximation to what is true, and (2) it is (virtually)
non-refutable, not on logical but on methodological grounds.
To perform an action which is ideally rational, an
agent has to adopt a means which is optimally effective relative
to the most advanced technical standards of his own cultural
setting. It is obvious that if a particular agent is not guided
in his choice of means by a full awareness of all the knowledge
available in his society or if he fails to evaluate correctly the
information to which he does have access, then although he may
think that he has chosen an optimal means to his desired end (or
desired hierarchy of ends) his action may nevertheless fall short
of what is ideally rational. When, therefore, a social scientist
is faced with a moderate discrepancy between an actual action and
an ideal line of conduct, he should attempt to discover what
influences were responsible; such a deviation will usually be
found to stem from factors like a mistaken assessment by the agent
of his own situation and/or of the possible means open to him on
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the occasion in question, or the possession by the agent of some
peculiar personality trait. (it is to be observed that when an
agent operates in conditions where it is logically impossible to
predict each of the possible outcomes of his actions with certainty,
an individual's choice of action cannot be explained without
taking into consideration his 'gambling temperament' , i.e. the
extent to which he is disposed by character to act cautiously in
the presence of risk and uncertainty-. ~)
What is a social inquirer supposed to do when
confronted with an action which is very unsuccessful? Is he
permitted to account for the great divergence between the actual
action and the ideally rational course of action, by hypothesising
that the agent under investigation has taken leave of his senses?
There can be no doubt that the answer to the second question is in
the affirmative, for one cannot exclude a priori the conjecture
that the agent suddenly became mad. However, by the methodological
maxim accepted two paragraphs back, the hypothesis of insanity
should be accepted only when all other attempts at explanation have
failed; thus, if it is at all possible, an extreme discrepancy is
to be accounted for in precisely the same fashion as a minor
discrepancy. Therefore, if an historian is faced with an action
which is so far from being ideally rational that it seems to possess
only subjective rationality, he must see if he is able to revise (in
1. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Imperfect Rationality', in R. Borger and F.
Cioffi (eds), Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences. (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1970), pp. 184-188
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a manner as little ad hoc as possible) the optimal course of action
in such a way that the actual action appears ideally rational given
that, say, the agent had just failed to notice something of great
importance and such that it is extremely hard to understand, with
hindsight, how any person could have overlooked it,"'" In other
words, in cases where there is a very great divergence between an
historical action and the constructed ideal course of action, an
historian should: (i) work out what objectively mistaken situational
appraisal could be attributed to the agent in question to show that
he acted rationally enough (by the standards of his own society)
given this perverse view of his own circumstances; and (ii) attempt
to discover if there is any independent evidence (perhaps hitherto
unnoticed) indicating that the agent actually held the situational
appraisal conjectured in (i) ,
On the question of the way an historian should apply
the principle of rationality, two (prima facie different) approaches
are available. First, there is Collingwood's view that the
explanation of the action of an individual who was attempting to
find a solution to a particular problem, is achieved by "the re-
p
enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind"* . And
secondly, there is Popper's position that an historian should
3
explain an individual's action by means of 'situational logic' ;
this form of analysis aims to demonstrate how the action of an
1. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Imperfect Rationality', op. cite, pp. 206-211
2. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, op. cit., p. 215 et
passim
3. K.R, Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. op. cit., pp. 135-143
and pp. 147-159
K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, op. cit.,
p. 96ff ej: al.
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historical agent corresponds to the course of action it would have
been (ideally) rational for him to take while pursuing his chosen
goal in his own specific situational circumstances. But is there
any fundamental difference between these two methods? In his
synopsis of British philosophy of history in the period 1945-1955,
Watkins claims that these two procedures amount to virtually
the same thing."'" More recently, Popper himself has expressed
2
precisely the same opinion. But what does the disagreement which
is alleged to exist, add up to?
Popper writes as follows:
"The main significance of the difference between
Collingwood's re-enactment method and my method of situational
analysis is that Collingwood's is a subjectivist method, while
the method I advocate is objectivist. But this means that, for
Collingwood, a_ systematic rational criticism of competing
solutions to historical problems is impossible; for we can
rationally criticise only conjectures or theories which have
not become part of ourselves, but which can be put outside
ourselves, and which thus may be inspected by everybody,
especially by those v;ho hold different theories. In contra¬
distinction, the objectivist method of situational analysis
permits the critical discussion of our tentative solutions -
of our attempts to reconstruct the situation; and to this
extent it is, indeed^ much nearer to the true method of the
natural sciences." 5
It is thus argued against Collingwood that his method of re-
enactment, by placing all its emphasis on the re-thinking of the
mental processes of an historical agent, only enables an historian
1. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Philosophy of History', in R. Klibansky (ed),
Philosophy in the Mid-Century. Vol. Ill, (La Nuova Italia
Editrice, Firenze, 1958;, p. 167
2. K.R. Popper, 'A Pluralist Approach to the Philosophy of History',
in E. Streissler (ed), Roads to Freedom, (Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1969), p. 197
Ibid., p. 198 (Popper's italics)
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to analyse an action in terms of what the individual concerned .
happened to think was the intelligent (i.e. ideally rational)
solution to the problem confronting him. On the other hand, it
is claimed that situational logic "is not confined .... to the
re-enactment of conscious thought processes, but makes allowance
for the reconstruction of problem situations which were incompletely
Understood by the agent"^ ; and that this is the case, because
situational logic is not only "concerned with the situation as
experienced by the acting subject .... (but also) with the objective
situation as it actually was, and thus with the objective errors
2
of the acting subject" .
What is one to make of Popper's comments? One should
begin by noticing that Collingwood's picturesque metaphor of ' re-
3enactment' cannot be taken literally ; one can only sensibly be
said to 're-enact' another's thoughts in so far as one is able to
consider in one's own mind what would constitute, in the given
circumstances, the ideally rational solution to the problem the
historical agent faced. But in order to construct the ideally
1. K.R. Popper, 'A Pluralist Approach to the Philosophy of History',
op. cit„, p. 199
2. Ibid., p. 200
3. Collingwood himself denies that to re-enact another's thoughts is
to perform an act of thought numerically identical with that of the
historical agent. He states quite plainly that for the historian
the "only possible knowledge of the past is mediate or inferential
or indirect". (The Idea of History, op0 cit., p. 282) To disregard
his explicitly asserted view on this point, is to take Collingwood
to be recommending that historical events be investigated by an
utterly impossible (and indeed nonsensical) method.
rational course of action for a given individual, an historian has
to engage in an objective examination of both the agent's
situational circumstances and the cultural tradition of the agent's
own society; thus, despite Popper's contention, Collingwood's
method is not, and cannot be, merely concerned with the 'situation
as experienced by the acting subject' . Indeed, Collingwood in
describing his method, explicitly asserts that "it is not a passive
surrender to the spell of another's mind .... (for) the historian
not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of
his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticises it,
forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he
can discern in it" . The significant phrase here is 'in the
context of his own knowledge' ; for, to repeat the point made a
moment ago, in order to establish the ideal line of conduct for a
given agent and to be able to account for any deviation from it,
an historian has no alternative but to undertake an objective
analysis of the conditions in which the agent in question is
placed.
It appears, therefore, that Popper is mistaken in
his claim that 'situational analysis' is superior to 're-enactment'
because only with the former method is it possible to stand back
from an historical individual, and to view his activities in the
light of modern knowledge. Re-enactment no less than situational
analysis, permits an historian to ascertain how far an agent's action
1. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, op. cit., p. 215
(italics added)
was ideally rational and to what extent the pertinent criteria '
of ideal rationality fall short of the criteria of objective
rationality. Thus, if there is an important difference between
the views of Popper and Collingwood on the application of the
rationality principle to historical actions, it seems not to lie
in the area Popper indicates.
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V INDIVIDUALISM, HOLISM AND FUNCTIONALIST!
(i) What is Methodological Individualism?
In the course of the present discussion, three examples of
'explanations of the principle' of economic phenomena have been worked
out: (a) en explanation of why oscillations of the price of certain
types of commodities occur in free markets, (b) an explanation of
occurrences of the 'paradox of thrift' phenomenon, and (c) an
explanation of why firms in conditions of imperfect competition will
produce less, and charge a higher price, than they would if they were
operating within conditions of perfect competition.
Although not mentioned previously, these three illustrations
are in fact examples of what are properly called 'individualistic social
explanations' ; the reason, for this, is that each of the explananda-
phenoiaena in question were accounted for by providing an answer to the
question: 'prom what purposive action, or set of interacting purposive
actions, does this phenomenon arise as the (intended or unintended)
social consequence in the given societal circumstances?* . A more
specific indication of what methodological individualism (as opposed to
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methodological holism) involves, is provided by J.W.H. Watkine . The
principle of methodological individualism:
"
.... states that social processes and events should be
explained. by being deduced from (a) principles governing the
behaviour of participating individuals and (b) descriptions
of their situations. The contrary principle of methodological
holism states that the behaviour of individuals should b®
explained by being deduced from (a) macroscopic laws which
are sui generis and which apply to the social system as a
whole, and (b) descriptions of the positions (or functions)
of the individuals within the whole." ^
It is clear from this quotation, that the principle under review is a
methodological precept which recommends that social explanations be of
a particular form. It urges social scientists, to cite Popper , to
take the view that:
"
.... all social phenomena, and especially the functioning
of all social institutions, should always be understood as
resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of
human individuals, and that we should never be satisfied by
an explanation in terms of so-called 'collectives' (states,
nations, races, etc.)." 2
Because (as will be seen) misunderstandings and misrepresentations of
the principle abound, it is necessary to stress with emphasis that
it is a methodological, rule governing what should be accepted, and what
should be rejected, as a satisfactory form of social explanation; the
principle is neither a theory of meaning concerning what concepts should
be regarded as ultimately elirainable from social scientific discourse,
1. J.W.H. Watkins, 'Ideal types and Historical Explanation', in H.
Feigl and K. Brodbeck (eds), op. cit., p. 729 (Watkins' italics)
2. K.li. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, op. cit.,
p. S3
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nor is it a set of political maxims advocating, for instance, anarchism,
egoism or laissez-faire capitalism."*' Methodological individualism is
a theory (or rather, a meta-theory) of explanation; it claims that if
it is one's wish to explain a particular social phenomenon, then what
one has to do is to trace its antecedents back to the action (or set of
actions) of v?hich it is the (designed or undesigned) social repercussion.
The debate on methodological individualism versus its rivals
has been a recurrent topic in both the philosophy of the social sciences
and the philosophy of history. In recent times, the question is
universally acknowledged to have arisen with the authoritative writings
2 3
of F.A. Hayek and K.R. Popper . Following- on from the classical
1. On the question of individualism as a political doctrine, see:
- K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I, (Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London, 1945, fifth edition, 1966), p. lOOf
Here the contrast individualism/collectivism is clearly differentiated
from the contrast egoism/altruism.
2. F.A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, op. cit., Chapter I,
(i.e. pp. 1-32) .
F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, op. cit., Chapters IV,
VI-VIII, (i.e. pp. 36-43 d pp. 53-S6, respectively) .
3. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. IX, op. cit.,
Chapter 14, (i.e. pp. 89-99) .
K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Hi3toricism, op. cit., sections 7, 23,
24 and 31, (i.e. pp. 17-19, pp. 76-83, pp. 83-93 and pp. 147-152,
respectively) .
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expositions, a large body of literature"'" has developed over the years.
Of this literature, there can be little doubt that the most important
1. J.W.N. WatkLns, 'Ideal Types arid Historical Explanation* (1952), in
H. Feigl and K. Brodbeck (eds), op. cit,, pp. 723-743
(This paper* is a compound of:
- 'Ideal Types and Historical Explanation' in The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ill, No, 9, Kay 1952,
pp. 22-43* and
- 'The Principle of Methodological Individualism* in The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ill, No. 10,
August 1952, pp. 186-189 .)
J.W.N. Watkins, 'Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences* (1957),
in P. Gardiner (ed), op. cit., pp. 503-514
M. Mandelbaum, 'Societal Facts' (1955), in P. Gardiner (ed), op. cit.,
pp. 476-488
K, Kandelbauta, 'Societal Lavs' (1957), in W.H. Dray (ed), Philosophical
Analysis and History, (Harper & Row, Hew York, 1966) pp. 330-346
E. Gellner, 'Explanations in History' (1956). Reprinted as 'Holism
versus Individualism in History and Sociology' in P. Gardiner (ed),
op. cit,, pp. 488-503
M. Brodbeck, 'Methodological Individualism: Definition and Reduction*
(1958), in H. Brodbeck (ed), op. ext., pp. 280-303
J. Agassi, 'Methodological Individualism* in The British Journal of
Sociology, Vol. XI, No. 3, September I960, pp. 244-270
K.L. Scott, 'Methodological and Episteraological Individualism* in The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI, No. 44,
February 1961, pp. 331-336
E. Hagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit., pp. 535-546
A.C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1965, edit-., 1968) Chapter XII, i.e. pp. 257-284
W.H. Dray, 'Holism and Individualism in History and Social Science* in
P. Edwards (ed), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4 ('The
Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York, 196?) pp. 53-58
S. Lukes, 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered' (1968), in
D. Emmet and A. Kaclntyre (eds), Sociological Theory and Philosophical
Analysis, (llacraillan, London, 1970) pp. 76-83
J.C. Barslinyi, 'Individualistic and Functionalistic Explanations in the
Light of Game Theory: The Example of Social Status' in I. Lakatos
and A. Kusgrave (eds), Problems in the Philosophy of Science, (North-
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1968) pp. 305-321
L. M. Lachmann, 'Methodological Individualism and the Market Economy*
.in E. Streissler (ed), op. cit., pp. 89-103
J.O. Wisdom, 'Situational Individualism and the Emergent Group-
Properties' in R. Borger and F. Cioffi (eds), op. cit., pp. 271-296
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pieces of discussion are those contributed by Watkins in defence of
the principle. His two main articles and his side in the justly famous
Goldstein-Watkins^ debate, comprise the main background to the writings
on the topic.
This chapter, however, will be less concerned to examine in
an historical way the contents of the various contributions to the
controversy, than to discern the main philosophical points actually at
issue and to see whether the principle of methodological individualism
can in fact be defended successfully. In order to analyse the principle
there are two important questions that need to be asked: (a) 'Can
methodological individualism be distinguished from psychologisTO?' , and
(b) 'Why should one accept methodological individualism rather than (some
version of) methodological holism?' . The first of these questions will
be examined in the section immediately following, while the second will
1. L.J. Goldstein, 'The Inadequacy of the Principle of Methodological
Individualism' in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LIII, Ho. 25*
December 6th 1956, pp. 601-813
J.V.K. Watkins, 'The Alleged Inadequacy of Methodological individualism*
in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LV, Ho. 9, April 24th 3.958,
pp. 390-395
L.J. Goldstein, 'The Two Theses of Methodological Individualism* in
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. IX, No. 33*
May 1958, pp. 1-11
J.W.H. Watkins* 'The Two Theses of Methodological Individualism' in
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IX, No. 36,
February 1959* pp. 319-320
L.J. Goldstein, 'Mr Watkins on the Two Theses' in The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. X, Ho. 39, November 1959,
pp.. 240-241
J.W.N. Watkins, 'Third iieply to Mr Goldstein', Ibid., pp. 242-244
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be looked at in the third section. Then, finally, in the last section
we shall investigate methodological functionalism in sociology and social
anthropology. There, an attempt will be rna.de to demonstrate that when
explicated ajjpropriately, functionalism is perfectly compatible
philosophically with the standpoint of methodological individualism.
(ii) Institutionalistic and Psychologistic Individualism
A considerable part of the foundations required to outline
the precis® tenets of methodological individualism was laid down in the
Eecond chapter. It will be recalled that there it was shown that the
conspiracy theory of society ~ the narrowest species of individualism —
was quite unacceptable; one is simply unable to hold that all social
phenomena are the intended consequences of the conscious actions of some
group of villains (or heroes, as the case may be) . Since this is a
statement of 'mixed quantifier' form, it cannot of course be shown to be
definitely false; one however rejects it as incorrect because in practice
it is unworkable. But all this has been discussed previously. Here,
beyond stating that a social scientific theory that fails to recognise
that not all repercussions of human actions are intended consequences lacks
one of the most essential premises for providing* true explanations of
social phenomena, nothing* more need he said about the conspiracy theory.
There is, nevertheless, another false variant of individualism that needs
to be tackled. This is something less narrow than the conspiracy theory,
but still narrower than (in Agassi's nomenclature) institutionalistic
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individualism,'*' that is, methodological individualism, proper. This
perverse species of individualism is known as 'psychologistic
individualism' , or, more simply, just as 'psychologism' .
Although the conspiracy theory and psychologism, as well as
institutional!stic individualism, operate from the ontological premise
that only human agents are the operative causes of social change, the
superstructure in each case built upon this common foundation is
different. In the case of psychologism, it is argued that "society
being the product of interacting minds, social laws must ultimately be
reducible to psychological laws, since the events of social life,
including its conventions, must be the outcome of motives springing from
2
the minds of individual men" . This theory therefore claims that an
adequate social explanation raust be in terms of the psychological
processes of individuals. As a methodological approach, psychologisra
recommends "reducing all social phenomena and all social regularities to
3
psychological phenomena and psychological laws" because, in the final
analysis, ail social institutions, roles, rules and traditions are a
♦reflection' of the psychological properties of the individuals who make
up society.
J.S. Hill can be identified as a serious exponent of this
totally reductionist explanatory procedure. He advances the opinion
many times that "all phenomena of society are phenomena of human
nature" , and that "human beings in society have no properties but
1. J. Agassi, 'Methodological Individualism', op. cit., p. 244ff
2. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies Vol. II, op. cit., p. 90
3. Ibid., p. 93
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those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the
nature of individual men"^ . Immediately, the crucial question has to be
raised of what methodological psychologists mean by the term 'psychology',
and what the relation of psychology itself is to the social sciences. In
other words, what is the nature of the discipline which is supposed to
deal with the 'laws of individual man' with reference to which all
social phenomena are to be explained and to which they are ultimately to
be reduced?
Popper , in his own exposition of what individualism correctly
conceived involves, takes great pains to differentiate methodological
individualism from psychologism and to demonstrate that these two types of
individualism can be clearly separated. An explanation of a particular
social phenomenon is achieved once one has discovered the complex of
actions of which it is the societal resultant. This does not mean that
en explanation can be achieved without reference, implicitly if not
explicitly, to the institutional situation in which the acting agents are
placed. The purposes, plans, hopes, desires and knowledge of the
individuals who initiate causative actions "are not ultimate data of
human nature ..... (for) they are, in their turn, explicable in terms of
2
the social situation" . Institutionalistic individualism recommends
that for the purpose of explaining a particular social phenomenon, the
social environment within which the explanandum-event occurs should be
regarded as given. Within a given situation (which constitutes a set of
initial conditions) social scientists are urged to show how particular
1. J.S. Mill, op, cit,, p. 572f , i.e. Book VI, Ch. VI, sc. 2, and Ch. VII,
sc. 1
2. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, op. cit.,
p. 96 (Popper1s~italics}
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social phenomena arise as the (intended or unintended.) social effects
of the behavioural interactions of a number of individuals, each of whom
is consciously pursuing his own end for his own reasons. The reasons or
plans which lie behind the actions of agents are not 'innate' psychological
motives. If a man is motivated to act in a certain way because of, say,
a 'speculative8 notion concerning the structure of society, then this
idea (no matter how erroneous it may in fact be) would have to be
mentioned by a social scientist in an explanation of any phenomenon
produced as the actual social result of the agent's action. Methodological
individualism does not, emphatically not, require that adequate social
explanations be ultimately in terns which use no social concepts at all.
Psychologist is to be distinguished from institutional!stic
individualism by the fact that only the former requires that social
explanations should, in the last resort, be in terms employing 'pure*
psychological concepts (along with, one supposes, bio-physiological,
neurological and physico-chemical concepts) . But what are 'pure® or
•innate' psychological dispositions?
psychology may be considered to be either a narrow or a
broad discipline. On the narrow conception psychology can roughly be
said, to be equivalent to physiology plus human biology. This discipline,
physiological psychology, examines and explains men's behavioural patterns
in so far as they result from basic instinctual drives and dispositions,
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nnd from bio-genetic factors and physical environmental influences.^"
On the other hand, psychology in the wide sense is what one may call
•human psychology' . The subject-matter of this discipline consists
of behaviour as it results from the actions of individuals whose entire
personalities and natures have been moulded (this is not the sane as
Baying 'determined completely') by the social situations into which
2
they were horn and in which they live.
The undeniable fact that "'human nature' varies considerably
with tho social institutions, and its study therefore presupposes an
3
understanding of these institutions" is recognised by methodological
individualists, but the fact of its acknowledgement seems to b£ ignored
by critics of methodological individualism ; it is indeed hard to
comprehend how critics such as Ernest Gellner can claim that "the real
1. The subject-matter of psychology in the narrow sense can be identified
easily by reference to any text-book of general psychology, eg.,
- H.H. Kendler, Basic Psychology, (Methuea & Co. Ltd., London, 1963) .
In this work, Chapter 5 - 'The Biological Foundations of Behavior' (pp.
80-107) - examines the rudiments of human biology. Chapters 6-9, dealing
with the physiology of sensation (pp. 111-148), of conditioning (pp. 149-
18J), of perception (pp. 104-226) and of motivation (pp. 221-268),
respectively, are concerned with what Howard Kendler himself describes as
"basic psychological processes in their purest form" . (p. 269)
Chapter 9 (of the above work) discusses basic instinctual drives and
dispositions. Among those examined, ax'e the various 'appetitive' drives
such as hunger (p. 232f), thirst (p. 255f) and sex (p. 236f), the
'aversive' drives such as pain (p. 241f) and the instinctive dispositions
such as the need for air, maintenance of a constant body temperature and
sleep, (p. 2431)
2. In H.H. Kendler (op. cit.), Chapters 11-15 fall into what may be
broadly termed 'human psychology' or psychology in the wide sense.
These Chapters are entitled, respectively, 'Verbal Behavior and Problem
Solving' (pp. 338-3S8), 'Frustration and Conflict' (pp. 389-436),
'Personality' (pp. 439-493)> 'Behavior Pathology' (pp. 494-545) and
'Social Behavior' (pp. 546-598) .
3. K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicisra, op. cit., p. 158
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oddity (of the doctrine advanced by Popper and Vatkins ) .... is that
it seeas to preclude a priori the possibility of human dispositions
being the dependent variables .... when in fact this is what they often
or always are" in social scientific and historical explanations. To
assert a claim like this in the face of what the methodological
individualists actually say, is seriously to misunderstand what the
doctrine in question involves. Institutionalistic individualism
acknowledges that the social relations of one individual to another,
and of individuals to societal institutions, are not just incidental
factors which have to be taken into account only when an individual acts
in a social situation. An individual is very largely what he is because
of, and by virtue of, the fact that he enters into a system of social
relations. if it were possible to remove from a given individual
literally everything which he owed to Ms status as e, social creature
(eg. Ms language find thus also Ms major thought processes) one would
1. E. Gellner, op. cit., p. 495
2., For precisely this reason on® cannot agree with Watkins® contention
that methodological individualism is analogous to the principle of
mechanism in classical physics (*Ideal Types', op. cit., p. 730 and
*Historical Explanation', op. cit., pp. 504-505) .
Under mechanism, an aggregate constellation can be wholly analysed
into its basic component parts and the external relations holding
between them. But, as was argued at length in the third chapter of t-Mo
discussion, the resemblance between the mechanistic approach and what
takes place in the social sciences (and other realms of intrinsically
complex phenomena) is only superficial. In areas of inherently simple
phenomena (such as classical, physics), the internal constitutions of
the entities or processes comprising an aggregate structure are not
affected by the system of relations into which the components enter.
But the basic constituents of society -- individual human agents -
cannot be studied as individuals except in their status as socialised
beings; for the social environment of which a human agent is a part
largely determines hia character. Thus, a study of social 'atoms' has
to presuppose societal conditions, wMle a study of physical atoms does
not have to presuppose any physical macro-configuration.
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have as a final residue a biological organism which one would hesitate to
call a 'person' oi* an 'individual'. It is just plainly false to assert,
with Mill , that "men are not, when brought together, converted into
another kind of substance, with different properties; as hydrogen and
oxygen are different from water, or as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and azote
are different from, nerves, muscles and tendons"1 .
If one reads through the reading list on methodological
individualism one cannot but notice that' the most frequently encountered
'refutation' of the individualistic approach is the one that first
uncritically identifies methodological individualism with psychologies!,
shows why the latter is untenable and then in conclusion triumphantly
claims the former to be overthrown. A blatant example cf this line of
thought occurs in the recent paper by Steven Lukes . He writes that
methodological individualism is the doctrine that "facts about society
and social phenomena are to be explained solely in terms of facts about
2
individuals" . To justify this statement as to the programme of
methodological individualism, Lukes produces the following quotation
from Hayek :
"There is no other way toward an understanding of social,
phenomena but through our understanding of individual actions
directed toward other people and guided by their expected
behaviour." 5
But this is virtually a paradigm case of the tearing of a quotation from
its actual context. The sentences of Hayek that immediately precede
1. J.S. Hill, op. cit., p. 573, i.e. Book VI, Ch. VII, sc. 1
2. S. Lukes, op. cit., p. 77
3. P.A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, op. cit., p. 6
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this one, and which Lukes fails to cite, run thus:
n
.... (it is) the silliest of the common misunderstandings
.... (to suppose) that individualism postulates, or bases its
arguments on the assumption of, the existence of isolated or
self-contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose
whole nature and character is determined by their existence in
society. If that were true, it would indeed have nothing to
contribute to our understanding of society. But its basic
contention is quite a different one; it is that ....... " ^
And then follows the rest of the sentence, which is the part that Lukes
seises upon as his illustrative quotation. Lukes this splits Hayek's
passage in half, and then uses the citation of the second half to show
that Hayek maintains an opinion which he in fact explicitly denies in
the first half of the sundered passage.
Methodological individualism properly understood agrees that
the actions of individuals not only have social effects, hut are
themselves the product of social conditions, ¥hile the social sciences
study the former (i.e. the social effects, particularly the unintended
social effects, of individuals' actions), human psychology studies the
latter (i.e. the formative influences - social as well as genetic and
physical - of human behaviour) » Social psychology is that branch of
human psychology that examines and explains the behaviour of individuals
as members of particular social groups (eg, families, work-teams,
prisons, revolutionary political cells etc.)." If psychology is
understood in the narrow sense as physiological psychology, then along
1. F.A. Hayek, Individualism and .Economic Order, op. cit., p. 6
2, For an outline of the kind of topics covered by social psychology
see, for example,
— F.A. Geldard, Fundamentals of Psychology, (John Wiley & Sons Ltd.,
Hew York, 1962) Chapters 20 and 21, 'The Individual in the Group',
(pp. 557-371), and 'Group Behavior', (pp. 373-392), respectively.
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with the physical and biological sciences it is presupposed by both
human psychology and by the social sciences. There can, however, be no
clear-cut division between human psychology and the social sciences -
both employ explanations using a mixture of social and 'pure'
psychological concepts. Human psychology and the social sciences should
be thought of as two different but nonetheless closely interdependent
kinds of studies with no clear boundary existing between them. Something
very like this seems to be Popper's view of the relationship of (human)
psychology to the social sciences. He considers that the former should be
thought of "not as the basis of all social sciences, but as.one social
science among others"^ .
The division of psychology into two disciplines enables one
to see that the psychological assumptions of economic theories are
psychological in the wide sense and have little to do with what is
pyschological in the narrow sense. Empirical postulates such as Keynes'
"fundamental psychological lav? .. that men are disposed, as a rule and on
the average, to increase their consumption as their income increases, but
not by as much as the increase in their income" , and the theoretical
assumptions based upon his "three fundamental psychological factors ....
the psychological propensity to consume, the psychological attitude to
liquidity and the psychological expectation of future yield from capital
3
assets" , are by no means 'simple laws of human nature' . Although
they are certainly in some way rooted in 'pure' psychological
1. K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, op. cit,, p. 142
2. J.M. Keynes, op, cit., p. 96
3c Ibid., pp. 246-247
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dispositions, as they are employed by theoretical economics they are
empirical assumptions stating how (anonymous) individuals will act in
a certain sort of social situation - namely an environment where such
social phenomena as 'income*, 'consumption spending*, 'capital assets'
etc. ezist. The postulates of an economic theory presuppose a particular
kind of social situation, and thus they are only fundamental in so far
far as the formal theory is concerned, and not abso3.utely. Explanations
In economics are therefore institutionalistically but not
psychologistically individualistic. The motives attributed to the
anonymous homines economic! are (idealised versions of) those that would,
typically be developed by actual individuals acting as economic agents
within the social conditions to which the theory in question is
conjectured to be applicable.
Psychologism, as expounded by Mill and as criticised by
Popper , has to recommend (if it is to be consistent find not assume
anything it wants to explain), that social phenomena in their entirety be
explained with reference to the elementary and socially unaffected
psychological laws of human nature. It must enjoin social scientists to
produce explanations that refer only to the actions of 'individuals' who
axe motivated by 'pure* psychological drives and dispositions, and who
possess minds that are tabulae rasae as far as societal concepts are
concerned.
A determined methodological psychologist might retort that
what lias just been outlined is not the notion of an individual
required by psychologism, but an extreme caricature. In defence of his
position, he may well admit that social environmental factors are
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important in explaining social phenomena as the result of the actions of
individuals, but he would deny that the social situation of the acting
agents can be regarded as simply given . The methodological
psychologist would argue that all.social situations are the result of
prior sets of actions and thus if one goes back far enough it must be the
case that all features of any particular social environment can be
explained with reference to the 'innate* psychological laws of human
nature. An institutionalistic individualist would have to agree, in reply
to the remarks of this imaginary defender of psychologists, that a social
environment cannot be considered as given if one means by this the
ontologies! thesis that if all individuals were to be eliminated by a
nuclear war, then society would survive them. He would also have to agree-
that there should be no part of any social situation that could not, in
principle at any rate, be explained with reference to some actions of
individuals residing in a temporally prior set of social conditions. But
does this mean that after all, individualism proper and psychologism
amount to the sarae position?
The opponents of individualism want its advocates to give an
affirmative reply at this juncture. Gellner , to take an example of one
such opponent, appears to argue that a methodological individualist has
so to answer. Ee starts from the premise thai individualism is "an
attempt to 'eliminate5 so-called 'holistic5 concepts, or rather to show
that these are in principle eliminable"' ; he then says (as was pointed
cut earlier) that since human dispositions are causally dependent on
1» E. Gellner, op. ext., p. 489
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social circumstances, if a methodological individualist explains a social
phenomenon with reference to actions within a social situation (or set
of * social facts') the occurrence of that situation in turn needs to be
explained. Although the individualist "may in some cases account in
seme way for the social facts in terms of the interaction of individual
decisions with prior 'social facts', any attempt to eliminate these
altogether will only lead to a regress and possibly to an irrelevant
genetic question of the hen~and-egg kind"* . But the mistake here is
the supposition that methodological individualists wish to eliminate all
2reference to social circumstances as initial conditions. Methodological
individualism, to repeat the matter, is a theory of explanation and not a
theory of meaning about the kinds of concepts that should bo regarded as
1. B. Gellner, op. eit., pe 499
If all social phenomena are to be explained psychologist.ica.IIy, then it
is the case that one is forced into the desperate 'historicist' position
of having to operate with the notion of a 'beginning of society' . For,
to avoid the infinite backward regress of having to explain social
phenomena with reference to actions initiated in some societal initial
conditions, one must be able to show how and why society itself appeared
in some postulated pre-social epoch when 'men* were motivated only by
basic instinctual drives and innate psychological dispositions. But, as
Popper remarks, "this theory of a pre~social human nature which explains
the foundation of society .... is not only an historical myth, but also,
as it were, a methodological myth" . (The Open Society and its Enemies,
Vol. II, op. cit., p. 93) For man, or rather his biological evolutionary
ancestor, was a social being long before he was ever human.
Strictly, it would thus seem to follow that the first emergence of
societal organisation and language as an institution (the latter of these
presupposes the former) are events that institutionalistic individualism
is, by definition, unable to explain - there being neither human actions
nor social initial conditions available with which to do it.
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ultimately acceptable in a social scientific explanation.
Institutionalistic individualists need not in the least be
perturbed about the existence of an unending regress of explanations.
There is a radical difference between: (i) the institutionalistic claim,
that in any social environment any specific social phenomenon can be
explained as the (intended or unintended) effect of the actions of human
agents, and (ii) the psychologistic claim that everything in the social
environment can be explained as the result of the actions of unsocialised
individuals, motivated just by innate psychological dispositions. It is
not the individualist but the psychologist programme that requires to
assert the claim that "all sociological notions may be analysed without
remainder into individualistic concepts or biopsychological concepts of a
certain kind .
All explanations (physical and teleological) have to be
given, explicitly or implicitly, with reference to initial conditions.
Institutionalistic individualists hold, as evidenced by the expository
citations given so far, that all social explanations require reference
not only to the (operatively) causative actions of individuals, but also
to some sort of initial social situation whose existence has to be
accepted as given, in the sense that it needs no explanation. Although
it is commonly accepted to be hostile to methodological individualism,
Maurice Mandelbaum's essay 'Societal Facts' contains nothing that
should worry an institutionalistic individualist, (it is to be noted that
Mandelbaum did not produce bis paper as part of the philosophical dispute
1. L.J. Goldstein, 'Ilr Vatkins on the Two Theses', op. cit., p. 241
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over individualistic explanation. He did not write to refute, or indeed
with reference to, any who intentionally contributed to the debate.)
Methodological individualists can readily agree with Mandelbaum that no
social phenomenon can be explained without reference to features of an
initial social environment. Mandelbaum discusses at length whether the
functioning of an institution such as a banking system could be explained
entirely in terms of the descriptions of the behaviour of individuals.
He points out that the behaviour of individuals such as bank tellers is
"unintelligible unless one views their behaviour in terms of their status
and roles, and the concepts of status and. role are devoid of meaning
unless one interprets them in terms of the organisation of the society to
which the individuals belong"^" . In other words, social explanations
require societal initial conditions - but to assert this amounts to a
denial of the psychologistic view that all social phenomena can be
explained with reference to the psychological laws and processes of
xmsocialised individuals.
What specific phenomena social, scientists actually decide to
select for explanation is subject to no restriction whatsoever. But
having chosen to explain a particular social, phenomenon a social scientist
commits himself to regarding some other social phenomena as unexplained
initial conditions. The social circumstances which one social scientist
deciders to accept as Ma initial conditions, may be those a second
social scientist is concerned to explain by reference to actions
initiated in the societal circumstances which he is prepared to take for
1. K. Mandelbaum., 'Societal Pacts', op„ cit., p. 479
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granted or to accept as given . Methodological individualism (as
espoused by Hayek , Popper and Watkins ) is thus not, to adopt the
terminology of John Wisdom's essay, "collectively reductionist" but
is "distributively reductionist"^ . According to the former kind of
doctrine social phenomena can be explained entirely in terms that employ
no societal concepts; according to the latter kind of doctrine social
phenomena can be explained only with reference to a societal background.
Thus, the claim that all social phenomena (i.e. any specific
phenomenon) can be explained as the (intended or unintended) effects
of human actions initiated within certain institutional circumstances,
is clearly distinct from the claim that all social phenomena (i.e. every
single social phenomenon) can be explained as 'reflections' of the
instinctual actions of unsocialised individuals dwelling in a purely
physical environment. For the former, institutionalistic individualism,
references to social conditions arc ineliminable; for the latter,
psychologistic individualism, all references to social conditions ar© in
principle dispensable.
This section of the discussion lias argued that psychologies!
is overwhelmingly untenable - it either fails to realise that human
nature is causally dependent upon social, conditions, or it fails to see
that unless the origin of society itself can be explained, social
explanations require social initial conditions. Since methodological
individualism proper can be differentiated from, end. does not entail,
psychologism, a rejection of this second doctrine is not a rejection of
the first.
1. J.O. Wisdom, op. cit., p. 274ff
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(iii) Methodological Individualism versus Methodological Holism
In reply to the second of Leon Goldstein's onslaughts,
Watkins attempts to make what he wants to claim unambiguously clear, by
setting down the two theses to which a methodological individualist is
committed. The first of these is an ontolcgical assertion, while the
second is a methodological prescription. In the form in which Watkins
presents them, they run;"*"
(l) Human beings (together with their material resources and
environment) are the only causal factors in history.
(?) Explain all social events in terms of human factors.
In reply to Watkins' second rejoinder, Goldstein writes a third article;
in answering this, Vatkins emphasises that neither he nor Hayek nor
Popper are interested, and are not obliged to be interested, in defending
2
a third proposition, namely;
(3) Analyse ell sociological concepts individualistically.
Section (ii) of this present chapter argued that while (3) is an integral
part of the psychologistic programme, it has indeed nothing to do with
institutionalistic individualism. One can therefore ignore Goldstein's
misinterpretation of the position in question and hold, without further
1. J.W.N. Watkins, 'The Two Theses of Methodological Individualism', op.
cit., p. 320
2. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Third Reply to Mr Goldstein', op. cit., p. 244
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hesitation, that (l) and (2) correctly summarise the individualist
position.
As is clear, (2) is not a categorical assertion, but a
methodological precept. However, examination of this prescriptive rule
will be helped if one is able to have at hand an expression of (2) in
the categorical mode. Such is the following:
(2-) Any social phenomenon can be explained as the (intended or
unintended) consequence of the interaction of the purposive
behaviour of a number of individuals (either specific, or
anonymous but typical) acting within a certain institutional
setting.
Statements (l) and (2*) deserve further scrutiny, (l) constitutes the
ontoiogieal foundation of methodological individualism. If it is amended
slightly, it asserts that individual agents are the only operative causes
in society; the societal conditions within which individuals act to
pursue their own goals are causal factors not operatively but only as
initial conditions. The social background is causally responsible both
for affecting individuals® minds, and for constraining their initiated
actions in certain ways.
Throughout the literature on this topic, statement (l) has
been exhibited as the most important part of the individualist's case.
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In his first paper, Watkins writes;
"The ontological basis of methodological individualism, is
the assumption that society is not some unimagined sort of
organism, but really consists only of people who behave
fairly intelligibly and who influence each other, directly
and mediately, in fairly comprehensible ways,"
In his second paper this ontological principle is again asserted — "the
ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people who act
more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions and
2
understanding of their situation" . This view is then put slightly
differently a little later on;
"The central assumption of the individualist position
.... is that no social tendency exists which could not be
altered i_f the individuals concerned both wanted to alter
it and possessed the appropriate information." 3
It is the denial of this essential premise that individuals are the only
operative causes of social change, that is taken by Watkins to
characterise the position of methodological, holism. Thus, he claims
that "if methodological individualism means that human beings are
supposed to be the only moving agents in history, and if sociological
holism means that some superhuman agents or factors are supposed to be at
work in history, then these two alternatives are exhaustive"^ .
however, this way of identifying the position of holism does
not seem to be entirely satisfactory. If methodological individualism is
1. J.W.H. Watkins, 'Ideal Types', op. cit., p. 732
2. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Historical Explanation', op. cit., p. 505
3. Ibid., p. 506 (Watkins' italics)
4. Ibid., p. 505
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is the advocacy of the precept (2), and if this is based, on the truth of
both (l) and (21), then the rejection of this truth-functional conjunct
can result in one or other of the following two positions:
(a) The doctrine that (l) is true, while (2*) is false, and
hence that (2) is unacceptable.
(b) The doctrine that both (l) and (2*) are false, and hence
that (2) is unacceptable.
(The theoretical fourth alternative in this 4-way truth-matrix, the
falsity of (l) with the truth of (2'), cannot be advanced because the
truth of (l) is obviously a necessary, but not of course sufficient,
condition, for the truth of (2').) For Vatkins , what is here called
position (b) amounts to social organicism, and this he explicitly
identifies (as lias been seen) with sociological holism; but he himself,
in his second paper, gives two examples of where methodological
individualism fails. Of these two examples, the first seems to be more
illustrative of position (a) than of position (b). These examples of
his will be examined in due course, but in the meantime one will regard
both (a) and (b) as varieties of holism, while recognising that only
position (b), which involves the denial of the ontological premise (l),
appears to he overtly recognised by Watkins as holistic.
Since it is conceivable for methodological individualism to
he false in tv?o ways, one has two possible holistic doctrines on one's
hand3 - holism and holism^. The former, 'phenomena logical holism',
agrees with the ontological premise (l) but considers that there are
social phenomena that cannot be explained in accordance with the
procedure enjoined by precept (2). This view therefore holds that there
are macro-phenomena in society which are sua generis (i.e. which cannot
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be explained as either the intended or the unintended consequences of the
purposive behaviour of interacting individuals), but which are not
manifestations of the activities cf any non-hunan agents. Holism^,
'ontological holism*, wants to assert that (2*) is false, and that hence
(2) recommends the adoption of an unworkable explanatory procedure,
because (1) is held to be false. This is therefore the doctrine that
society, societal institutions and other social 'wholes' or 'collectives'
have aims, intentions, goals and purposes quite apart from those given to
them by human individuals acting in particular societal or institutional
roles.
What reasons can be advanced for accepting the two
fundamental theses of methodological individualism? Two are suggested by
Watkins , but he is careful to add that these only support the principle,
they do not entail it."*"
The first reason is the generally disreputable character of
scientist (or physicalism) . It is the case that in ail the social
disciplines without exception, what count as the 'objects' of investigation
cannot be recognised by their physical properties but only by their
intentional or ideational properties. In other words, before one can get
down to explaining anything at all in the social sciences, it is necessary
to obtain a prior understanding of what tilings mean to the individual
agents living in the society under investigation, one is unable to
identify the referents of social concepts such as 'money', 'price',
'inflation', 'rate of interest', 'riot', 'revolution', 'state' and
'nation' using physical criteria in the way a botanist does to identify
1. J.W.N. Watkins, 'Ideal Types', op. cit., p. 729ff
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particular taxonomic specimens in a herbarium. In F.A. Hayek's
original analysis of methodological procedures in the social sciences,
opposition to holism, or methodological collectivism as ha calls it,
arises mainly as a corollary to his opposition, to scientisia, On this he
writes? "Closely connected with the 'objectivism' (i.e. physioalisrn) of
the scientistic approach is its methodological collectivism, its tendency
to treat 'wholes' like 'society' or the 'economy', 'capitalism' (as a
given historical 'phase') or a particular 'industry' or 'class' or
•country' as definitely given objects about which we can discover laws by
1
observing their behaviour as wholes" . It will be recalled that in the
first chapter of this present discussion the anti-physicalist position
was accepted^ therefore one can proceed without further comment to agree
wholeheartedly with Hayek in his rejection of scientistic holism. It
is indeed true that the "belief that the total view will enable us to
distinguish wholes by objective (i.e. physical) criteria .... proves to be
2
just an illusion" . Holism, however, need not be scientistic; to show
that scientistic holism is an unworkable methodology is not to refute,
although it Kay help to discredit, a non-physicaliot holism.
The second and more interesting reason given in support of
individualism, was touched upon in. section (iii) of the previous chapter
when Max Weber's theory of ideal types was under discussion. Although
the referents of many collective concepts (eg. 'demonstration', 'riot',
'battle', 'church service*) do refer to easily observable social entities
whose (intentional) properties are agreed upon by all those living in the
1. F.A. Hayek, The Counteiwievolntion. of Science, op. cit., p. 53
2. Ibid., p. 59
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society studied, the exact referents of many others (eg. 'capitalism' ,
*democracy1, * eonrsunisa* , 'imperialism', "war*, 'nation', 'race*) which
consist of widespread collections of individual activities, roles, rules
and relationships arc not immediately discernible. In cases where, even,
after one has come to understand how the acting agents view particular
features of their own society, one cannot find uni.versal.ly agreed criteria
for identifying with any degree of precision, the referents of far-flung
collective concepts, one should not proceed to reify them. This is the
'error of naive collectivism which "mistakes for facts what are no wore
than provisional theories, models constructed by the popular mind to
explain the connection between some of the individual phenomena which w®
observe""'' . Instead of vainly attempting to study crudely hypostatised
holistic entities, social scientists must show how widespread socio!
concepts can be made precis© by the employment of theories that relate
together the social connections that are discovered to exist between sets
of actions and certain sorts of unambiguously identifiable social
phenomena. Indeed, as Hayek continues, far-flung holistic concepts
possess distinct, as opposed to merely vaguely comprehended, referents
"only if, and to the extent to which, the theory is correct which we have
formed about the connection of the parts which they imply, and which we
can explicitly state in the form of a model built from, thes©
1. P.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution, of Science, op. cit., p. 54
Similar sentiments are to be found in the following:
•- K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Ilistoricisa, op. cit., pp. 135-136, and
p. 140
- K.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit., p. 341
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relationships"^" .
This last point can be understood better if one compares
a social scientist to a chemist. The latter, if in possession of the
relevant criteria of identification, can undertake an examination of the
macroscopic properties of a substance and can form functional laws
between their magnitudes, without having to make mention of the
constituent molecules. With far-flung social 'wholes', however, overall
access to the precise properties is not immediately available. If one
tries to identify the referents of such concepts by physical, criteria,
one falls 5ato the quagmire of scientist. If, when faced with wild
disagreement as to the precise criteria of identification on the part of
those in the society under investigation, one tries to recognise the
referents with non-physical criteria of one's own choosing, one's social
inquiry becomes an arbitrary verbal game - the 'wholes' have the
properties one says they have merely because* one has so defined the
denoting concepts. The only way to obtain criteria for identifying far-
flung social collectives such that the criteria have a chance of
becoming universally accepted among those living in the society in
question, is to produce a true theoretical analysis. This will explain
the occurrence of particular phenomena by tracing them back to the
actions of which they are the (intended or unintended) effects. Once
the actual connections between a number of directly observable social
phenomena have been uncovered, one should be able to demonstrate clearly
that, for instance, certain phenomena that were popularly imagined to be
1. F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, op. cit., pp. 55-56
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features only of a particular social •whole1 (eg. capitalism) were also
salient features of another 'whole* (eg. socialism). But such
illumination cannot be gained by direct or non-theoretical observation of
widespread social collectives; it can only be obtained as the result of
a careful examination of actions initiated in. particular situations and.
their social effects - i.e. individualistic analysis.
To recapitulate briefly: the reasons given, in support of
methodological individualism are two in number. They are, first, that
the subject-matter of any social science cannot be identified unless one
knows what the acting agents think about their environment, and, secondly,
that there are many social 'wholes' which can only be identified via an
individualistic theory. But granted, as one is prepared to, the truth of
both of these, they neither entail that there do not exist phenomena which
can successfully elude individualistic explanation nor that individuals
are the only operative social causes. Certainly, both reasons strongly
suggest that individualism is the natural explanatory principle, but
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nonetheless both are logically compatible with phenomenological and
ontological holism.'*"
In the second of his two main papers, Watkins admits that
methodological individualism is not universally applicable since clear
examples can be given of kinds of social phenomena which it cannot be
2
used to explain. The first sort of phenomena are probability-
situations where capricious, accidental or irregular activities by
1. It should be noted that neither phenomenological nor ontological
holism is what is subject to the main attack under the name of 'holism*
in The Poverty of Historicism . As understood by the important section
(23)t holism is ths doctrine that recommends that the social sciences
investigate all (literally all} the properties of society, for to select
certain features of the social structure and to explain only thea is to
destroy knowledge of 'reality itself a.a it exists in all its richness
of detail.
To rebut this approach, Popper writes that the tern 'whole' is
extremely ambiguous; it is "used to denote (a) the totality of ell the
properties or aspects of a thing, and especially of all the relations
holding between its constituent parts, and (b) certain special
properties or aspects of the thing in question, namely those which make
it appear an organised structure rather than a 'mere heap'", (op. cit.,
p. 76) To say that a 'whole* in sense (b) is more than the sum of its
parts is the trivial assertion that the . 'thing* is not just a bar©
collection, but is an integrated structure possessing some aspect which
one can recognise and sea how all the component parts are organised.
But the scientific propriety of examining 'wholes' in sense (b) cannot
be traded upon as a basis for urging that society should be studied as a
'whole* in sense (a) .
Clearly, no such study can be undertaken; all inquiry has to be
strictly selective in character. Since a property is simply a respect in
which one tiling resembles or does not resemble something else, it is the
case that the properties of any entity are infinite in number; thus one
cannot (logically cannot) comprehend all the properties of even the most
humble of objects such as a crust of bread, let alone all the properties
of something as complex as a society. Therefore, to urge that social
inquiry be unselective, is to recommend that social phenomena be studied
by a manifestly absurd method.
2. J.W.N. Watkina, 'Historical Explanation', op. cit., p. 507f
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individuals (eg. suicides, murders, motor accidents, the posting of
unaddressed letters) all add up to fairly regular and predictable social
aggregates. Secondly, methodological, individualism does not work in cases
where one is 'driven* by the nature of the phenomena to treat them as if
they were organic entities. The example given of this kind of phenomenon
is that of a wild crowd, as part of which individual agents are mindlessly
carried along by a nob consciousness to do things they would not have
have done if they had paused for a moment to reflect on their behaviour.
These two kinds of phenomena - both 'recalcitrant* as far
as methodological individualism is concerned - are very different in
character, and will be looked at separately in greater detail.
The appearance of constant statistical regularities in
society where no regularities can be detected at the individual level
poses a problem for the individualist. It is to be noted carefully tint
it is not particular instances of such tilings as murders and suicides, nor
the fact that the levels of such actions may alter as the general social
environment alters, that are the problem, but the constancy per time
period of the aggregate totals for all phenomena of one kind in any set of
social conditions. The constancy of statistical aggregates cannot be
explained, as methodological individualism requires, as either the
intended or the unintended result of the rational behaviour of interacting
individuals striving to achieve their own. chosen goals. Variations in
the levels of the aggregates in different societies may be explained by
showing to what extent the differences in societal features dispose agents
to act in the way in question. And these features nay then be explained
individualistically (as the result of goal-seeking behaviour within a
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temporally prior institutional setting), but to do this is not to show
why a constant total of irregular actions emerge in a given period of
time.
But what follows from recognising the existence of
'irreducible® statistical tendencies? To make such an acknowledgement is
neither a vindication of the thesis (as Mill triumphantly proclaims")
that men's volitions are indeed governed by the ®law of invariable
causation', nor does it mean that one must think that 'group-minds'
or 'super-individuals' are at work in society. Probability-phenomena do
indeed constitute an exception to methodological individualism in favour
of phenonenologi.cal holism; but since the breach in the (categorical
mode of) the principle is not very great - only proposition (2®) is
violated and not (l)the important ontologieal foundation — and only
for a limited area, the existence of such social phenomena is no reason
for the methodological individualist to become over worried.
If one now moves from these probability-situations to the
second type of social phenomena to which the principle of methodological
individualism is inapplicable, one is faced with occurrences which if
their appearances were not very infrequent, would undermine the
principle, or at best severely circumscribe its range of effective
application. However, if one has to adopt an organicist approach only
rarely, and even then only with reference to social groups whose
1. J.S« Mill states that instances of a "singular degree of regularity
en masse, combined with the extreme of irregularity in the cases
composing the mass, is a felicitous verification a posteriori of the
law of causation in its application to human conduct" . (a System of
Logic, op. cit., p. 609, i.e. Book VI, Ch. XI, sc. 1 ; Mill's italics)
The existence of probability-phenomena in society, does not, of course,
establish any such conclusion as to the nature of human actions.
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members are virtually physically contiguous with each other, then
individualism can survive with honour and continue to be upheld as
supplying, barring the few minor exceptions, the generally applicable
pattern of explanation within the social sciences. Bit how often is one
•forced* by the intrinsic nature of an explananduo-phenomenon to explain
its occurrence by postulating the existence of a •group-consciousness'
which 'wills* the actions of the individuals who are the members of the
social collective in question?
One can start to answer this question, by trying to seelc
answers to two closely related sub-questions, namely;
(i) How are the actions of social 'wholes5 to be explained?
(ix) Do social 'wholes' have minds of their own which 'decide*
wiiat their component members do?
On the supposition that (ii) can be answered in the negative, the
answer to (i) can easily be given. If the 'whole' is a group, such as
a crowd or a football team, whose members are in close physical
proximity to each other, to explain its actions is just to explain the
actions of its members consciously attempting to co-operate together in
some common enterprise. If the 'whole* is a far-flung monocentric
institution such as a trade union, an industry or a government, to
explain its actions is to explain the actions of those (sometimes a
very few) of its members who are entitled by socially accepted rales to
act in its name. If the 'whole' is a far-flung polycentric structure
such as a market economy, when one refers to its actions one is referring
either to the many different sorts of actions of its members, or to the
(intended or unintended) results of these activities. All this sounds
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pretty truistic. But appearances here are not misleading: a football
teara (literally) does not win a natch, but its members acting together
do; a trade union does not go on strike, but trade unionists do; an
economy does not respond to a budget, but economic agents do and their
responses have wide social consequences. Tims, in normal, circumstances
there is no mystery surrounding the actions of social 'wholes*. There
is no reason, to think, that an individualistic analysis is not perfectly
in order.
This 'favourable' reply to (i) was obtained on the
assumption that (ii) could be answered negatively. But is this the
case?
One example of where just such a reply cannot be given has
already been mentioned. If a closely knit crowd gees berserk, its
members behave as if they were in a waiting trance; they do not decide
to go along with the collective frensy, they just do. Hence, instead of
explaining the actions of each member of the group, it is more
appropriate to treat the 'whole' as a social organism with a life of its-
own and which positively 'wills' the behaviour of its component parts.
However, such organism-like social phenomena are not every-day occurrences,
and even v?hen they do appear their life is seldom very long. Thus, while
they constitute a second kind of formal exception to methodological
individualism (tliis time in favour of ontological holism), they are too
infrequent to be anything but unimportant.
More serious, however, is the question of whether far-flung
collectives need ever be thought of a3 having minds of their own. Does
one ever have to postulate that society itself 'thinks' for its
individual members and 'induces' them to pursue certain goals, the
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consequences of which pursuit servef unknown, to the conscious actors,
the •needs1 of the" •whole' to which they belong:? The answer, to
anticipate what will be argued in the following section, is that while
one cannot offer concrete disproof of the existence of long-lived
•collective minds1, there are overriding reasons why such 'entities' need
never be invoked as explanatory requirements.
.(iv) Rmctlonalisia - 'Strong' and '¥eak'
It may be thought that some sujjport for the holistic denial
of the ontological proposition that human agents are the only operative
causes of social change, can be drawn from the fact that in sociology
and social anthropology the results of 'functional analysis' are
presented in teleological or purposeful form. However, on closer
inspection of the issue, the claim that support for ontological holism is
forthcoming from this source simply evaporates. The question of such
support can only appear when *functional!sa1 is understood in an
unacceptable way, and it just vanishes when the method is taken in the
way its modem spkesmen urge it to be taken.
The three main figures responsible, historically, for the
development of the functional approach were the anthropologists Bronislaw
K. Malinowski (1884-1942) and Alfred li. Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1995) ,
and the present day sociologist (to whom reference has previously been
made) Robert K. Herton (1910- ) . An exceedingly important difference
between the functional analysis developed by Merton for sociological
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inquiry and the 'functionalist1 and 'structuralist1 approaches developed
by his two respective predecessor exponents for anthropological research,
is that Hertorx never asserts that his analysis constitutes a form of
explanation. (The difference in disciplines here is only of verbal
relevance; Radcliffe-Brown himself lends support to defining "social
anthropology as that branch of sociology that deals with primitive
societies"* .) But this is precisely what Kalinowski and iladcliffe-
Brown want to maintain, and it is just because they want to do this
that the philosophical problem concerning ontological holism is pushed
into prominence. Since much depends on the point that there is a 'right'
and a 'wrong* way of viewing the functional approach, the matter deserves
some elaboration.
In his well known and frequently cited article written for
the thirteenth edition of The Encyclopaedia Britannica , Malinowski
is eager to impress upon his readers that the functional approach to
culture "supplies the right theoretical foundation for the practical
p
application of anthropology" . In describing what this involves,
1. A.R. Badcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society,
(Cohen and West, London, 1952, edit., 1965) p. 2
2. B. Malinowski, 'Anthropology*, in The Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Supplementary Volume I (The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company Ltd.,
Loudon., thirteenth edition, 1926) p.. 155
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he writes:
"This type of theory aims at the explanation of
anthropological facts at all levels of development by their
function, by the part which they play within the integral
system of culture, by the manner in which they are related
to each other within the system, and by the manner in which
this system is related to the physical surroundings. ... The
functional view of culture .... insists upon the principle
that in every type of civilisation, every custom, material
object, idea and belief fulfils some vital function, has some
task to accomplish, represents an indispensable part within a
working whole."
Let us leave aside for the moment what is asserted by the the second half
of this quotation. A point of view similar to that expressed in the
first half, is to be found advanced by Radcliffe-Brown ; in a
particularly revealing passage, there is this fascinating methodological
pronouncement:
"The postulate on which the (functional) method depends
is that there are certain general 'physiological' laws,
or laws of function, that are true for all human societies,
for all cultures. The functional method aims at discovering
these general laws and thereby at explaining any particular
element of any culture by reference to the discovered laws." 2
However, in Ms systematic outline of* the theoretical foundations of
modern functional sociology, Merton austerely, and in direct opposition
to Kalinowski and Radcliffe-Brown , takes the "central orientation of'
functionalists .. (to ha) the practice of interpreting data by establishing
1. B. Malinowski, op. cit., pp. 3.32-133 (italics added)
2. 1-i.K. Scrinivas (ed), Method in Social Anthropology, Selected Essays by
A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, (The University of Chicago Tress, Chicago, 1958)»
pp. 40-41 (italics added)
- In the above quotation from Radcliffe-Brown, one notes (in passing)
that the belief in universally operative laws of society is strongly
scientistic in character. One should not, therefore, take seriously
the claim that there are 'physiological laws' of social phenomena.
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their consequences for larger structures in which they are implicated.
The entire problem concerning ontologies! holism in
functional sociology arises out of what on the face of it seems merely a
trivial point. But in fact, 5S functionalism is understood as a method
of explanation (i.e. what will be called 'strong* fUnctionalism) and
not merely as a method of interpretative analysis (i.e. 'weak'
functionalisia) , then this does indeed endanger methodological
individualism. For, in certain circumstances (to be outlined in a
moment), to say 'the occurrence of actions A (eg. customary or
institutional practices of some sort) is to be explained by the fact
that they fulfil function F * may be considered, to invoke by implication
the existence of a long-lived collective consciousness or group-mind, or
some other non-human mental 'entity' ,
In Merton's codification, of functional procedures, the
object of analysis has to be "a standardised (i.e. patterned and
repetitive) item, such as social roles, institutional patterns, social
2
processes ... etc." . The set of actions which go to make up items of
this sort may or raay not have societal repercussions. With reference to
1. U.K. Herton, Social Theory and Social Structure, cp. ext., p. 101
(italics added)
"" interpretat ion of a phenomenon (as opposed to an explanation of
it), is a description phrased in the appropriate manner; and by 'in the
appropriate manner', is meant 'in the terminology of the theory (or
group of theories) developed to investigate the realm of events to which
the phenomenon in question belongs' .
2. R.K. Herton, op. cit., p. 104 (Merton's italics)
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actions that do, Merton writes:
"Functions are those observed consequences which.
Bake for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system; and
dysfunctions, those observed consequences which lessen the
adaptation or adjustment of the system. There is also the
empirical possibility of norifunctional consequences, which
are simply irrelevant to the system tinder consideration." 1
To say that an action (ox- set of actions) is functional within a given
social framework is to say that its initiation is sufficient to bring
about consequences which serve either the vital biological or
psychological needs of each individual member* of the society in question,
or which serve the 'necessities of group existence' . Functional
consequences may be the intended or the unintended results of the
initiation of certain actions; if they are the former they are known as
2
"manifest functions" , and if the latter "latent functions"
If one is concerned with manifest functions, then it is in
fact quite compatible with methodological individualism to regard
functional analysis as constituting an explanation as well as just an
interpretation of the actions which brought them about. To explain the
occurrence of a custom by pointing to its manifest function (or functions)
is equivalent to offering a rationality (or a rational) explanation of why
the agents concerned acted as they did. They initiated their actions in
order to bring about something which would be to the benefit of each of
them individually, or to bring about something which would ensure some
desired alteration to the structure of the society in which they lived.
1. U.K. Herton, op. cit., p. 105 (iterton's italics)
2. Ibid., p. 105
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Thu3, even if one should take functional analysis to be an explanatory
procedure, if it is applied to actions and their manifest functions, it
is, from the individualist standpoint, methodologically unproblematic.
But like theoretical economists, functional, sociologists
are more interested in discovering whether any unintended consequences
of certain sorts of actions are produced, than in finding out whether
the intended results of the acting agents are in fact achieved. "It is
precisely the latent functions of a practice or belief which are not
common knowledge, for these are unintended and generally unrecognised
social and psychological consequences. As a result, findings concerning
latent functions represent a greater increment in knowledge than findings
concerning manifest functions"^ . Suppose one is examining the
ceremonials of the Eopi Indians designed to produce abundant rainfall.
If one confines oneself to the question of whether the intended result
is achieved or not, the matter becomes more a problem for the
meteorologist than for the anthropologist. But if one is prepared to
extend one * s inquiry beyond the occurrence of meteorological phenomena
into possible repercussions of the rain-making ritual upon the groups
that conduct the ceremonial, one may discover that this and similar
activities "fulfill the latent function of reinforcing the group
identity by providing a periodic occasion on which the scattered members
P
of a group assemble to engage in a common activity"
As far as methodological individualism is concerned, there
is no problem connected with advancing any of the following: (i) the
1. lt.K. Kerton, op. cit., p. 122
2. Ibid., pp. 118-119
(l-ierton's italics)
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occurrence of the Hopi rain-ceremony reinforces the group identity,
(ii) the important significance of the Hopi rain-ceremony is that it
reinforces the group identity, and (iii) the social cohesion of the
Hopi is to be (partially) explained by the performance of the rain-
making ceremony. However, because the occurrence of group reinforcement
is a latent and not a manifest function of the rain-ritual, to assert
the following is to raise a host of problems: (iv) the occurrence of
the Hopi rain-ceremony is explained by the fact that it brings (or, helps
to bring) about the reinforcement of group identity. With (iv) one is
asserting that a certain sort of actions are performed not for the reasons
given by the acting agents, but because their unintended consequences
satisfy the 'needs' of the social 'whole' to which the agents belong.
The most trenchant of J.C. Harsanyi's criticisms against
functionalist explanations is clearly only relevant to the claim that
social phenomena can be explained by reference to their latent functions,
and not to the claim that such can be explained by reference to their
manifest functions (where these exist) . • Harsanyi writes:
"If functionalistic explanations are to have any
explanatory value then it is not enough simply to assume that
social institutions arise in response to actual social needs.
Rather, one also has to be in a position to point out the
specific social mechanism (or mechanisms) by which these
social needs supposedly give rise to institutions satisfying
these social needs - and functionalisra plainly fails to do
this." -1-
But is such a 'mechanism' not provided if one postulates the existence of
a group-mind which is to society what the human mind is to sn individual
1. J.C. Harsanyi, op. cit., p. 307 (Harsanyi's italics)
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agent? Under this theoretically hypothesised 'mechanism', the collective
consciousness 'thinks* for the constituent individuals and 'makes' them
initiate (for misleading or false reasons), actions that produce,
as unintended consequences, social results which are functional for the
adaptation or persistence of the 'whole' . But why is this conjecture
so implausible?
In the case of a frenzied crowd it is legitimate to
postulate the coming into existence of a short-lived mob consciousness,
ill the individuals are in close physical proximity to each other and
their minds become 'fused into one'. They then act together to do things
as a collectivity, but afterwards the agents are unable to provide any
justification for their behaviouri literally, they were 'carried along
with the crowd.8. However, one cannot accept that a far-flung social
collective lias a mind which 'makes* prima facie free agents act to bring
about consequences that are not of their own choosing. The only evidence
for the existence of a group-mind would be the truth of a statement of
the form 'the occurrence of actions A is explained by their having the
latent function F ' ; but the truth of a statement of this form could
only be established if some 'mechanism' of the requiste sort had been
demonstrated to exist. In short, the groups-mind hypothesis is quite ad
hoc. The only evidence for it, consists of the very phenomena its
existence is supposed to be used to explain.
Since one cannot show a non-contradictory uneircurascribed
existential statement to be false, one is unable to produce a definite
disproof of the existence of group-minds. But, nonetheless, one is
entitled to reject the group-mind hypothesis as unacceptable, if no
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satisfactory evidence is forthcoming. If one does this and can find no
other suitable functionalist 'mechanism', one must therefore conclude
that one cannot explain, as Kalinowski and Radcliffe-Brown would
have one believe, the occurrence of sets of societal actions simply by
pointing to their functions regardless of whether these are manifest or
latent. To discover that a set of actions lias a latent function, or a
number of latent functions, is not to explain the set of actions
(although of course it is to explain the occurrence of the functional
consequence, or consequences) .
In that they are interpretative and not explanatory of what
produces the function, statements in the social sciences referring to
latent functions are similar (in this respect) to functional statements
in biology. To say fthe function of the heart is to circulate the blood
through the organism' is not to explain the occurrence of the heart, but
to interpret"8' the consequences of its operation for the organism of v/hich
it is a part.
Whenever a functional statement is used in the biological
sciences, inquirers (implicitly) assume that the process to which it
refers is an integral part of a complex and more extensive system such as
an individual organism or an ecological structure. Such a system is self-
regulating,. by means of a homeostatic or negative-feedback mechanism,
with regard to one or more of its properties or to its own continued
existence as a self-maintaining structure of mutually dependent
1. In this instance, 'to interpret' means 'to describe in the technical
vocabulary of the theories constructed to investigate the partial
processes of biological entities' „
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relationships.^" When asserted against this sort of initially assumed
complex system of "order, functional statements in biology are true if the
following are true: (i) a statement that a pertinent causal connection
holds (ego 'the pumping of the heart is sufficient to ensure the
circulation of the blood through the organism') , and (ii) a statement
or set of statements giving an account of the way the causal effects of
the working of the particular component, contribute both to the
continuation of its own operation and also to the operation, or
persistence of the rest of the general structure in question (eg. 'the
circulation of the blood is necessaiy for the physical survival of the
organism and hence for the continuing operation of the heart') » From
this explicatory outline, it should be manifestly clear that functions!
statements in biology in no way require the existence of dynamic
entelechies or vitalictic goal-seeking 'agents' behind either the system
itself, or the particular part whose operation is sufficient to ensure
1. C.G. Ilempel, 'The Logic of Functional Analysis* (1959), in Aspects
of Scientific Explanation, op. cit., pp. 297-330
IS. Nagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit., pp. 398-428
S. Nagel, 'A Formalisation of Functionalism' (1953)? in E. Nagel,
Logic Without Metaphysics. (The Free Press? Glencoe, Illinois,
1956), pp. 247-233
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the fulfilment of the discerned organic necessities.^" To point to
the discovered function (or functions) of a particular component of a
complex biological system, is not to explain the occurrence of the
system; to explain the occurrence of the system, is the task of the
theory of evolution.
Even if one agrees that in sociology and social anthropology,
the appearance of institutionalised actions which give rise to latent
functions cannot be explained simply by pointing to these functions, it
is nevertheless the case that things like the Hopi rain-ceremony require
explanation. A methodological individualist will explain such activities
by uncovering the consciously held aims and purposes of the agents
concerned. The Hopi ceremony is explained by discovering that it is
practiced in order to produce rainfall. Whether or not the social
scientist holds that the ceremony is en objectively rational choice of
means to the llopi's chosen goal, is beside •the point as far as both
1. The claim that vitalistic agents can be successfully banished from
biology, by no means entails the further claim that all biological
statements (including those which refer to self-regulating systems and
structures) can be translated without remainder into statements of
physics and chemistry. Although all biological processes are causally
dependent upon physico-chemical processes, this provides no support for
the contention that the former are 'really' notiling but the latter; for
the structural principles of (say) an organism cannot be described in
language which uses only the concepts required by physics and
chemistry. Since the concept 'organism' (at the very least) is
ineliininable from theories of biological phenomena, the biological
sciences cannot be 'reduced' to the physical sciences, (it is also the
case that for similar reasons, chemistry cannot be 'reduced' to
physics; and that within physics itself, thermodynamics (for instance)
cannot be 'reduced' to mechanics.)
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the general form and particular content of the explanation go; the
divergence of the actual behaviour from the social scientist's own
standard of rational behaviour, is to be accounted for by the empirical
fact (let it be assumed) that the Hopi have not yet developed a critical
approach to the matter of the acquisition and growth of knowledge
pertaining to physical causation. However, by the appropriate criteria of
ideal rationality, the rain-ritual doubtless appears highly successful:
have there not been a very large number of convincing instances of the
power of the ceremony to produce the desired rain? ; when rain is not
forthcoming, is not this because mistakes were made in the performance
of the ritual or because on that particular occasion it should have been
performed more than once? . Thus, provided the social anthropologist
argues generally along lines such as these (the substantive content of
the explanation in each case would of course have to be decided
empirically by field-research), explanations of the occurrence of sets
of societal actions which in no way achieve their intended goals, but
which lead to important unintended functional consequences, can be
accommodated without difficulty in the methodological framework of the
institutionalistic individualist.
It is patently false that a society is an organism. But
how far is a society like an organism? The analogy between social and
organic structures is clearly not entirely misconceived. A society is
similar to a biological organism in that it is an inherently complex
'field6 or 1 area of happenings6 that is made up of a multitude of inter¬
acting, inter-dependent and mutually self-adjusting relationships and
dependencies. An organism, however, can be thought of as a highly
integrated 'whole6 in the way that a society cannot (or, at any rate, a
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society that has advanced even, a modicum of distance from the most
primitive non-literate state) . With an organism the 'end' (or 'ends')
which the 'goal-directed* behaviour of the system 'intends' to 'achieve*
can be unambiguously established, because within an organism the
functional consequence of the operation of any part is both functional
for the worising of the entire structure and also uniformly functional
for the continued operation of all the other partial processes. With a
society, however, this is not the case." The constituent individuals,
groups and institutions within a society do not act together in such a
way that the (intended and unintended) effects of the interplay of their
actions fit harmoniously together to form a functionally unified 'whole'
whose 'goals' can be discovered without much difficulty. A society,
unlike an organism, is a highly differentiated structure; what is a
beneficial societal consequence for one important component, may be an
undesirable and adverse result as far as another is concerned.
As well as the important criticism that was discussed
earlier in this section (namely, that one cannot explain a set of actions
by pointing to its latent function), Harsanyi's essay produces three
other subsidiary shortcomings of the functionalist approach in sociology.
1 / \
These ares (i) it assumes that every social institution serves some
useful function, and thus it tends to overstate the efficiency of
existing social, institutions in serving social needs and to neglect any
inefficiencies and detrimental social effects of these institutions,
(ii) it plays down important conflicts of interests among different
1. J.C. Harsanyi, op. cit., pp. 506-507
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social groups which exist in all societies with the exception, of the
most primitives and (iii) it is ideologically committed in virtue of
an unduly conservative bias . A careful examination of these points
shows, however, that they are no more applicable to the functional
analysis developed by Herton , than is the major criticism Earsanyi
produces.
• With reference to (i), one finds that Kerton emphatically
denies, for instance, what Malinowski vigorously asserts in the second
half of the quotation given earlier from his article in Br-i tannics :
namely, that functional analysis should work with the "postulate of
universal functionalism""^ (i.e. the foundational assertion 8every
institutionalised action, has some functional result8 ) . Kerton holds
that it is, ais a matter of fact, just not fruitful, to study society on
the supposition that this postulate is true. With reference to the second
and third points from Harsanyi's critique, Kerton unequivocally
2
rejects both the "postulate of the functional unity of society" and
*3
the "postulate of indispensability" s . functional analysis, as Herton
develops it, neither assumes that any given society is a fully integrated
or functionally unified organismic 'whole8 (i.e. a social 'whole8 with
no serious or woresolvable internal conflicts) ; nor does the analysis
hold either that a particular function may not be diversely fulfilled by
alternative kinds of activities, or that indeed any particular function
is crucially necessary for the substantial survival of the 'whole8 .
1. U.K. Kerton, op. cit., pp. 84-86
2. Ibid., pp. 79-84
5. Ibid., pp. 86-91
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Although Harsanyi mentions^ Kerton by name as one of
those to whoa his criticisms apply, Merton in fact advocates a
functionalistic approach that escapes every one of the strictures
Kartianyi brings to bear on what he takes functionalist to be. His
censorious critique appears to be pertinently directed only against an
extreme organicist version of 'strong® functionaliom. Thus, Merton's
organ!smically tempered version of 'weak' functionalist can emerge
unscathed.. Kerton's functional analysis in no way appears to be
incompatible with methodological individualism as expounded by Hayek ,
Popper and Vfetkins .
Granted that when appropriately explicated functional
analysis is methodologically unobjectionable, how suitable i3 it as a
method for the social sciences generally? At first sight, it appears
that functional analysis is applicable whenever the explieanduro-
phenomenon takes place within an initial environment which (with regard
to one respect) can be viewed as a means-end structure and has effects
that play a part in the continuing operation of such a system. It is
therefore surprising to find that in economics, which of all the social
sciences concerns itself with the workings of clearly identifiable feed¬
back mechanisms, one only infrequently comes across statements in
functional form.
It- is not the case that true statements involving reference
to unintended consequences which affect the operation of a means-end
/
1. J.C. Harsanyi, op. cit., p. 305
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system (i.e. consequences sociologists call 'latent functions'), and which
result from the interplay of actions directed towards the achievement of
economic ends, cannot be constructed. For example, take the following:
(i) The function of the price system is to ensure that whatever
is demanded is actually supplied, and whatever is supplied
is actually demanded.
(ii) The function of the activity of saving is to (help to)
provide a fund from which, by the process of competition,
the profitable industries can obtain necessary investment
capital.
In principle, these are quite in order. The price system is not like an
army; it is not a conscious creation (purposively designed to procure
a number of pre-determined goals), but is a spontaneous system of
unintended polycentric order arising as the result of many men, groups
and institutions rationally pursuing their own different economic goals.
It also succeeds, to a greater or lesser degree, in carrying out th®
function imputed to it. It is likewise the case that raen do not save
(i.e. abstain from immediate consumption) for the purpose of providing
industry with investment capital, they do it to secure a monetary return
in the future for themselves. But their actions to this desired end,
nevertheless, have the unintended (but not, of course, unrecognised)
consequence of supplying industry with a source of capital upon which it
can draw for its investment requirements. The fact that the investment
needs of industry can thus be met, ensures that many individuals in the
future will be in a position to undertake acts of saving.
Despite their truth, statements such as (i) and (ii) are
not often to be found in economic literature. The reason is that there
is simply a difference in the emphasis of interest between sociologists
and economists. The latter are primarily interested in discovering
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social generalisations which will enable them to explain and predict the
societal repercussions of the initiation of certain kinds of actions
thin a particular means-end structure (such as the price system), the
existence and general properties of which are taken for granted. On the
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other hand, functional sociologists do not restrict their investigations
to the task of establishing generalisations concerning phenomena which
result from the rationed pursuit of economic goals; they are concerned,
inter alia, to learn what specific environmental conditions must prevail,
in order that a particular means-end structure (eg. an economic, legal
or political system) in a given society may persist through time.
What final assessment should be made of methodological
individualism? To make sense of the principle (it will be recalled),
it should on no account be viewed as the social scientific correlate of
mechanism in classical physics; for if this is done, then the way is
open for an identification of the principle with the highly
unsatisfactory position of psychologisra. If however the principle is
correctly understood, then it indeed seems to be the case that (for the
vast majority of societal phenomena), methodological individualism
enjoins social scientists to adopt the appropriate explanatory pattern;
that is to say, it recommends that every social scientific explanation
should be formulated as an. answer to the question; 'Prom the interaction
of what set of purposive actions, does this phenomenon result as the
(intended or unintended) effect in this institutional setting?' .
VI CONCLUSION
We shall now briefly bring together the main results
of the present inquiry into the nature of the social sciences and
their methods of explanation.
It has been argued that all social explanation is
concerned (directly or indirectly) with the activities of human
agents attempting to achieve their ends within a given institutional
setting. The social sciences have nothing to say about the actions
of unsocialised men or of individuals as they would be if unaffected
by contact with any society. Human beings, indeed, are what they
are and 3.argely behave the way they do because their minds have been
moulded by the society into which they were born and reared. In a
clear sense, therefore, a society does not merely exist outside men
but resides within them as well.
The process of explaining social phenomena takes place
on two closely inter-connected levels. On the lower level, we are
concerned to explain single actions. To show why a single action
occurred, we give either a rational explanation (if our aim is simply
to indicate the intention in the mind of the agent who initiated the
action in question) or a rationality explanation (if our aim is to
show why the agent acted one way rather than another to achieve his
goal or goals within the circumstances in which he found himself).
The central and most controversial component of the latter (and more
commonly encountered) of these two types of explanation is the
•principle of rationality'. On the higher level, we seek to explain
the societal consequences of the purposive activities and behavioural
interactions of many men. To account for such phenomena (the main
sort of interest to economics, sociology and political science) it
is appropriate to employ an individualistic analysis. Within this
kind of analysis, the concept 'unintended consequence' plays a major
role; there is, however, no need to follow Popper and Hayek in
virtually identifying the subject-matter of the social sciences with
the results of human action which are not the results of human
design. We can hold that the unintended repercussions of intentional
human action bulk large among the social phenomena worth studying,
without having to assent to the view that the undesigned results of
human action are the only social phenomena worth studying.
Of the social sciences which aspire to the status of a
theoretical science, economics is manifestly the most successful.
This discipline examines the actions by which scarce resources are
used to satisfy competing human needs and desires, and the immediate
societal consequences (both intended and unintended) of these actions
thus, a particular phenomenon is called 'economic' if it is involved
in a process of valuation for the purposes of exchange. Because
such valuations can be expressed in money terms (i.e. as market
prices), the diverse and heterogeneous objects and activities upon
which the market mechanism bestows a value can be measured
quantitatively and rendered amenable to linear addition. Since a
clear conception is available of the respect in which all economic
phenomena can be viewed as similar (i.e. as possessors of some
measure of monetary valuation), a theoretical science of such
phenomena is possible.
Although much of economic theory can be presented in
mathematical form, this should not lead us to think that economics
is able to give 'explanations of detail' of the events which fall
within its province. All social phenomena are inherently complex;
that is to say, all social phenomena are brought about by a large
number of factors, only a few of which can possibly be taken into
consideration for the purposes of explanation. But even though we
should not expect to achieve 'explanations of detail' of human and
societal events, we may hope to obtain 'explanations of the
principle' upon which our explananda-phenomena are produced. An
'explanation of the principle' does not enable us to account for
the precise properties possessed by a specific economic phenomenon,
but it does permit us to show why the phenomenon in question is a
member of a particular range of events rather than a member of some
other range.
Finally (and perhaps most important of all), it should
be mentioned that whenever reference is made to the causation of
social phenomena one must not think that the use of the term
'causation' implies that human actions (and the societal consequences
resulting from them) are produced in precisely the same fashion as
physical events. Human individuals, unlike physical objects and
processes, are rationally purposive agents who are moved to act
because their minds interpret the behaviour of other men and their
own environmental conditions in certain ways. Hence, social
scientists are only in a position to identify the causes and effects
extant in a given social situation after they have acquired an
understanding of how the agents under investigation view themselves
and their society. That the social sciences deal with meaningful
(as opposed to purely physical) phenomena, is the source of most of
the special difficulties associated with the study of human and
societal phenomena; for example, since social phenomena are in a
sense constituted by thoughts, the possibility is ever-present that
one's predictions of such phenomena will be controverted because
the act of prediction has itself become a relevant causal influence.
It is therefore reasonable to contend that a golden rule for social
scientists is this: Remember that what is being studied belongs to
a different order from what the natural scientist studies, and that
accordingly questions asked of social phenomena should be appropriate
to the basic nature of such phenomena„
268.
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